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Abstract
This thesis uses the data from two experiments to investigate the nientai representations
underlying syllogistic reasoning. The first takes the standard syllogisms task but adds a
recall component, the second consists of an entirely new syllogistic reasoning paradigm:
seeking valid individuals.
The main effects found centre on the explanation for the figural effect and the status
of agglomerated representations as an explanation for responses to syllogisms. Subjects
who do not use an agglomerated representation show a figural effect - this throws doubt
on explanations of this phenomenon based on the transitive arrangement of an agglom¬
erated representation. Analysis reveals that subjects seem to interpret the syllogism at
a linguistic level initially and derive a likely topic for the argument of the syllogism.
The representation must also include information about the potential of t he syllogism
to "cancel"' the middle term. If the syllogism does not cancel, then this will either cause
effects similar to those found for indeterminate texts or with the individuals task help
subjects to determine whether syllogisms possess a valid conclusion or not.
Strong order effects for positive and negative information are found in both experi¬
ments and this preference also has an effect on the reasoning data, similar to the ligural
effect. The information in the syllogism must therefore be reordered before a conclusion
is given, to satisfy this preference.
Many subjects do appear to use an agglomerated representation plus eye les of testing
to solve syllogisms, but the representation they use must contain linguistic information
about topic, and will be reordered so that positive information precedes negative. Ag¬
glomerated representations are probably equivalent at the level of coding common to
all subjects, the differences apparent to introspection will depend on the particular
instantiation chosen by the subject.
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1.1 Human Reasoning
The study of mental processes is as old as the discipline of psychology. Early work
on the structure of memory and some of the earliest strictly experimental work in
psychology was carried out by Ebbinghaus (1964. originally published in 1885) who
laid the foundations for much of the later work in the field and who first yielded the
observation that familiar and meaningfully connected material is easier to commit to
memory than material which is meaningless and unconnected. Later work by Bartlett
(1932) demonstrated that memory is constructive - that when attempting to recall
rather abstruse material, people will make errors that demonstrate that they are actively
reconstructing what they recall having read or seen to fit the information in better with
their own conceptions or experience.
Theories of learning, the process of which memory is the result, have been strongly
influenced by the behaviourist school of psychology which originates at least in part
from the work of Pavlov on conditioned reflexes in dogs. These theories have in com¬
mon a conception of human behaviour as being the predictable response to an external
stimulus. The early behaviourists (Skinner for example) professed t homselves interested
only in the observable elements of behavions and not in the part between stimulus and
response, the element of cognition. As experimental technicians have been refined it has
become possible to make more and more of that hidden process observable and more
and more complex descriptive models, such as mathematical models for example, have
been used to characterise the learning process, but the underlying model ol cognition as
a process of taking information (stimulus) and transforming it (response) has persisted.
The similarity of this to the way information is processed by a computer has led to
efforts to formulate human thinking based on the methods used to program computer
systems.
The information-processing conception of human reasoning relies on elements of com¬
puter programming to explain how humans might go about solving problems, under¬
standing language or even negotiate social exchanges. The first significant attempt
to simulate a human cognitive process in terms of computer architecture was made by
Newell and Simon (1956) who developed an information processing model to prove theo¬
rems in symbolic logic and subsequent research has found much of value in the computer
I
metaphor, as an example of information processing that is transparent to research in
the best behaviourist tradition, by virtue of the fact that it is a human artefact.
1.1.1 Reasoning and resource limitation
As the metaphor of the serial computer has become popular in cognitive psychology, so
its limitations as an explanatory model have become apparent. There are many aspects
of human cognitive performance that simply cannot be captured on a computer of this
type. One of the main reasons for this lies in one of the most basic features of the
machine: its memory. A serial computer will forget nothing that it is not programmed
to delete and possesses no intrinsic facility for processing tiie information it receives,
so as to create a memory store that is meaningfully structured. Although humans
also possess a possibly infinite store for long term events, the information within it is
arranged so as to be accessible from a number of different points and as the result of a
number of different searches. The part of our memory that does not act as a permanent
store - working memory - has a very limited size. In a now-famous paper. Miller ( 1957)
established that working memory could contain seven units +/ two units of information
at any given time. It was already known that working memory spontaneously starts to
decay after a few seconds without rehearsal to maintain the information in it. I hese
phenomena can only be replicated in a serial computer by artificially creating limits on
memory size and duration and no way has yet been found of simulating the transfer
from working to long-term memory in such a way as to structure ihe information in the
appropriate form.
The importance of the limitations on the computer metaphor becomes very obvious
when attempts are made to model human reasoning on a serial machine1. There are
certain tasks that humans find particularly difficult-:- complex mental arithmetic, for
example, and the reason for this difficulty appears to lie in the limits on working mem¬
ory. In the case of mental arithmetic, we are incapable of computing the next stage in
the process before the information from the proceeding stage has started to fade. As a
contrast, a serial computer, once properly programmed has no difficulty at all wit h such
tasks as there are 110 limits on its memory, hence the popularity of pocket calculators.
Conversely there are human functions such as understanding speech, which we perform
A serial computer is taken to mean a computer programmed as a serial computer
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effortlessly, but which have resisted attempts at computer simulation to the present
day. While we may have developed special perceptual mechanisms for such processes,
the form of our storage and retrieval mechanisms in long-term memory must also play
a part. This should come as no surprise given that the earliest research by Hail let t.
already referred to above, found exactly that human recall is not a simple matter of
certain items just being deleted from memory, perhaps by interference, but of elabo¬
ration and reconstruction. Further, work such as that by Sachs (1967) and Jarvella
(1971) demonstrates that not all information is treated equally in memory - that some
information is more readily lost than others and this in turn has led in part to a model
of language processing and memory being undertaken at a series of levels (for example
Kintsch (1974)) with syntactic information being lost from memory rather readily but
the essential semantic content of the information being preserved. This taken with the
finding of Bransford and Franks (1971) that language is only readily understandable
when it is presented in a context that makes it meaningful tends to work against the
idea that human processing works similarly to simple computer models which take in
information without surrounding context, treating all parts of the message with equal
importance.
It is clear that an understanding of memory is essential for a proper understanding
of cognitive functions. Further, to understand why humans find certain reasoning tasks
difficult, we must appeal to the notion of resource limitation, the operation of context
and the prioritisation of information for storage in memory as sources of error.
1.1.2 Reasoning and context
In the previous section reference was made to the fact that a language function such as
speech recognition was difficult to model on a serial computer and t hat t his was probably
due to some characteristic features of human memory. It may be the case ihat in order
to successfully carry out the functions of language, which are immensely complicated,
we have developed particular kinds of mental systems, which function not on the basis
of logical operations, but on the basis of complex heuristics derived from repeated
experience. Language, being our most effective means of communication has developed
in such a way as to reduce ambiguity in the message to be transmitted. However the
complexity of the situations we attempt to communicate about means thai the receiver
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of language must attempt to exclude ambiguity as much as the deliverer. This can be
done by making certain assumptions; these might be about the communicative intentions
of the speaker, derived from a. knowledge of the speaker; the situation one is in (the
context of the speech) and certain conventions all users of language assume to be in
operation, summarised by Grice (1975) in the form of conversational implicatures. All
this information and the inferences that can be drawn from it must be built up from
repeated language experiences and stored in such a way that everything relevant to a
conversation can be activated once speech begins.
Because language has such a central importance to humans, it is reasonable to sup¬
pose that the processes we use for language function affect other aspects of our mental
functioning that, while not directly derived from language, are related to it. Theories ol
reasoning have found that, apart from error due to resource limitation, humans adopt a
particular perspective to some logical problems that lead them to draw non-logical in¬
ferences. One example of this is the selection task extensively studied by VYason ( 1965).
This problem consists of subjects being presented with four cards each of which has
something printed on both sides. But they are only able to see one side of each card.
They are asked to verify a rule which stales a condition about the nature of the items
printed on the cards. They are asked to do this by indicating the smallest number of
cards that they would need to turn over to verify or falsify the rule. In the abstract
condition, the ride might be "if there is a vowel on one side of the card, there must
be an odd number on the other". Subjects have four cards, one with a vowel; one an
odd number; one an even number and one a consonant on the visible side. The over¬
whelming response from naive subjects is to choose the card with the vowel on one side
and the card with the odd number. Clearly subjects are making the inference that the
rule is reversible, that if p~>q then q->p. This is not warranted by the rule. Subjects
also fail to make the inference that not q-> not p and therefore fail to (heck this by
turning over the card with the even number to see that it does not have a vowel on its
reverse. Once subjects have discovered the correct response they are able to perform
the task correctly without difficulty, but their initial approach to the problem is very
often incorrecl.
This finding suggests that subjects are unable to use standard logic appropriately.
Evans (1973) found that rather than using a verlicationist strategy, subjects were choos-
ing cards on the basis of "matching" the items in the rule to t hose on the card indicating
that subjects are using a non-logical strategy to solve the problem. The effect of the
content of the problem on performance has also been studied, with the finding that,
although using real-life materials aids reasoning it does not do so in every paradigm. A
comprehensive study of this problem and conditional reasoning in general by Oaksford
(1988) has shown that subjects' failure to grasp the requirements of the task and the
relationship of content to reasoning can be explained by a model of the reasoner as
searching for a suitable context in which to situate the rule2. Falsification is not used as
a strategy unless taught as a method because it is not a useful means of communicating
information. The ability to use falsification is increased by situating the rule in context
where the reasoner has had the opportunity to experience the negated implication of
t he rule
Human reasoning does not proceed along the lines of predicate logic, t hereto re. pa it I y
because we are unable to keep in mind all the ramifications that such problems require
and partly because we bring to reasoning problems a particular set of strategies and
priorities that have been developed for successful language use. To understand human
performance at a reasoning problem it is crucial to identify the elfect these strategies
might have and to bear in mind that a ny gi ven reasoni ng problem \\i 11 fi rst-and -foremost
be interpreted as an attempt at communication.
1.2 Investigating Human Reasoning
The discussion above should serve to illustrate that the interface between natural lan¬
guage processing and reasoning is deserving of further investigation. Firstly there is the
observation that people do not always adopt a rational strategy when faced with some
forms of logical problem, but that a significant proportion of them make predictable
errors when attempting to solve such problems. Secondly there is the observation that
features of natural language processing appear to provide a possible explanation for
subjects' behaviour, as has been the case with the four-card problem. At this point it
is appropriate to set the agenda for the work which follows in terms of the proposition
that human reasoning is to some extent dependent and affected by strategies adopted
2Similar effects have been found for syllogisms, beginning witli W ilkins (IUJX) and recently Oakiiill
et al (1989).
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for language comprehension. To take the matter further, it could he argued that im¬
portant insights into natural language processing could be gained by observing people's
performance on reasoning problems given that the errors they make will be at least in
part the consequence of the natural language strategies they use for everyday commu¬
nication. The evidence already outlined above and some of the discussion below (see
especially Newstead's work) support such an argument and pave t he way for a detailed
examination of these issues.
With these aims in mind, the way forward would seem to be to build on the findings
from the four-card problem and investigate human performance in relation toother rea¬
soning tasks. A view of human reasoning is being adopted which assumes that cognitive
processes are highly "transparent", that is that they are open to examination directly
and it could be argued that this is not the case, however it seems unreasonable to argue
that, two functions of human cognition, language processing and deductive reasoning,
could be conducted by two completely separate and unrelated sets of procedures. It
also seems unreasonable to believe that these processes are completely or even largely
opaque and that experimental results can give us nothing beyond superficial information
about how these processes are carried out. It is essential to a "top-down" approach to
take 011 trust that these operations can be described meaningfully at the macro-level
and the success of other studies of this kind in using such methods to explain aspects
of human reasoning should bear testament to the persuasiveness of this approach.
To proceed a reasoning problem mttsi be chosen that has certain specific features.
These can be listed as being:-
• The problems must require reasoning to be solved correctly
• There must not be too high or too low a ceiling on the difficulty of the problem -
subjects must be able to solve some of 1 lie problems but have a reasonable risk of
making a.11 error
• The problems must to stateable in language used for everyday communication -
mental arithmetic would not be suitable for example
• There must be sufficient numbers of the problems to obtain a suitable number of
cases per subject
b
• Specifically with reference to the examination of memory effects and reasoning,
the problems must be similar enough that they can be confused in memory during
a recall la.sk. but not so similar that they cannot be distinguished. There should
preferably be some part of the problem that can be used as a cue for recall and
therefore is unique to each problem.
For these reasons the set of reasoning problems known as syllogisms wore chosen as
a means to study how the way in which humans approach reasoning problems might be
bound up in the requirements of language comprehension.
This brief description of the structure of syllogisms demonstrates why this subset of
logical problems have been chosen for study in line with the ex pressed aims of t his work.
The criteria laid out in the preceding section are all fulfilled: these problems are not of
uniform difficulty, therefore subjects have a reasonable chance of answering some but
not all of the problems correc tly and reasoning is required to solve t he problems, so t hat
the performance of subjects not using logic to solve the problems can be distinguished
from those that are using logic. Syllogisms as will be shown in the section that follows,
can be stated i n language that might be used to convey i n forma I ion in ol her set tings and
therefore should activate the language strategies of the subjects and t he\ can contain
unique information that can be used as a cue for recall, by replacing the abstract "A".
"B" and "C" with nouns signifying distinct groups, such as professions, nationalities or
pastimes.
1.3 Syllogisms
Syllogisms are a set of logical problems invented by Aristotle. They were used as a form
of argument during the middle ages and during this century have been of interest to
cognitive psychologists for a variety of reasons. Kacli syllogism consists of a predicate
(P). middle (M) and subject (S) term which are arranged into two premises, each of
which contains a quantifier describing the relationship between the nouns. An example
is given in Figure 1.1
To correctly solve a syllogism t he reader must eit her decide whet her a valid concl usion
follows from the premises and give a correct valid conclusion if one does, or determine
whether a given conclusion follows from the premises. A valid concl usion is a relationship
"All the M are IV
"All the S are M."




BA-BC' None No Valid Conclusion
BA-C'B Some..not
Figure 1.2: Possible components of a syllogism
between the subject and predicate terms which cannot be falsified by any interpretation
of the syllogism. Some early studies only allowed one form of conclusion to be considered
correct, that of the form "All S are P" for example. Later work has allowed conclusions
of the form "All P are S" to be considered correct also' . Figure 1.2 gives the four
ways the nouns can be arranged in each syllogism, the four quantifiers and the types ol
conclusion that can be drawn.
There are sixteen possible pairs of quantifiers that could be used in each syllogism
and given the four possible figures, there are sixty-four possible syllogisms that can be
evaluated. Of these, twenty-seven have valid conclusions of the form ,\-c or c \ and
thirty-seven have no valid conclusion.
1.4 Theories of Syllogistic Reasoning
Syllogisms would be of little interest to psychologist were it not observable on casual
inspection that they are not uniform in their difficulty. The very easiest syllogisms are
very easy indeed, the very hardest very rarely solved correctly. From a logical point ol
view there is nothing to justify these differences, it seems to be a uniquely human feature
of this kind of reasoning. Much work has therefore been carried out in an attempt to
3Following recent work 1 will adopt a slightly different terminology from that used above and call
the predicate term A the middle term B and the subject term ('
characterise subjects' attempts at syllogistic reasoning. Below these will be described,
firstly those that emphasise the non-logical aspects of subjects* performance, then those
descriptions that do rely on some notion of rationality. The strengths and weaknesses
of each theory will be evaluated.
1.4.1 Non-Logical Mechanisms and Errors of Interpretation
The first studies on syllogisms adopted the idea that subjects drew conclusions on the
basis of non-logical strategies or misinterpreted the premises of the syllogism before
drawing a conclusion. Woodworth and Sells (1935) theorised that subjects, when forced
to make errors would choose conclusions that had something in common with the syllo¬
gism itself. This they called the "atmosphere effect" and they formulated rules to show
which type of conclusion the subject would be most likely to draw given any particular
syllogism. These, as stated by Begg and Denny (19(39), are the following:
• When one quantifier is negative, then the accepted conclusion will tend to be
negative.
• When one quantifier is particular then the conclusion will tend to be particular.
• In general the tendency is to choose universal or affirmative conclusions.
Rather than use logic to solve the syllogisms, the argument runs, subjects can choose
a conclusion to the syllogism by using the atmosphere of the premises.
There are several problems with this approach as it stands, firstly it gives no account
of how subjects can correctly answer syllogisms, except more or less by chance. Secondly,
it fais to explain how subjects can ever give the response "no valid conclusion" as every
syllogism has a conclusion that can be derived from atmosphere. Thirdly, it fails to
account for effects found in the choices of conclusion that subjects make - the figural
effect. Stated briefly the effect concerns the relative frequencies of different types of
conclusion, whose frequencies vary according to the order of the nouns in the conclusion.
Syllogisms with the figure ab-bc tend to be followed by conclusions of t he form \ r and
syllogisms of figure ba-cb are followed by c a conclusions. The atmosphere effect has
been criticised for failing to provide any means by which this effect can be explained.
Interest in this approach has continued to the present day and many of the claims




Figure 1.3: Politzer's formulation: an example
structed models that were elaborated versions of the atmosphere effect and conversion
theory. This study found that 88.9% of the data collected could be explained by a
feature-matching model based on the atmosphere effect. Politzer (1989) has reformu¬
lated the atmosphere effect to explain the responses of his subjects. Recognising that
the atmosphere effect as conventionally stated is a good descriptive theory but a poor
explanatory or predictive one he has retained the four principles that make it up and
added some others. In this revised theory, lie includes a principle preventing subjects
from creating a conclusion containing the middle term and one t hat asserts i hat subjects
will always choose a conclusion that is as general or less general than the least general
premise of the syllogism. The most crucial new factor however is his introduction of
a new means for combining the information carried by the quantifiers and the nouns
in each premise. Politzer rites precedents that suggest that the information relating to
quantity conveyed by the quantifiers (whether it is universal or particular) is carried
by the subject of the premise in which the quantifier appears and that the information
relating to quality (whether it is positive or negative) is carried by the predicate. Thus
each syllogism can be expressed in terms of a feature matrix, no two syllogisms carrying
the same combination of nouns and features. Figure 1.3 demonstrates the consequences
of this for the syllogism "All the A are B. none of the (' are B". Politzer then uses
the principles of the atmosphere effect to select a quantifier for a candidate conclusion,
opens this quantifier into a two feat u re frame as was done for the quant ifiers of t he syllo¬
gism and fills it using the major and minor terms of the syllogism. Rather than chance
determining the order of these nouns in the conclusion. Politzer suggests that nouns will
be attracted into the available slots by the possession of a feature that matches that of
the slot.
By this means Politzer introduces the possibility that different syllogisms will have a
preponderance of certain conclusions and that in certain cases the response "No Valid
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Figure 1.4: Drawing a conclusion by Politzer's method
containing the quantifiers "all" and "some" in the first and second premises respectively,
as in figure 1.3 with the figures 1. 3 and I. When attempting to lill a frame for a
conclusion using the nouns bound to the feat tire in question in t he syllogism, t he subjects
will often find that the middle term is the noun most suitable for a slot in the frame.
This term cannot play a part in the conclusion and therefore when making a filling where
this occurs an asterix (*) is used in its place. The subject must then find another term
for the slot. In some cases s/he will decide that there is no conclusion to the syllogism.
Politzer states that this decision is made with a probability that "is a parameter of
the population", which is taken to mean that individuals will differ markedly in their
decision under these circumstances and that predicting their response is not possible.
The subjects may also decide to substitute another term for the middle term, this will
always be the term not already filling a slot in the frame. In certain cases the frame
can be filled directly, without the involvement of the middle term, this is the case with
the syllogism AET® . The prediction can therefore be made that the incidence of .WW1
responses will be low for this syllogism as the necessity to choose a non-ideal noun for
the conclusion will never arise.
Once the first fillings are completed, a stage is allowed where any other fillings for
the conclusion frame are considered and the conclusions that can arise from this are
Following an earlier convention the quantifiers will he occasionally referred to as A for "all". I lor
"some", E for "none" and O for "some.not. Pairs of quantifiers can be expressed in this way - A I. refers
to the pair "All, none"
This acronym is used for the phrase "no valid conclusion"
given. In cases where both the major and minor terms are bound to the appropriate
feature in the same premise. Politzer proposes that the term that takes precedence will
depend on factors such as the similarity of the conclusion frame to the premise each
term appears in and the temporal proximity of each term to the other feature of tin1
conclusion frame.
In this way Politzer shows that his updated version of the atmosphere effect can be
made to account for two major phenomenon that previously it was unable to explain:
the figural effect and the existence of "no valid conclusion" responses. A full analysis of
the 64 syllogisms in this way gives a prediction for the conclusions that closely mirrors
the performance of his subjects.
Another early approach was to explain error as the result of misinterpretation of the
quantifiers of the syllogism. Chapman and Chapman (1959) identified conversion as a
main source of such error, meaning by this that subjects would interpret a statement
such as "All the A are B" to mean "A is equivalent to B" and therefore suppose "All
the B art1 A" also to be true. In this way. tin1 subject would misunderstand the logic
of the premises and draw an incorrect conclusion. Xewstead and (Iriggs (19X4) have
followed this precedent and have looked more specifically at subjects' ability to make
inferences on ihe basis of the logical meaning of the four quantifiers used in syllogisms.
In their experiments they found that subjects were able to make the < outradiclory and
contrary inferences (if "all" is true then "not some...not" is also true; if "all" is true
then "none" is false) but had difficulty with the subcontract' inference ("some" is not
equivalent to "some..not") and the subaltern ("till" implies "some" and "none" implies
"some..not" and vice versa). Conversions of premises with "all" or "some..not" as the
quantifier were made in 34% and 60% of cases respectively'1.
Newstead (1988) evaluated predictions generated by the conversion liypot hesis. (iricean
implicatures and Erickson's set theoretic approach using Eider's circles and immediate
inference tasks. Subjects' choices in these paradigms provide evidence relating to these
theories in a number of ways.
6For two of the quantifiers used in syllogisms, it is logically possible to infer the converse of a given
sentence to be true: "None of the A are B" implies "None of the B are A" and similarlv "Some of the
A are B" implies "Some of the B are A". However the quantifers "all" and "Some...not do not imply
the converses of the sentences in which they appear.
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Newstead found the following:-
1. The conversion hypothesis, stated as a belief of the subject that all quantifiers are
symmetrical in their logic, would predict that subjects choose Euler's circles or
make immediate inferences to the effect that if "All A are B" then "All B are A"
for example. Newstead finds significant numbers of these errors for the immediate
inference task but only for "all" with the Eider's circles paradigm.
2. Given that subjects are following Gricean implicatures when interpreting the syl¬
logisms, they should tend not to make the inference that "Some A are B" implies
"All A are B" and "Some A are not I!" implies "No A are B". In other words they
will interpret "some" as meaning "some but not all" and "Some...not" as meaning
"some but not none". There is evidence that subjects perform in this way for the
Killer's circles task but not in the immediate inference paradigm.
3. The difficulty of the interpretation of the quantifiers is related to their complexity,
as predicted by Erickson's (1974) set theoretic approach, but although this theory
specifically rests on subjects choosing only one representation for each quant fier.
the evidence suggests that this is rare and the difference in difficulty for "some" and
"Some...not" is not found to be great enough to unequivocally support Erickson's
hypothesis.
Newstead concludes that both conversions and Gricean implicatnres play an impor¬
tant role in the interpretation of quantifiers, but that their relative importance depends
upon the sort of task the subject is required to perform'.
1.4.2 The deductive approach
The theories described above tend to ignore t he deductive component of this process and
ascribe errors in drawing conclusions to processes outside reasoning. Some researchers
have become uneasy with using these approaches as whole explanations, as they appear
to overlook the fact that subjects can and do behave rationally wlmn attempting to
solve syllogisms. Various attempts have therefore been made to create a description ol
the deductive processes subjects use when solving syllogisms.
'See also Politzer( 1990)
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Guyote and Sternberg (1978). for example use a combinatorial symbolic language
to capture subjects reasoning performance. They assume that the combinatorial rules
are applied without error, and that subjects produce incorrect responses by failing to
consider all the possible representations that can Ire considered. Newell (1981) takes
Venn diagrams as a starting point, with a heuristic process combining the premises to
provide a possible conclusion to be evaluated.
Erickson's (1974) set-theoretic approach uses Eider's circles as the basis of the rep¬
resentational device, with limitations on the numbers of interpretations that can be
considered. The reason that this limit must exist is that the traditional version of Kil¬
ler's circles requires several representations to be constructed to fully capture the logic
of the quantifiers. Figure 1.5 demonstrates t hat only "none" has only one interpret at ion
under this representation, "all" has two. "some..not" three and "some" four.
Erickson (1979) tests two models based on t his notation, one of which allows only one
interpretation of the syllogism to be entertained and one which allows all interpretations
to be considered in turn - a random combination model. The former model is the most
sucessful explanation of the data, but does not allow t he response "no valid conclusion".
Erickson suggests that a compromise model that can consider more than one but not
all combinations of the syllogism would overcome this difficulty.
Major criticisms of these theories, made by Johnson-Laird (19*4) are i hat they as¬
sume that subjects possess a mental logic which is in some way flawed so as to produce
the errors observed. He argues that theories of this kind cannot explain why some syl¬
logisms appear to be harder than others. Theories such as Erickson's lie criticises for
allowing a combinatorial explosion of models and having to lie artificial!} constrained
as a result. Further he states, the fact that "some" and "some..not" have an equivalent
representation in an Eider's circles notation, forces Erickson to invoke the atmosphere
effect to explain why subject will choose one quantifier in some situations and the other
under different circumstances.
■Johnson-Laird's solution to these problems is to propose a different representational
device based on individuals rather than set.-, and to appeal to the limitations and prop¬
erties of working memory to explain subjects" errors and preferences. Firstly, as did
Erickson he identifies the fact that certain syllogisms require a number of mental op¬
erations to be performed before the presence or absence of a valid conclusion for I hem
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All of the A are B
Some of the A are B
None of the A are B
Some of the A are not B
Figure 1.5: The four quantifiers in Filler's circles notation
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can be ascertained. Other syllogisms require only one representation before it becomes
clear that there is a. valid conclusion. Johnson-Laird argues that the more operations a
syllogism takes to solve, the less likely it is that the subject will be able to produce the
answer as, following Sternberg (1981). the limits on working memory make it difficult
for her/him to entertain all the possibilities simultaneously. In addition, Johnson-Laird
proposes that subjects tend not to attempt to negate the conclusions they have drawn
and are thus led into error. Examining the error rates of subjects allowed to freely
draw conclusions, Johnson-Laird (1978) finds high numbers of errors where two or three
operations are required, low error rates where only one model is needed.
His second criticism is that these theories of syllogistic reasoning fail to account
for subjects' marked preference for certain forms of conclusion - the figural effect. To
elaborate on what was mentioned earlier: it was established by Erase (1968). Pezzoli and
Erase (1968) that the four figures of the syllogism resemble the four stage mediational
paradigm and on the basis of this, differences in the difficulty of the syllogisms were
predicted according to figure8. It was found by Dickstein (1978) that these differences
do exist: that subjects make most errors when the figure is ah b< intermediate errors
on ab-ch and ba-bc and fewest on bach. In addition, the number of conclusions of
the form a—c exactly reverses the trend. If conclusions of either form are allowed, this
finding shows that for the figure ah bc' conclusions of the form a o are preferred and
c-a for figure ba-cb. while the other two figures have no bias.
To explain this effect Johnson-Laird states that when interpreting the syllogism sub¬
jects must arrange the nouns in it so that they can be related into a single model, for
the figure ab-bc this is straightforward: a is first related to h and then b to < and
the relationship between a and c tested. With ba-cb this cannot the case. To repre¬
sent syllogisms of this figure, subjects must lind a way of rearranging the nouns in the
syllogism so that the middle term stands between the two other terms. Johnson-Laird
hypothesises that the premises are interpreted in reverse order of presentation, giving a
figure of the form cb-ba. With the figure ab-bc, the term a enters working memory
before the term c. Thus, when a conclusion has to be drawn, this term is the first
to be retrieved, given a "first in-first out" principle is operating in working memory.
*Here reference to difficulty is only meaningful given that correct conclusions must be of the form
C-A.
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Therefore conclusions of the form a-c will he preferred when this figure is encountered.
With the figure ba-cb. the term c will he the first to he retrieved from working memory
and therefore conclusions of the form c-A will he chosen. For the other two figures,
reversal of the nouns within one premise to give one of the two arrangements required
is thought to be the mechanism used. If the nouns are reversed at random then a 50-.">0
distribution 011 types of conclusions should be found, and this is in fact the case with
the data in question.
1.4.3 Evaluating the hypotheses
A brief description of a number of major theories has been given along with what
have been identified as their main problems. Johnson-Laird uses these arguments as
arguments in favour of his mental models approach and offers evidence of its applicability
to other areas of human reasoning to advance the argument that a mechanism of this
kind forms the basis of a large part of human verbal reasoning and other language
processes.
However, it may be that he is too ready to dismiss other theories, sometimes per¬
haps because they present problems that his approach cannot resolve. In the follow¬
ing sections, il will Ire discussed whether certain theories really are incompatible with
.Johnson-Laird's claims and ways of reconciling what may appear to be at first sight
conflicting approaches considered. It will also be of interest to discuss whether some of
these theories have offered insights that Johnson-Laird con not easily explain.
Quantifier misinterpretation
Misinterpretation of the quantifiers as a source of error in reasoning, is an established
finding, as already shown. For example in Fisher's (19X1) model, misinterpretation,
particularly conversion, is found to be necessary to explain typical performance. A
model depending on correctly interpreted premises provides a poorer fit to t he data then
one including misinterpretations. Fisher also finds that introducing a fad or resembling
a limit 011 working memory capacity by constraining the number of interpretations of
the quantifiers that the system can entertain must be included, as must a deductive
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gure 1.6: Part of Revlis" flow chart for syllogistic roasoniii
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Most formalisations of syllogistic reasoning use a flow chart to demonstrate the pro¬
cess. To take as an example Revlis' ( 1975) model (see Figure 1.6), this takes as separate
parts of the process the interpretation of the premises and the manipulation of the
representation derived from the premises to produce an answer to the problem. In prin¬
ciple then, there is no reason why a hypothesis such as the conversion hypothesis or
Gricean implicatures should conflict with a theory such as that of mental models. In
fact Johnson-Laird himself separates the reasoning process into two such parts - premise
combination and then cycles of testing to establish the correct response. Thus hypothe¬
ses that explain error through misinterpretation of the quantifiers are found not to be
exclusive of theories incorporating deductive reasoning. It is quite plausible that a sub¬
ject might incorrectly interpret the syllogism and go on to reason with it logically. This
seems even more acceptable once it is remembered that the conception of conversions,
for example, has changed with time from being an automatic and inevitable process
(Revlis,1975), to it being a natural propensity of the system (Revlin and l.eirer. 1980).
In this way, subjects do not have to make conversions, but may make them, for example,
by failing to disallow a representation which includes an illicit conversion.
The atmosphere effect
The atmosphere effect is not a theory of premise misinterpretation, but rather a mech¬
anism that allows subjects to choose conclusions without using deductive reasoning
processes. Given that subjects are observed to behave rationally, it is ha.nl to defend a
theory that does not make any allowance for deductive reasoning. Revlis hypothesises
that in circumstances where rationality cannot be used, such as in Woodworth and Sells'
experiment where subjects were asked to draw conclusions for syllogisms where no valid
conclusion exists, feature-matching will be used as a strategy to generate conclusions.
Politzer, whose neo-atmospheric approach resolves many of the arguments against the
atmosphere effect as originally conceived by developing a mechanism whereby both the
figural effect and "no valid conclusion" can be generated without the need for deduction,
argues that some syllogisms indeed exceed the capacity of the subject. It might also
be the case that some subjects fail to use deductive reasoning at all and use nothing
but non-logical strategies to generate conclusions. Politzer points out that there is a
group of syllogisms who appear quite difficult to solve in that correct answers are given
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to them rarely and a larger group that gel correct responses only part of the time, lie
infers from this that many syllogisms are beyond the capabilities of a large group of
subjects who therefore use other means to draw a conclusion to tlieni. This view con¬
flicts with the deductive approach that holds that underlying all syllogism solving is a
reasoning mechanism common to all who attempt syllogisms and probably to the whole
class of reasoning problems. Rather than differing in their ability to hold a number of
possibilities in mind, rather as we differ in our ability to perform mental arithmetic,
according to Politzer subjects differ in their approach to the problems themselves. Few
if any, he supposes, reach the stage of using deductive reasoning to solve these problems
and instead resort to the method lie describes. It is also possible that subjects use an
atmosphere approach to first generate conclusions to the syllogisms and then gradually
learn to test the conclusions thus arrived at by means of a interpreted model.
Theories of deduction
It has been shown that theories based on non-logical mechanisms do not necessarily
conflict with the idea that subjects can treat syllogisms rationally, but may simply be
capturing the performance of subjects who do not fully understand the logic of the
quantifiers, even if the rest of their performance is immpeccably deductive or that in
circumstances where the subject finds a syllogism exceeds their capacity, non-logical
approaches are used to generate an answer.
The explanations for the deductive part of the process have also been criticised
however. The three main problems found and introduced above are: that theories based
on rules of inference express in syntactic form that which is semantic, that theories based
on Eider's circles notation cause combinatorial (explosion and that none of these theories
adequately explains the figural effect.
First let us consider the criticism thai human deductive reasoning is semantic rather
than syntactic and that therefore systems of reasoning that are based on proofs.being
syntactic in nature connot incorporate that which is distinctive about human processing
of this kind - its reliance on semantic networks in the shape of context and real world
knowledge. Intuitively it seems that there is a very real difference between these two
things and it is this argument that .Johnson-Laird uses to motivate his theory. Sten-
ning(1990) makes clear however that there is a conceptual muddle about the use of
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the terms syntactic and semantic in this sense. He argues that there is no syntactic
arrangement of a logical process that cannot lie restated as a piece of semantics (say
as a theorem being restated as a truth table and vice versa) Rather than these two
levels being two sides of the same coin, he conceptualises them as two points along a
continuum along which human reasoners travel, the poles of which are agglomerative
strategies versus analytical ones. At some level of coding it may well be true that human
reasoning is analytical, but if this is so, it is a level not available either to introspection
or experimentation. What Johnson-Laird has asserted about human reasoning is not
that it is semantic, but that it is agglomerative - that human beings tend to combine
all the information available into a single representation which they then use to assess
the truth or falsity of statements. The problem with syllogisms is that assessing their
truth or falsity involves the kind of abstract manipulations that we find places too great
a burden on memory.
If it is agglomerativeness that is important rather than "semanticness". w hat advan¬
tages do mental models have to offer above other types of representation that are also
agglomerative? Erickson's set-theorectic approach is certainly agglomerative - Eider's
circles almost beg to be combined, but this approach has been criticised because of the
combinatorial explosion it is supposed to provoke, as discussed above and the point has
already been made that tolerating more than one representation is exactly what people
are bad at. Mental models get round this problem by using individuals rather than sets
and including a. notational device that can allow the possibility of a relation existing,
without asserting it to necessarily exist. Stenning and Oberlander (1900) note however
that the inclusion of a shading notation allows Killer's circles to capture the information
in each quantifier with one diagram as Johnson-Laird's tableau do. Figure 1.7 shows
that shading the area in an Filler's circles representation where individuals can be as¬
serted to definitely exist gives an equivalent representation to tableau, while also falling
in with subject's intuitions about the type of structures they are using.
These diagrams can be combined just in the same way that .Johnson-Laird's are. but
with the interesting effect that in some cases there are areas that become shaded twice
as a result (see figure 1.8). This feature does not correspond exactly with the existence
or otherwise of a valid conclusion, although in many cases where double shading exists,
a valid conclusion does exist and the absence of shading is often found where no valid
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All of the A are B
03 Some of the A are B
None of the A are B
Some of the A are not B
Figure 1.7: Stenning's version of Killer's circles
conclusion can be found. The fact that there is no exact overlap between double shading
and the existence of valid conclusions leads to interesting predictions about subjects'
behaviour should they be using this method to select conclusions.
It can be seen that in both cases several possible representations must be considered
before the correct response can be generated, so .Johnson-Laird's intuitions about the
way memory interacts with the reasoning process can also be preserved.
1.4.4 The explanation of the figural effect.
The important claim about mental models than is that they are agglomeraiive and par¬
simonious, this has been shown to be the case for an Filler's circles notation too. The
claim might then be made that mental models stil have some greater claim to explana¬
tory power because they are able to provide an explanation for the ligural effect. As
already shown, Johnson-Laird claims that this effect occurs because the nouns in the
syllogism must be presented in a certain order for a representation to be constructed.
This is not a necessary feature of all representations of syllogisms, but follows from
mental models because they incorporate an element of order. An Filler's circles repre¬
sentation, for example, does not require nouns to be presented in any particular order.
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Some of the A are B
None of the B are C
All of the B are A
Some of the C are not B
Figure 1.8: Combining premises with Filler's circles
any information can be included in the representation at any point, but for a mental
model to be constructed, information entering the system must be related to objects
that have already been included in the model, leading to the necessity for a particular
order of processing to be adopted. Il is this, the argument runs that creates the figural
effect, because of the way in which memory must deal with this ordering.
Thus the figural effect falls out of mental models theory as part of the process of
reasoning. But as a consequence, Johnson-Laird is forced to make a very strong claim
about the form of the representation subjects use. A subject that produces a ligural
effect must use a mental representation that involves the use of individuals rather than
sets. In other words, according to Johnson-Laird, subjects cannot use F iller's circles
as a means for solving syllogisms and still display a figural effect, despite the fact that
subjects report the spontaneous discovery of Filler's circles as a reasoning device as they
become proficient at syllogistic reasoning (Inder 1986) and that Filler's circles are widely
used as a means of teaching syllogistic reasoning (this, incidentally is one of Johnson-
Laird's prerequisites for a successful theory of syllogistic reasoning). Johnson-Laird
might argue that underlying an Filler's circles representation is one based on individuals,
or that the preference created by mental models remains even if the representation
changes. This leads to a characterisation of the process that is unecessarilv complex.
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Johnson-Laird makes the assumption that the ligural effect must In- a consequence of
the representation adopted by the subject, hence his success at criticising other theories
for failing to explain it. However, what he is doing in fact is providing a description of
mental models rather than an explanation. Eider's circles could be given a notation to
specify order of processing, without this necessarily explaining why the order has to he
so. A conceptual leap is made in assuming that because the nouns in mental models
have to be arranged in a particular way this implies that they have to be processed in
that order. If what is required of a theory is that it provides a description of the figural
effect then this paves the way for any explanation of the figural effect to be acceptable
so long as it can be incorporated into existing theories.
From another point of view then it is possible that syllogisms are seen by reasoners
as an attempt at communication (there is evidence cited above from study of other rea¬
soning problems to suggest that this is a likelihood ). t hen I he most likely interpretation
of syllogisms will be that they are a form of argument. This is the position adopted by
Gilhooley and Wetherick (1989) who go on to point out that if syllogisms are interpreted
as arguments, then it is natural to suppose that the subject will identify some topic for
the argument to be about. This topic will be the su bject of the conclusion, as t he point
of an argument must be to make some statement about its topic. The person solving the
syllogism must use some criterion to decide what item in the syllogism the argument is
about. There is ample evidence from linguistics" to suggest that one such might be the
grammatical roles of the nouns in the syllogism, with the subject term being taken as
the subject of the argument. When there are two subject terms or no subject terms in
the syllogism ihen other factors might come into play, some of which will be discussed
in chapter 4.
If the requirement of a. theory is that it provides a framework in which a descrip¬
tion of the figural effect can be couched then the force of the argument in favour ol
mental models is weakened. Any factor could be responsible for creating the effect, a
respectable substitute has been proposed above, so it is not necessarily t he case that
the representation itself must be the cause of the effect.
9see Chafe (1U76) for a summary
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1.4.5 Explaining quantifier misinterpretation
Factors such as premise misinterpretation and tlie atmosphere effect are well supported
experimentally as sources of error in syllogistic reasoning and have been shown not
to exclude in principle the possibility of subjects using deductive reasoning as another
part of the process. In fact the experimental finding that subjects show preferences
for certain interpretations of tire quantifiers which accord with Ciricean implicatures
creates a difficulty for Johnson-Laird's choice of representation. As noted above, using
a mental models notation has the advantage that one representation can be used to
denote each quantifier, whereas with the original formulation of Filler's circles between
one and four diagrams are needed. Stenningand Oberlander's ( 19!) I ) additional notation
solves this problem, but allows a. measure of ambiguity that may capture why logically
inexperienced subjects fail to fully understand the meaning of the quantifiers. Other
researchers have found that "some..not" and "some" are often confused in meaning.
With the Euler's circles notation it is easy to see how this could happen - misplace the
shading and the two become equivalent. Wit It mental models, quite radical rest rue t tiring
is required before the two resemble each other and it is hard to see how subjects can
ever make such errors if they are using such a representation.
The same is true of the conversion hypothesis. If subjects make conversions as a
result of only choosing a particular interpretation of the quantifier (in the case of "all"
for example they would choose the interpretation "A is equivalent to M" ) then they
must have a representational device that does not necessarily allow for the full logical
meaning of the quantifier to be included. Although Johnson-Laird can achieve this by
excluding some of the information from the mental model for each syllogism, he would
render his tableau equivalent to Euler's circles by doing so. (iricean implicatures pro¬
vide a basis for arguing that subjects choose an impoverished version of the meaning
of the quantifiers "some" and "some..not" as these implicatures are claimed to underlie
language processing and will affect our comprehension and therefore representation of
information a priori. However, conversions do not appear to result from any preexisting
preference, rather they appear to be a consequence of the representation itself. The
same is true of the common confusion between "some" and "some..not", although this
may result from a. G ricean interpretation of their meaning leading to equivalent repre-
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sentations for these two quantifiers. Thus, as (|uantifier misi ui erpret at ion is supposed
to result from the representation itself and as there is no principled reason for any in¬
formation to he excluded from a mental model . to do so in order 1o allow quantifier
misinterpretation to occur would be a device designed to suit the data. Johnson-Laird
claims that Erickson's theory is inadequate because it cannot capture the figural effect
due to the symmetrically of Euler's circles and that the inclusion of some device to
generate a figural effect would be "...an act hoc manouevre designed to save (the theory)
from falsification". Now it is found that to capture the effects of quantifier misinterpre¬
tation, mental models would have to make a similar manouevre. On the other hand,
quantifier misinterpretation "drops out" of an Euler's circle representation as a result
of one of the criticisms Johnson-Laird makes of them:- the memory load on subjects
produced by the multiplication of figures needed to capture all the information about
the quantifiers means that not all the figures are produced and those chosen are those
that conform to factors such as Gricean implicatures.
1.5 Logical and non-logical strategies
Theories of reasoning generally assume thai ail subjects exercise some degree of deduc¬
tion when solving syllogisms. One of the criticisms of the atmosphere effect for example
is that it makes 110 provision for deductive reasoning strategies. It is certainly the case
that some subjects display a grasp of the logic underlying syllogisms and use this with
a greater or lesser degree of success to obtain an answer. However, there is evidence
that, some subjects fail to grasp the logical significance of syllogisms altogether and use
other strategies to generate conclusions as argued by Poiitzer. Gilhooley and Wet herick
(1989) find that subjects choose a conclusion that has the same quantifier as one of
the quantifiers in the syllogism. By isolating a group of six syllogisms that have both
quantifiers the same and for which there is no valid conclusion, they identified a group
of subjects that were reporting conclusions for these syllogisms containing the same
quantifier as that found in both premises. The performance of their subjects overall
correlated highly with the number of such conclusions the subject gave - the higher
the number of these conclusions, the higher the number of errors overall. Gilhooley
and Wetherick concluded that certain subjects were using what they called a "match¬






All of the A are B
Some of the B are C'
Figure 1.9: Possible interpretation of "All of the A are B. some of I lie B are ("'
where the subjects had two different quantifiers in the syllogism to choose from for their
conclusion, a principle such as the atmosphere effect might be used.
These responses also occur in Johnson-Laird's own data, but his theory fails to lake
account of the possibility of non-logical performance altogether. In fact, the claim is
that mental models are a version of the representation that is the basis of all human
inferencing - one of the arguments advanced for this is that mental models can be used
to represent quasi numerical quantifiers and multiply-quantified assertions. If this is the
case, then it must also be the case that simply to read and understand the syllogism
involves the construction of a mental model of the type described, as this is the way
the semantics of the quantifiers are understood. In this way all subjects can produce at
least one model of a syllogism and generate a conclusion front it.
However this on its own does not explain why subjects when encountering the syl¬
logism in figure 1.9 do not choose the response "None of the A are c" as a result of
creating one model alone. To explain the instances in his own data where subjects
produce matching responses where the response "no valid conclusion" would be correct.
Johnson-Laird devises two heuristics that guide the initial choice of representation.
• Heuristic 1 — with affirmative premises ensure that the intersection between sets
is never empty.
• Heuristic '2 — with negative premises ensure that the intersection between sets is
always empty.





All of the B are A
All of the B are C
Figure 1.10: Mental Models representation of "AH of the B are A. all of ihe B are C
on the basis of the model that they have.
As demonstrated, these heuristics can generate the "matching" responses in a number
of cases. However, there are other syllogisms where matching responses cannot be
generated by these heuristics (see Figure 1.10). The response "All the A are ('" or "All
the C are A" to the example in figure 1.10 would not follow from the mental model
drawn in accordance with Heuristic 1. As shown, it should be immediately obvious that
the correct response is "Some of the A are or "Some of the (.' are A". In Johnson-
Laird and Steedman (1978) 50(X of subjects gave a response with "all" as the quantifier
for the conclusion.
Given that this example cannot be accounted for, a theory of syllogistic reasoning
must include the possibility of subjects using non-logical strategies. As subjects ap¬
pear to sometimes choose conclusions that cannot be generated from a single menial
model, even with a heuristically determined starting point, it must be supposed that
some subjects are reading and understanding the syllogism without constructing a rep¬
resentation of the sort that Johnson-Laird proposes. A reason this might In1 possible is
that syllogisms are first-and-foremost. texts and. as Begg and Harris ( 1982) point out.
they can be treated as attempts to communicate. If subjects fail to recognise the logical
possibilities of the syllogisms then they will use pragmatic inferences to generate con¬
clusions for them, of which matching is an example and the atmosphere1 effect another.
The representation of syllogisms at the textual level is therefore unlike that used by
subjects who are attempting deductive reasoning. The claim made by Johnson-Laird
that mental models are the automatic means of representing syllogisms is breached.
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1.6 Memory and Syllogistic Reasoning
As discussed in the first section, a.11 understanding of memory is crucial for an under¬
standing of human reasoning as its structure underpins all our cognitive processing. In
particular a study of what information survives in memory after a particular task has
been performed can give quite subtle insights into the nature of the processing that
preceded the memory test. Successful use has been made of such a method to investi¬
gate the nature of textual processing by Stenning. Shepherd and Levy (19X7), with the
result that information has been gained about how people can associate properties as
belonging to one individual and not another and thus build up stable descriptions of
individuals. This question is also of importance to theories about syllogistic represen¬
tations as these also require the processing of collections of individuals. Stenning has
pointed out that there are seven distinct types of individuals thai can be found in any
syllogism: the three nouns of the syllogism can be combined in any one of seven ways to
assert that an individual either has or does not have that particular property. Syllogisms
can describe situations in which up to all seven of these individuals exist, but only in
a limited number of situations will it be the case that a particular individual must ex¬
ist. This is equivalent to a syllogism possessing a valid conclusion although the overlap
between conclusions and individuals is not exact. This can be found to relate to i he re¬
formulated Eider's circles notation in an interesting way: as shown before in figure 1.1 I
certain syllogisms when represented in this way have areas that are shaded twice, or
"double-hatched" and these are always syllogisms that have individuals that must exist.
There are in addition two cases where syllogisms that are not double-hatched have valid
individuals and some cases of syllogisms thai have individuals but no valid conclusion
(figures 1.12 and 1.13). In addition to this Stenning has noted that representing the
quantifiers as expressing a simple affirmative or negated relation between two nouns10
and combining the two premises gives a simple structure for the syllogism in which the
B or middle term is affirmed or negated in both premises or negated in one and affirmed
in the other (figure 1.14 and figure 1.15) depending on the figure of the syllogism. The
cases that give B a different role in each premise are syllogisms that never, bar two cases,
have a. valid individual or conclusion. Should subjects be aware of such a mechanism.
10The quantifiers "all" and "some" have both nouns positve. "none" negates the non-repeated term
and "some..not" negates the predicate
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Some of the A are B
None of the B are C
All of the B are A
Some of the C are not B
Figure 1.11: Combining Stenning's variation on Filler's circles
thev would have a quick and easy way to decide if' certain syllogisms have a conclusion
or individual. The two exceptions are the two that have no double-hatching yet possess
a valid conclusion and individual.
Asking subjects to find individuals rather than draw conclusions has never been done
before. It is of interest therefore to try this variation on the syllogistic theme to see if
subjects are able to find the individuals t hat exist where no conclusion does and to look
for evidence that they use the presence of double-hatching and cancellation to make
decisions about the presence or absence of individuals. These results can be compared
to those obtained in the usual task to see if these factors play a part in the strategies
adopted by subjects to find valid conclusions.
Another way in to the reasoning task though, is through memory. As mentioned
above studies of recall data have already provided information about the ways in which
properties and individuals are kept together and modelled in distributed systems. Mem¬
ory could play a similar part in gathering information relating to the way properties are
combined in representations. But memory also pi ays a crucial part in the explanation
AO
All of the A are B
Some of the C are not B
A B
C ~B
Some of the A are riot B
All of the C are B
A-B
C B
Figure 1.12: Syllogisms that are not double-hatched but that have valid conclusions
None of the B are A g A
Some of the B are not C B ~C
None of the A are B
None of the B are C
-A B
B ~C
Figure 1.13: Syllogisms that have a valid individual but no valid conclusion
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AH of the B are A
Some of the C are B
B A
C B
All of the A are B A B
None of the B are C B ~C
Figure 1.1-4: Syllogisms that cancel
Some of the A are not B A ~B
AlloftheBareC BC
Some of the B are A B A
Some of the C are not B C ~B
Figure 1.15: Syllogisms that do not cancel
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of syllogistic phenomena: the mental models account of the figurai efleet and. most
importantly, the errors created by cycles of testing exceeding memory capacity.
These relationships between memory and syllogistic reasoning could affect recall data
in a number of general ways: phenomena, such as the depth of processing effect reported
by Craik and Lockhart (1972) may have relevance if memory for particular syllogisms
can be shown to vary according to the amount of processing required to correctly solve
them. It has also been demonstrated that the greater the difficulty of a task that
follows a. piece of text or the greater the processing capacity required to perform the
task, the better remembered the text that was originally read11. It has been found
that increases in difficulty beyond a moderate level do not improve memory and can in
fact degrade it and that tasks that integrate information within a text aid recall after a
delay in particular. Again these effects might be expected to transfer to the syllogisms
paradigm in a similar way to depth of processing, but perhaps predicting a drop off in
recall performance for the most complicated solutions and accent uated effec t s of a mount
of processing at delayed recall. Kintsch and van Dijk's (198:5. 1990) work on levels of
representation within texts gives a similar view: that the better intergrated the text, the
better the recall of that text will be. Ratclifle and McCoou (1980) suggest that different
kinds of information may be available to recall at different points in retrieval, l imy
have found that early in the time course of recognition tasks, surface similarity of the
texts plays an important factor, and other considerations, related to deeper processing
for delayed recognition. Again, cued recall of syllogisms may be affected by similar
factors, with errors due to the formation of mental representations only appearing in
any numbers at delay although the work of Lea et al (1990) finds t hat subjects are able
to discriminate in memory between information that was actually present in a given
text and information that must have been inferred from the text to correctly answer a
question aboui it. The effect of reasoning on syllogisms may not therefore be to directly
introduce inferred material into the recall.
1.7 Agenda
The general motivation for this work has already been outlined as being the desire to
examine in del ail the way in which natural languge processing affects human deductive
reveiwed in Kinstein and McDanicl 1U9U.
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reasoning and further what can be said about language processing itself on the basis
of this. A number of more specific questions have also been raised with respect to the
interaction beiween memory and syllogistic reasoning and also issues about combining
information, the operation of the figural effect and the whole question of what kind of
representation is available to subjects of different levels of expertise.
In an attempt to decide these questions and to collect information about the general
issues that form the theme of this work an experiment where recall data for syllogisms
has been collected and analysed has been carried out. The second part of this work has
been to collect data regarding subjects' ability to find individuals. This experiment it
is hoped will demonstrate the existence of strategies for solving syllogisms similar to
those found for the four-card problem and in general to aspects of language processing.
Because the data collected from the second experiment relates to the reasoning and recall
data collected from the first experiment, it has not been possible to adopt a conventional
structure for this work, in which a first experiment is described and analysed and then
a second. Instead the two experiments have very much been taken together and there
are many points at which data, from both experiments can be taken together to furnish






This experiment aimed to investigate the relationship between language processing and
reasoning by asking subjects to perform a reasoning task and then examining the recall
errors they made when asked to remember the content of the syllogism. ITom these
errors it should be possible to build up a picture of the strategies, priorities and assump¬
tions subjects use when attempting to solve these reasoning problems and relate these
to errors of reasoning. Ultimately a model of how humans reason might be constructed
from this data which would probably have much in common with earlier humiliations,
but which will be enriched by the information collected here. Cued recall was used as
the means to elicit the memory for the syllogism, as free recall under circumstances
such as these is likely to be too poor to provide much of interest. Two recall conditions
were included, one where recall was immediately after the subject read the syllogism,
one where the recall was at 32 texts delay. The aim here was to ensure that a recall
condition of sufficient difficulty was included - there are few precedents for this type of
recall task, so little was known about the difficulty of the task. Should immediate recall
prove too straightforward, delayed recall would certainly be more productive of errors.
In addition, it is also possible to study the effects of decay with time on memory and




Twenty-five subjects were used, aged between 18 and -10, all graduates or undergradu¬
ates. Most were paid for their participation, some were volunteers. It was felt necessary
to choose subjects who were likely to be familiar with some aspects of logical reasoning
if not with syllogisms themselves. People who are exposed to syllogisms without any
prior experience of this type of task are apt to find it difficult to grasp the requirements
of the experiment without substantial coaching, for example the distinction between a
valid conclusion and one that is only true in certain situations can Ire difficult for very
naive subjects to understand. This can lead to large numbers of non-standard responses
being given and although this experiment was constructed so as to prevent subjects from
giving anything but standard answers, it was felt that inexperienced subjects would be
confused to the point at which little of value would be obtained from their responses.
It was also important to use subjects who were not very familiar with syllogisms and
also to exclude people who may be familiar with psychological theories of syllogistic
reasoning. For that reason, students who were undertaking studies at the Centre for
Cognitive Science were not asked to participate, as most if not all of these students
had taken courses specifically concerned with syllogistic reasoning and its psychological
implications.
2.1.3 Materials
This experiment requires subjects to read and evaluate syllogisms. Syllogisms consist
of two sentences, each begins with one of four possible quantifiers. I hese quantifiers
are "all"; "some"; "none" and "some not" known as the positive universal; positive
particular, negative universal and negative particular quantifiers respectively. As there
are two sentences and four possible quantifiers for each sentence, t he number of possible
quantifier pairs is sixteen. The rest of each sentence consists of two nouns. An example
syllogism is given in Figure 2.1.
One noun is repeated in both sentences - this is known as the middle term. The
unrepealed item in the first sentence is the called the major term and that in the
second sentence the minor term. The nouns in the two sentences can be arranged in
four different ways relative to each other. The syllogism in Figure 2.1 illustrates one
such order, another is given in Figure 2.2
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All of the busdrivers are cricketers.
None of the cricketers are German.
Figure 2.1: First example syllogism
Some of the French are not butchers.
All of the French are footballers.
Figure 2.2: Second example syllogism
Using the convention that the major term is a. the middle term h and the minor
term c the four figures can be represented as ab-bc; ba-cb; ab- cb and b,\ bc. giving
the order of the nouns in the two premises of the syllogism. Combining tin1 order of
the nouns or figure of the syllogism with the number of pairs of quantifiers possible, the
total number of syllogisms that can exist is sixteen times four or sixty-four.
Twenty-seven of these syllogisms have a valid conclusion - that is the situation de¬
scribed in the syllogism implies a relationship between the major and minor terms that
cannot be falsified by another interpretation of the syllogism. Thirty-seven of the syl¬
logisms have no valid conclusion, that is to say that there is no relationship between
the major and minor terms that cannot be falsified by another interpretation of the
syllogism.
2.1.4 Design
All sixty-four syllogisms were used. Each was presented to the subject once, in two
sessions of thirty-two syllogisms each. The syllogisms were randomly assigned to these
two sessions and were presented in a random order so that no two subjects read the
syllogisms in the same order, or had the same group of syllogisms in either tin1 first or
second session. Each syllogism had a. unique set of nouns: a nationality, a profession
and a hobby were used in each syllogism and never repeated. The older of noun type
was randomised so that, for example the major term was not always a profession, but
might be a hobby or a nationality.
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2.1.5 Presentation
The syllogisms were presented on a BBC microcomputer. Each subject first completed
a practice session of 4 syllogisms, accompanied by a set of printed instructions, which
explained how to use the microcomputer and gave four syllogisms with the correct an¬
swers worked out. Two of these had a valid conclusion, two did not. No particular
strategy for representing or solving the syllogisms was discussed, but the correct con¬
clusion for the syllogism was given with some indication as to why this had to be the
case. All the subjects completed the same practice session and so all had already solved
the same four syllogisms when the experiment proper began. The practice syllogisms
were also included in the experimental session.
Once the practice session was completed, the subject proceeded to the main experi¬
ment. The subject read the first premise of the syllogism, then pressed the space bar on
the computer keyboard to read the second premise. Once they had finished reading the
second premise they pressed the space bar again and were asked whether 1 h<* syllogism
had a valid conclusion or not. They were required to answer "yes" or "no": they had
been warned that once they had made a decision as to whether a valid conclusion ex¬
isted or not and pressed the appropriate key. they could not change their mind. II they
chose "no", the computer would print the message "No valid conclusion" and proceed.
If they chose "ves", then the computer generated a menu consisting of the four quanti¬
fiers and the major and minor terms of the syllogism they had just read, the major and
minor terms being in random order. An example response for the syllogism shown in
Figure "2.1 is given in Figure 2.3
From this the subjects were instructed to choose a conclusion consisting of a quantifier
and then the two terms, in the order in which they thought they should appear. For
example the conclusion "none of the Germans are busdrivers" would be represented as
"none Germans busdrivers". as shown above. Once the subject had chosen a conclusion,
he or she pressed the RETURN key. The question "are you sure?" would then appear¬
and the subject had the chance to change the answer. If the subject was sure of the
answer he or she could respond "yes". If the subject attempted to choose more or less






























Figure 2.4: A sample recall menu
Once the conclusion was completed, the recall menu appeared. This consisted of
seven items, the four quantifiers and the three nouns that the syllogism just read had
contained. Figure '2.4 demonstrates what the subject woidd be shown and would have
to produce having been given the syllogism in Figure 2.1.
The nouns were not in the same order as they had appeared in the syllogism, for
example the middle term might appear first, the minor second and the major last. As
noted above, these nouns were unique for each syllogism and acted as a cue for the
syllogism concerned, so that the subject did not have to explicitly recall the nouns used
in the syllogism. He or she was required to list six items from the menu, two groups
of three consisting of a quantifier followed by two nouns, each group representing one










Figure 2.5: A sample menu at delayed recall
the butchers are French" the correct group of items to choose would be "All butchers
French'*, however the subject was at liberty to choose any quantifier and any order for the
nouns. Each premise had twenty-four different possible quantifier-noun combinations.
Once the list was complete, the subject pressed the RETTRN key and again was given
the opportunity to correct the reply. Again, if there were fewer or more than six items in
the list, the computer would prompt the subject to give the correct number. Once the
recall was completed, the instruction to press the SPACE bar appeared and the subject
could begin reading the next syllogism. Phis procedure was repeated for all thirty-two
syllogisms in the session.
As soon as the recall for the thirty-second syllogism was completed, the instruction
"recall the first syllogism" appeared, accompanied by the same menu that was used for
the recall immediately after the first syllogism had been read, with the exception that
the nouns were presented in a different order, as shown in Figure 2.5.
The subject could use the nouns in the menu as a cue for the syllogism in question
as no other syllogism had contained these nouns. As before the subject had to choose
six items from the menu which would capture all the information in the syllogism and
the order in which the items occurred. Once the first syllogism had been recalled
then a second menu appeared for the second syllogism and so on. until all thirty-two
syllogisms had been recalled a second time. The subject was then told that the session
was complete.
Exactly the same procedure was followed for the second session, which contained
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the thirtv-two syllogisms not yet encountered in the first session and a separate set of
nouns.
2.1.6 Summary of the data collected
The microcomputer used recorded the data for each subject. This consisted of an
identifying code for each syllogism; a note of tlie exact nouns used in each syllogism: the
conclusion given; a recall profile for immediate and delayed recall and the reading time
for each premise of the syllogism. The data was analysed using the BMDP statistical
analysis package.
The conclusion data consisted of the quantifier in the conclusion and the two nouns,
or a code corresponding to the response "No Valid Conclusion", bach possible type of
conclusion was therefore represented. The recall data consisted, as shown in figures 2.1
and 2.5, of six items, the first three being the recall of the first premise, headed by
the first quantifier and followed by the two nouns recalled as being in the premise, the
second three corresponding to the second premise. All possible versions of the syllogism
were captured in this way. There were a small number of responses that could not be
classified, these consisted entirely of instances where the same noun was repeated in one
premise. Errors of this type were excluded from the analysis.
The reading time for each premise of the syllogism was also recorded. In general the
reading time for the second premise was much longer than for the first. I he experiment
was designed so that the syllogism would no longer be available when t he subject reached
the point of being asked for the solution to the problem. This resulted in the subjects
processing the syllogism and reaching a conclusion for it when the second premise was
still available. Thus the time taken to read the second premise corresponds to the time
taken to process the syllogism and find an answer to it. The time taken to respond
to the first premise relates to the time taken to form a simple representation <>f the
information in the syllogism. Both measures of processing time will be used to test
hypotheses about the syllogistic reasoning.
2.2 Experiment Two
In this experiment, subjects were given all sixty-four syllogisms, as in Experiment One.
but rather than being asked to perform the standard task, were instructed to seek valid
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individuals, possessing all three properties in the syllogism in some respect, to report
the individual should they exist and if one could not be found, to note this too.
2.2.1 Subjects
Twenty-one subjects were used, aged between 18 and 40. all graduates or undergradu¬
ates. Some were paid for their participation, others were volunteers. The same criteria
for selected subjects were used for this experiment as for the first and for the same
reasons.
2.2.2 Materials
The syllogisms were printed each on a separate piece of paper, with enough room for
the subject to write her/his conclusion at the bottom.
2.2.3 Design
Every subject was intended to answer all sixty-four syllogisms. A fault in l lie program
producing the syllogisms meant that the IE syllogism of figure ah ch was replaced
with the EI syllogism of the same figure. Not every session was faulty however, and
the analysis has been adjusted to allow for this discrepancy. The syllogisms contained
distinct sets of nouns, as in Experiment One. Each syllogism contained a nationality,
an occupation and a hobby, pastime or other attribute. The syllogisms were presented
in random order.
2.2.4 Presentation
Each subject was given a general explanation of what syllogisms consist of. They were
given an example syllogism and the concept of a valid individual introduced. They were
invited to attempt the first syllogism and discuss their response. An example without
a valid individual was given and the subject asked to attempt it. Again their response
was discussed until the subject felt confident that s/he understood the requirements
of the task. The examples were chosen randomly from the subject's session and their
responses not altered. Once the subject felt confident the nature of the task was grasped
s/he was invited to begin solving the syllogisms. When these had been completed, the
finished papers were collected and the subject thanked for his/her participation.
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2.2.5 Analysis
The responses were transferee! by hand to a master sheet, and this was then processed
to a computer file, giving the subject number, response type and a score as to whether
the response was correct or not. Three subjects had success rates beneath 50%. These
were excluded from the analysis on the basis that their grasp of the task was too poor
to provide meaningful results. Response type was divided into the individual actually
chosen by the subject, represented by a series of positives and negatives and the order
the nouns in the individual appeared in. A category for "110 valid individual" was
also used. Certain responses were unclassifiable. usually because the subject had given
two responses without indicating his/her final choice or because only two of the three
categories were actually used. These responses were excluded from the analysis, further




Preliminary Investigation of the
Recall Data
3.1 Recall of the Quantifiers
When recalling the syllogisms, the subjects indicate wliicli quantifier they remember as
having occurred in the first and second premises of the syllogism. The errors made when
doing this are investigated in the following section. The first question to be addressed is
whether there are any differences in the number of recall errors for the different types of
quantifiers and whether there are differences in error rates between premises, figure :{.)
shows the mean error rates for each premise, each type of quantifier and for immediate
and delayed recall. The maximum number of errors for each category is sixteen.
A two-way Anova shows the significant differences between these means. There is a
significant difference in numbers of errors for immediate and delayed recall (F= I IX,TF
p<0.01). The type of quantifier is significant, for the first premise (1 = 19.95. p<0.01 )
and is significant for the second premise at delayed recall (F=TbN. p<().()."> from a one-
way ANOVA). The interaction between the type of quantifier and immediate versus
delayed recall is also significant for the first premise but not for the second (F =X.12.
p<0.01; F=1.96, n.s.). This implies that the pattern of recall errors is significantly
different at delayed recall compared to that at immediate recall, for the lirst premise.
Comparing the first and second premises shows that there is no effect of premise for
immediate recall, but that the second premise has significantly more errors than the first
for delayed recall (F=0.95, n.s.: F= 18.84. p<0.01). This comparison also shows signifi¬
cant interactions between the premise and the quantifier typo, as might be expected, as













some not 1.01 5.88
Figure 3.1: Mean recall errors for the quantifiers
j)<0.05; F="21.36. p<0.01).
An t. test shows that the difference between "All" and "Some..not" in t he first premise
is significant at immediate recall and the difference between "All" and the other three
quantifiers is significant at delayed recall. The difference between "All" and "Some..not"
for the second premise delayed recall is also significant, but there is no overall difference
between means for immediate recall of this premise.
Figures 3.'2 and .3.3 give the mean errors for quantifiers as a bar chart, for each
premise at immediate and delayed recall. There clearly is an effect of quantifier type -
"All'* has fewest errors in the first premise and "some not" in the second. "Some" has
second fewest errors in the second premise and in the first premise at immediate recall.
These differences are significant as lias been shown. The pattern of errors is similar for
delayed and immediate recall, though the differences between errors rates by quantifier
type is less pronounced at delayed recall.
To further investigate the effect of quantifier type on recall, the choices subjects ac¬
tually made when recalling a particular quantifier are shown in figure 3.1. For example,










Figure 3.3: Mean errors for t he second quantifier
equally likely 10 recall "all", "none" or "some not" when making an error'.'
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that "all" is a popular choice for the first premise quantifier,
when an error is made and that "some..not" and "some" are preferred for the second
premise. The patterns for immediate and delayed recall are roughly similar, but there
is a larger proportion of errors for delayed recall. The recalled syllogism, even when
incorrect tends to have a feature in common with the actual quantifier, thus "some" is
recalled for "all" and "some..not", "all" and "some..not" for "some". Instances where
the recalled quantifier has no features in common with the actual quantifier are uncom¬
mon, the only exception is when "none" was in the premise read, in this case "some" is
the second most common quantifer recalled as an error.
3.1.1 Quantifier pairs by recall errors
Figure 3.5 shows the number of errors for each pair of quantifiers. The first premise
quantifier is shown in the top row, t he second quantifier is foilnd in Ilie loft most colninn.
The total errors for each pair are shown as is the number of times both quantifiers were
wrong. Particularly high error rates are shown in bold typo. Following the double errors
are the number of times both quantifiers were wrong because they had been recalled in
reverse order.
There is a cluster of high total error rates for quantifier pairs wit h "all" or "some" as
the second quantifier and "none" or "some..not" as the first. The pairs "Some. None"
and "Some..not, None" also attract many errors. The reason for some of these high
error rates is shown by the number of double errors and reversals in the second table.
Pairs with "all" as the second quantifier tend to be reversed so that "all" is the first
quantifier. The pair "Some..not. Some" is also reversed to "Some, Some..not". The pair
with high errors rates that is not reversed would be transformed by reversal to a pair
that attracts a similarly high error rate. This is the case with "Some. None" and "None.
Some". In the other cases reversals change a pair into one that would not attract many
errors. These findings are in line with those above. Preferred pairs have "all" in the
first premise and "some" "none" or "some..not" in the second. Pairs that violate this
preference are liable to be reversed in memory so that they conform. The two pairs that
are not covered by this explanation are "Some. None" and "None. Some". The same
tables, for delayed recall, are shown in figure 33).
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First Premise. Immediate Recall
actual quantifier chosen quantifier
all some none some not
all 386 10 3 1
some 13 373 2 12
none •28 13 353 6
some not 4 45 0 351
Second premise. immediate recall
actual quantifier chosen quantifier
all some none some not
all 355 17 18 10
some 8 360 I 31
none I 14 356 23
some not 0 20 6 371
First premise del ayed recall
actual quantifier chosen quantifier
all some none some not
all 317 42 17 24
some 82 228 24 66
none 69 51 •228 52
some not 53 94 32 221
Second premise, delayed recall
actual quantifier chosen quantifier
all some none some not
all 170 85 52 73
some 36 226 30 108
none 28 62 205 101
some not 12 109 26 253
Figure 3.4: Actual quantifier by chosen quantifier
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Total errors all some none some not
all 2 12 23 19
some 6 6 21 22
none 11 17 9 23
some not 11 14 15 11
Both wrong all some none some not
all 0 9(8) 16(13) "(4)
some •2(0) 0 5(0) 9(8)
none 3(2) 2( 1) 2 4(0)
some not 0(0) 1(3) 4(0) 1
Figure 3.5: Errors for quantifier pairs, immediate recall
Total errors all some none some not
all 39 70 72 65
some 48 59 57 64
none 50 63 62 (if)
some not 40 69 54 65
Both wrong all some none some not
all 1.S 39(18) 40(14) 35(15)
some 13(4) 22 25(6) 34(15)
none 11(0) 27(4) 32 25(6)
some not 13(3) 21(11) 22 (1) 19
Figure 3.6: Recall errors for quantifier pairs, delayed recall
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The findings for delayed recall are similar 1o those for immediate recall, although
fewer of the double errors can be explained as reversals. The lal tor are also not so si rict I y
confined to pairs that are changed by reversal to pairs with low error rate. Perhaps at
delay, memory for the order of the pair has deteriorated more than the memory for
the actual items hence more pairs are recalled in incorrect order even though this may
create a pair that does not accord with the general preferences for quantifier type in
each premise outlined above.
Expressing quantifier errors in a different way can give further insight into the gen¬
eral trends underlying the individual mistakes that subjects make. Each of the four
quantifiers can be expressed in terms of two features each of which have two values.
One feature can have the value universal or particular the other 1 he value positive or
negative. The combination of these features that the quantifiers possess distinguishes it
from the others. "All" is positive and universal, "some" positive and particular, "none"
negative and universal and "some..not" negative and particular. This classification is
useful because it helps to show how all the errors act together to change some features
into others, including those where two features are changed. Figure -5.7 gives the abso¬
lute and percentage values for the first and second premises at immediate and delayed
recall for each of the four possible ways the features can change when an error is made
- universal goes to particular and vice versa, postive goes to negative and vice versa.
It can be seen from Figure T7 that for the first premise at immediate and delayed
recall the strongest trend is for a negative1 feature to change to a positive1, as would
be expected with the tendency to choose "all" for the first premise, but tin1 next most
frequent change is for a universal feature to change to a particular one at immediate
recall and for this change and its opposite, from particular to universal to be almost
equally frequent at delayed recall. This demonstrates that the preference for "all" is
by no means overwhelming for the first premise. The second premise at immediate
recall has two feature changes of almost equal frequency: universal to particular and
positive to negative at delayed recall, changes from universal to particular have become
a clear majority. Movement to no one particular quantifier can explain ihese changes,
they demonstrate a. trend that operates above the level of tin1 individual items. I hose
frequencies taken as a percentage of each group can be shown to become h \ss |)ron< h111 c<h1
front immediate to delayed recall, especially the change from negative to positive in the
immediate recall delay* d recall
first premise second premise first premise second premise
U to P 30 64 169 324
P to U 19 15 191 104
T to - 18 60 131 263
- to + 90 41 267 211
U to P 19.1% 35.6% 22.3% 35.9%
P to U 12.1% 8.3% 25.2% 11.5%
+ to - 11.5% 33.3% J 7.3% 29.2%
- to + 57.3% 22.8% 35.2% 23.4%
Figure 3.7: Feature change: absolute numbers and percentage
first premise.
3.1.2 Quantifier errors and the recall menu
It is apparent that recalling the quantifiers in syllogisms correctly or incorrectly does
not purely depend on superficial characteristics of memory such as serial position. One
example of this is the differential recall success for the quantifiers which depends on the
type of the quantifier and the premise it appeared in. To summarise, it has been shown
in the previous section that the quantifier "all" has fewer recall errors than the other
three quantifers when it appears in the first premise and the quantifier "some..not" is
similarly recalled more accurately than the other quantifiers when it appears in the
second premise. In addition, subjects tend to choose these two quantifiers when they
attempt to recall one of the others for the appropriate premise. There may be an obvious
explanation for this effect. When the subject is asked to recall the syllogism, s/lie are
given a recall menu which contains firstly the four quantifiers, then the three nouns
in the syllogism. The order of the nouns is randomised, because a particular feature
of interest was whether the subjects would bo able to correctly recall the order of the
nouns in the syllogism. However, the order of the quantifiers in the recall menu was not
randomised, but the quantifiers always presented in the order "all", "some", "none .
"some..not". This has the effect that the quantifier "all" is always the highlighted item
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First premise












all some none some..not
Immediate recall •23.1% 25.7% 23.8%. 27.1%
Delayed recall 15.4%, 30.1% 19.6%. 33.6%
Figure 3.8: Percentage choices for quantifiers
when the subject is given the recall menu and must choose the first quantifier. When
the identity of the actual quantifier is at all uncertain, the temptation must be. albeit
unconsciously, to choose the first item on the list. This may cout rilmte to the popularity
of "all" as a choice for first quantifier.
Does this explanation completely explain the recall results for the first quantifier,
however? For immediate recall the case that it does seems quite strong, "all" is generally
the most popular choice of quantifier and where it is not "some" is instead and as this is
the second quantifier in the menu, it seems reasonable to suppose that it will be second
choice where "all" would be too different from the original - where "some..not was
the actual quantifier for example. If the same were to be true for delayed recall, one
would expect the effect to be exaggerated: for as uncertainty about 1 he identity of the
quantifier increases, the likelihood of choosing one of the quantifiers from t he beginning
of the list should also increase. Figure 3.8 shows that the percentage of the total that
each quantifier gets does increase in the favour of "all" at delayed recall, but that this
is almost entirely at the expense of "none" and that "some" and "some..not" are not
much affected in their relative popularity by delay. The arrangement of the menu cannot
explain the fall in choices of "none" at delayed recall being greater t han for "some..not"
which is further from the beginning of the menu, nor the lack of an increase of choices
of '"some" which is next to "all" and might be expected to be chosen more frequently
where there is uncertainty but "all" would be too far from the original.
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The second quantifier is also probably affected by the order of the quantifiers in
the menu. When the subjects have completed their recall of the first premise, they
find themselves positioned in the nouns composing the last three items in the menu.
They must return to the top four items to choose the second quantifier and if they
proceed back up the list from bottom to top, the first quantifier they will encounter
will be "some..not". If, instead of proceeding up the list they choose to go down the
list, the item at the top of the menu -"all"- will become highlighted. The fact that
"some..not" is the most popular choice for the second quantifer may be due to many
subjects proceeding back up the list as described and finding "some..not." the first
quantifer they are able to choose. As hypothesised for the first quantifier, in cases of
uncertainty, this may well be the quantifier they decide upon. However, continuing the
explanation used for the first quantifier, "none" should then be I lie second most frequent
choice of quantifier and this is not so. "Some" is the most popular choice of quantifier
after "some..not" a finding that cannot be explained simply by the positions of the
quantifiers in ihe menu. Order effects in the menu cannot be as strong an explanation
for the choice of second quantifier as it is for the first, as the item chosen is not already
highlighted when the subject comes to recall it. as is the case with the first quantifier.
The subject must make a more active decision at this point in the recall to choose a
particular item. Figure 3.8 shows an accentuation of the effect, but again the pattern
of this effect cannot be explained by order effects in the menu except to note thai the
unpopularity of "all" in the second premise may be due to its overuse in the first -
subjects may compensate for ibis by tending to ignore it when selecting the second
premise. The accentuation of the effects of individual quantifiers upon recall should be
placed alongside the finding that when the quantifier errors are expressed in terms of
features, as in figure 3.7. the changes most pertinent to the quantifiers that might be
affected by the menu order tend to diminish with delay, because of the cumulative effect
of other types of changes.
When the choices for both premises are averaged and expressed as a percentage,
as in figure 3.0 it can be seen that the effect of the second premise outweighs that of
the first, producing an overall preference for the quantifiers "some" and "some..not" at
both immediate and delayed recall. In cases of uncertainty, subjects are likely to want to
make the most equivocal statements they can. the quantifiers "some" and "some..not"
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all some none some..not
Immediate recall 25% 26.6%, 23.1% 25.3%
Delayed recall 24% 28% 19.2% 28.2%
Figure 3.9: Percentage of overall choice
are the most likely to be true of the model formed from the syllogism and may be
preferred for that reason.
3.1.3 Summary of the quantifier errors
It has been found that choices of quantifier are not uniform over the two premises.
The first premise is significantly more likely to be recalled as containing the quantifier
"all" and the second as having contained the quantifiers "some" or "some..not". \\ lien
quantifier pairs occur that have these quantifiers but in the non-preferred order then
there is a strong tendency to recall them as having occurred in t he preferred order, that
is in reverse order to the original. The fact that the recall menu always presented the
quantifiers in a particular order suggests that this might be responsible for the trend
and this is supported by the increase in certain choices at delayed recall. However, other
features cannot be explained by the order of the recall menu, particularly t lie preference
for "some" in the second premise and the overall unpopularity of "none"
3.2 Recall of Noun Order
3.2.1 Recall variables used
When analysing the recall of the order of the nouns in the syllogisms, a number of
variables were used. The recall of the "rest of the syllogism". t hat is t lie nouns exel udi ug
the quantifiers, can be subdivided into two variables noun assignment, or whether
the correct nouns were recalled as the major, middle and minor terms respectively,
irrespective of whether the middle term was in the correct place and figure, or whether
the middle term occurred in the correct position, irrespective of whether the nouns had
been assigned correctly. For example the syllogism "All the French are butchers, some
of the skiers are French" might be recalled as "All the skiers are French, some of the













BABC 3.10 9.0 i
Figure 3.10: Mean recall errors for noun order
In the first case the figure is correct (BACH) hut the nouns are incorrectly assigned
(middle term=skiers not French). In the second case the noun assignment is correct
(middle term=French) but the figure is incorrect (ba hc not ba-ch).
The mean errors in Figure 3.10 are out of a maximum of sixteen. Analysis of variance
of the errors lor noun assignment and figure shown in this figure confirm that delay
significantly increases the number of errors for both variables (1=90.0 I. p<0.0l for
noun assignment; F=34.08, p<0.01 for figure). The effect of figure type is significant
for noun assignment (F=2.84. p<0.05) but not for figure. The interaction between
delay and figure type is not significant for noun assignment but is for figure (F = 2.72.
p<0.05). One-way Analysis of variance of figure type by errors shows t hat figure recalled
is significantly different by actual figure at immediate but not delayed recall (F = 3.97.
p<0.05). An t test shows that the difference in error rates for recalling figures ba-ch
and ba-bc is significant at immediate recall.
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the relative success of recall of the roles of the nouns in
and the figure of the syllogism for the four different figure types. For immediate and
delayed recall figure type ab-bc has a slight advantage over the other types and ba hc
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has the highest error rate for noun assignment for both immediate and delayed recall.
At immediate recall, the figure ba-bc has fewest errors for recall of figure, at delayed
recall it has most and ab-bc has least. It should be noted that the two figures that have
a first premise of the form a-b have the lowest noun assignment errors at immediate
recall and that at delayed recall the two figures with middle terms possessing different
grammatical roles in each premise have fewer errors than those where the syllogism has
the same grammatical role, in contrast to the error rates at immediate ret ail.
To further investigate the recall errors for the figure of the syllogism, the data has
been adjusted to exclude those cases where noun assignment was incorrect. The effect of
incorrectly recalling the noun assignment of the syllogism, even if the figure is correct,
is often to produce a syllogism that has more in common with anothei figure than
the original. lor example the figure ab-bc might be recalled as ha \r. The figure is
correct, but the incorrect noun assignment has produced something closer to a syllogism
with the figure ba-bc. The recall of the figure of the syllogism shows that the figure
ab-bc tends to be the hardest to remember for immediate recall. This contrasts with
delayed recall where the figures ab-bc and ba cb have the lowest error rales and \ h-cb
the highest.
Figure 3.13 shows the kinds of errors the subjects made when recalling a particular
figure. The figures have been adjusted to exclude all the cases where the noun assign¬
ment was incorrect. If this were not done then only the position of the nouns thought to
be the major, middle and minor terms coidd be compared. In the cases considered, the
terms a, b, c have been correctly assigned and the actual degree of similarity between
the actual and recalled syllogism can be compared as a. b and c are the same noun in
both the actual and recalled syllogism.
This figure demonstrates that the tendency at immediate recall is for the- subject to
choose a syllogism that has something in common wit h the one t hat was a< t ually given.
The preferred choice usually keeps the first two items in the syllogism the same, but
keeping the second two the same is also much more popular than having no items the
same. By the delayed recall stage the number of times the subject chooses a figure that
has no items in common with the actual figure has risen a great deal, while the number
of other errors has risen very little, in two cases not at all. The number of errors for






Figure 3.11: Mean error for noun assignment
ON
Data from "Untitled Data #1"




Figure 3.1'2: Mean error for figure
.">!)
immediate recall
actual figure recalled figure
ABBC BACB ABCB BABC tot at
ABBC' •280 8 25 32 ISO
BACB I 259 •21 38 169
ABC'B 3d 19 273 10 1 75
BABC' 17 45 3 •282 175
total 338 301 322 362
delayed recall
actual figure re( ailed figure
ABBC BACB ABCB BABC total
ABBC 160 31 34 32 1 19
BACB 30 14 7 27 38 120
ABCB 4d 37 140 29 120
BABC 40 49 11 132 1 15
total •276 264 212 •231
Figure 3.13: Actual figure by recalled figure
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Class St at us
First Premise Nouns (A.B) correct
Second Premise Nouns (B,C) correct
First Premise Order (B.A) correct
Second Premise Order (B.C) correct
Table 3.1: Type 1 recall
the same number of texts at delayed recall that have an incorrect figure hut correct
noun assignment, as at immediate recall.
3.2.2 A preliminary model of recall of noun order
An examination of the frequencies of the various types of errors that su bjects make when
recalling the order of the nouns in the syllogisms, suggests an analysis that divides the
process into a series of types.
Type 1
In these cases the subject has made no errors in the recall of the noun order of the
syllogism. This is demonstrated for a syllogism of the form ha hc in table 3.1. At
immediate recall 72.2% of syllogisms have made no errors (have a type I recall) at
delayed recall this has dropped to 37.-1% .
Type 2
Here, the identity of the nouns in each premise is correctly recalled, but their position
in one or both of the premises is forgotten. This results in one ol the premises having
the correct nouns recalled in the wrong order, that is reversed. The commonest type
of reversal error is for the first premise to be recalled correctly and the second to be
reversed in the manner described. The next most common is for the first premise to
be reversed and the second recalled correctly and the third for both premises to be
reversed, that is only the content of the premises to be recalled, not the order ol either
premise.
(il
Class St at us
First premise nouns (A.B)
Second premise nouns (B.C)
First premise order (B,A)





Table .3.2: Type 2 error
Immediate Recall Delayed Recall
Second Premise Reversed 27.25% 17.38%
First Premise Reversed 20.80% 14.19%
Both premises reversed 6.5% 10.59%
Figure 3.14: Percentage of total error for Type '2 errors
The percentage of the total error that these error types accounts for is shown in
Figure 3.14.
Type 3
Here, the subject can correctly recall the contents and order of one premise, usually
the first, but cannot remember which item was repeated in the other premise. In such
cases, the subject will not choose the original middle term in one premise to be repeated
in the other, but will incorrectly choose the major or minor term to be repealed. In
the majority of cases the position of the minor term is correctly recalled and tin- major
term simply replaces the middle term in the recall. In other cases, the position of the
minor term is also forgotten and it is recalled in the position the middle term originally
occupied. The same error types are found for the case where the second premise has
been correctly recalled and the first premise contains the error. An example of a type
3 error, using the classification for the syllogism of the form n,\ -hc shown in table 3.1
is given in table 3.3.
Figure 3.15 shows the percentage of total recall error that is accounted for by these
error types. The commonest error type is for the first premise to be correct and t he minor
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Class Status
First Premise Nouns (A.C)
Second Premise Nouns (B.C)
First Premise Order (C.A)





Table 3.3: Type 3 error
C' in correct position.
Immediate recall Delayed recall
Major Term Swopped for Middle





c in incorrect position.
Immediate recall Delayed recall
Major Term Swopped for Middle






Figure 3.15: Percentage of total errors for Type 3 errors
term c to be in the correct position in the second premise. All t hat has oc< uired in this
situation is for the major term to have been substituted into the second premise in the
place of the middle term. The second most common error is for the first premise to be
correct and the c term to have been moved to the other position in tin1 second premise,
with the A term occupying the original place of the c: term. Clearly, information about
the first premise is retained in preference to either noun assignment or order information
in the second premise.
Type 4
The identity of the middle term is recalled at t his stage, but its position in each premise
has been at least partly forgotten. Most commonly the position of the middle term
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Class Stat us
First Premise Nouns (B.C)
Second Premise Nouns (A.B)
First Premise Nouns (B.C)





Table 3.4: Typo 4 error
Immediate recall Delayed recall
Middle Term Correct 1 O.N |</ 13.40(X
Figure 3.16: Percentage of total errors that are Type I
is correctly recalled, but the other two nouns are "swopped" that is the major term is
recalled as having occurred in the second promise and the minor term as having occurred
in the first, and neither are repeated, in a smaller number ol cases only the identity ol
the middle term has been recalled, not its correct position in each premise. An example
is given in Table 3.4 following the syllogism described in Table 3.1.
This type of error involves recalling information that is forgotten in type 3 - namely
the identity of the middle term. It is likely that the circumstances under which type 3
errors will be made and those under which type I errors will occur will differ therefore.
Here, it will be noted that making a type 3 error requires a strategy that places most
importance on recalling the exact contents of one premise and t he use of t he information
that one term is repeated in both premises, however the wrong term is chosen to be
repeated, type 4 errors occur when most importance is given to the identity of the
middle term - this is correctly recalled, but the identities of the major and minor terms
swopped . In litis way each error type is complementary. The percentage of total error
types that type 4 errors account for. shown in Figure 3.16. demonstrates that this type
of error is less frequent overall than type 3 errors, although they become more common
at delayed rec;tll. while the overall percentage of type 3 errors drops from immediate to
delayed recall.
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Types of Noun Order Error
Information
Preserved









































Figure 3.17: Information preserved or lost by noun order error types
Type 5
This category includes all the remaining errors that have been made. In these cases, it
is possible that one of the noun roles has been correctly remembered and in a few cases
the figure of the recalled syllogism may Ire the same as the original.
Figure 3.17 summarises the kind of information preserved and lost by each of these
different types of error.
This demonstrates that there is a progression of loss of information moving from the
top to the bottom of the table. There is some justification for thinking ol these errors
as representing poorer and poorer memory of the order of the nouns in the syllogism
being remembered. It will be of interest to see if this type of progression can be linked
to quantifier error and to features of the original syllogism and conclusion drawn.
3.3 Processing the Figure
In the preceding section, the error types committed by the subjects have been analysed
into a number of categories. It has already been shown that the figures of the syllogisms
bo
are not uniformly represented in terms of different error types, of which these categories
are composed. At immediate recall, the figures ha-bc and ha ch both have higher
levels of noun assignment errors (type 3 and type -I errors capture most of these) than
the other two figures. These findings might be explained by reference to the processing
of the texts by the subjects. It is a feature of this experiment that the subject is obliged
to read the first and second premises separately. This means that when the subject
reads the first premise, s/he has no information about the nature of the second premise.
This implies that the subject can have no certainty about the roles of the nouns in
the first premise (which is the middle term, which is the major) or the figure of the
syllogism until the second premise has been read. In some cases the whole of the second
premise must be read before the whole structure of the syllogism is known, in others
just the first noun in the second premise indicates the exact structure of the text. The
subject is faced with a predicament when reading the first premise, therefore, hither
s/he suspends the interpretation of the first premise until the second has been read and
risks forgetting some of the information in it. or s/he makes an assumption about the
identity of the nouns and figure and risks having to change this if it is incorrect. As
the first premise has few recall errors it may be the case that the strategy is to make
assumptions about the identity of the members of the first premise, so that it is well
remembered, and risk some interference if this has to be changed.
When the first premise is read, the subject has a 50:50 chance of choosing t lie correct
noun as being the repeated one. If s/he makes an incorrect choice about the identity of
the middle term, there is an increased risk that at recall the term a will be remembered
as being the repeated term because that will be the assumption that was made before
the second premise was read. If the subjects have a bias towards choosing one or the
other of the nouns in the first premise as being t ho repeated one. t lien t his will affect t he
numbers of times this kind of recall error will happen by the form of the first premise.
It was noted above that the two figures with b a as the first premise are more prone
to errors in the recall of the noun roles. It is hypothesised that this occurs because
subjects tend to assume that the predicate of the premise is the repeated term. This
preference will mean that subjects will be right about the identity of the middle term
more often with ab-bc and ab-ck than with the other two figures, where one would
expect to find higher numbers of errors where \ has been incorrectly used as the middle
(hi
Immediate recall
Noun Order Both Right Error Reversed
Type 1 Error 91.0% 8.0% 1.0%
Type 2 Error 79.1%. 19.4% 1.6%
Type 3 Error 72.7% 24.2% 3.1%
Type 4 Error 45.8% 12.5%. 41.7%
Type 5 Error 56.3% 37.4% 6.3%
Delayed recall
Noun order Botli Right Error Reversed
Type 1 Error 60.6% 37.6% 1.8%
Type 2 Error 42.4% 53.6% 1.0%
Type 3 Error 27.6% 64.7% 6.4%
Type 1 Error 14.1% 00.1% 25.9%
Type 5 Error 15.3% 73.5% 1 1.2%
Figure 3.18: Percentage noun order errors by quantifier error
term in the second premise. For the figures ha cb and ba-hc 5% and 8% of the total
incidence of each figure have this error at immediate recall, compared with 3.<% and
3.2% for figures ab-bc and ab- cb.
3.4 Interactions Between Recall Variables
Figure 3.18 gives the percentage of each type of noun order error found for quantifier
errors across the first, and second premise. Because the interesting interactions seem to
involve differences in noun order error rather than quantifier error, the percentage of
each type of quantifier error has been calculated for each category of order error, the
changes for quantifier error by noun order error uniformly show a drift towards deeper
levels of error for noun order as recall of the quantifiers deteriorates. I his demonstrates
a clear interaction between the two recall variables. Immediate recall is generally good
and when there are no noun order errors (type 1) there tend to be few quantifier errors.
The relationship between quantifier and noun order recall is also demonstrated by













Figure 3.19: Percentage of correctly recalled texts by recalled quantifiers
they were reversed. This type of error increases with type of noun order error, with
the exception of type 4 errors. These are unusual in having much higher levels of cases
where the quantifiers were correctly recalled hut in reverse order. As this type of error
consists of reversing the roles and therefore the order of the ma jor and minor terms this
implies that reversal of one kind of informal ion is related to a reversal in another type
of information.
The type of quantifier found in the first or second premise might affect the recall
of the nouns in the premise. Certain quantifiers are preferred in each premise at recall
and whether this has any effect on noun order error should be determined. This can
be sub-divided into possible effects of the original quantifiers of the syllogism and the
effect of recalling a particular quantifier, whether this was the same as the original or
not.
As there are similar effects on accuracy of recall of nouns for both the original and
recalled quantifiers, figure 3.19 shows the percentage of the occurrences ol each type
of quantifier at recall where there were no errors in the recall of the nouns. There is
an interaction with both the first and second recalled quantifiers individually but not
between quantifier pairs and correctly recalled nouns at delay. There is no interaction
at immediate recall. For both the first and second quantifier "all" and "none" are
chosen in circumstances where memory for other parts of the syllogism is good. "Some"
and "some..not" do not have such high proportions of correctly recalled noun orders,
particularly "some". The fact that the effects for the first and second premise are roughly
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similar demonstrates that the preference for "all" in the first premise can not simply be
the result of guessing at the first item in the menu when memory is poor. There may
be an element of this, hence the lower percentage of correct noun recalls when "all" is
chosen for the first premise than when it is chosen for the second, but it cannot be the
only cause of this trend. Choosing "some" is always associated with poorer memory
and to a lesser extent "some..not". The summarised effect is that choosing universal
quantifiers is related to good memory otherwise, choosing particulars when there is
uncertainty about other parts of the text. The fact that the effect is also found for the
original quantifiers allows one to go further and suggest that particular quantifiers do
not allow as secure a memory for noun order as universal quantifiers. Similar effects are
found both for type 2 and type 3 errors, so either encountering or recalling a universal
quantifier seems to be related to fewer noun reversals within a premise and to better
recall of noun roles. Part of this may be due to the logic of certain quantifiers only
allowing one order of the nouns in its premise, if its logic is to be preserved. I lie
influence of this will be discussed in a later chapter.
One other effect should be noted. W hen choosing a subject for recall of i lie promises,
subjects have a tendency to prefer h as the subject term in both the firsi and second
premises. This is also associated with a particular type of quantifier change. Referring
back to the classification of the quantifier changes used above, when a quantifier in the
first premise changes from negative to positive, there is a stronger tendency to recall
the first term as having been b at both immediate and delayed recall. The ot her feature
worthy of note is that the preference for b as subject is accentuated by coi rect recall of
the quantifier of the premise in which it is to appear. These effects are siiinmarisod in
figure 3.20
3.5 Summary
Some main effects have been found in the recall data. I lie quantifier-, show large
differences in recall success depending on premise and tend to reverse their order to
suit an underlying preference for positive quantifiers to occur in the first premi-e and
particular ones in the second. The recall errors bear out this preference. The possibility
that the recall menu could be responsible for this trend is not supported. The recall
of the noun order shows a tendency for ba bc to be the preferred figure at immediate
bit
Immediate Recall
b Subject A Subject C Subject
First Premise 49.3% 47.3% 3.4%
Second Premise 48.8% 5.5% 45.7%
No Quantifier 49.4% 48.2% 2.4%
Error 49.7% 4.5% 45.7%
- to + Change 51.1% 10.0% 8.9%
First Premise
Delayed Recall
B Subject A Subject c Subject
First Premise 4 7.7% 42.7% 9.6%
Second Premise 40.3% 10.6% 13.0%
No Quantifier 50.7% 44.8% 4.5%
Error 45.3% 11.1% 43.5%
- to + Change 46.1% 38.6% 15.4%
First Premise
Figure 3.20: Percentage of recalls with each noun as subject by total, recall without
quantifier error and negative to positive changes
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recall and ab--bc at delay. The recall of the noun roles (or noun assignment) varies
according to whether the first premise of the figure was of the form b a or \ b. errors
being more prevalent in the former case. It is hypothesised that this is the result of
subjects tending to assume that the predicate of the first premise is t he repeated one and
therefore mistakenly repeating a in the second premise, recalling this as the repeated
term.
The noun order errors can be subdivided into various types and these related to
recall of the quantifiers. It is found that there seems to be a progression of noun order
error, with reversals of nouns within a premise type 2 errors occurring more frequently
when there are no quantifier errors than type •') errors, where the major or minor term
is mistakenly recalled as the middle term. The finding that noun roles are better re¬
membered on the whole than figure, suggests that forgetting this information represents
quite a major disruption in memory. It is also found that reversal of quantifier order
tends to occur with reversal of the major and minor terms (type I errors), l'lie types
of quantifier also play a part in the recall of the nouns. I his is belter (as represented
by type 1 recall) when the recalled or original quantifiers are universal and there are
more type 2 and 3 errors when the quantifier was particular suggesting that universal
quantifiers lead to better consolidation of the rest of the premise they appear in.
The preferences for the quantifier will later be explained in terms ol the ordering
of negative and positive information, but the interaction between quantifier and noun
order recall suggests that particular information is found in the second premise because
it is less determinate than universal information and must therefore act as qualification
rather than introductory material. The fact that only "all" is both positive and universal
explains why this quantifier is so often found recalled in the first premise. ( haracterictic
errors in the recall for the noun order will be explained in terms of t he subjeets" attempts
to find a topic or focus for the argument the syllogism is about.
Chapter 4
The Reasoning Data
Experiment One allowed subjects to choose any form of conclusion they wished with the
restriction that if a conclusion be drawn the two nouns in it be the subject and predicate
terms. The answers given are summarised by syllogism in Appendix A. Experiment Two
asked subjects to find valid individuals rather than conclusions. These results are given
in Appendix B. A general discussion of the reasoning results found for each experiment
is given and factors such as the number of models required to solve the syllogism and
the figural effect are considered. Anomalies and findings peculiar to each experiment are
also discussed and the implications of these for a formulation of the reasoning strategy
of the subjects summarised.
4.1 General Findings: Experiment One
The percentage of answers that were correct overall was (id.9%. Johnson-Laird and
Steedman (1978) found a correct response rate of 58% for the first trial and (is1/ for
the second. The percentage of syllogisms with no valid conclusion that were correctly
answered was 69.3%, so there seems to be a difference belween subjects ability to give
the response "no valid conclusion" correctly and to report a correct conclusion.
After -Johnson-Laird the syllogisms are divided into those requiring one. two or three
models to be given a correct valid conclusion and two and three1 models to be found to
have no valid conclusion and the percentage correct responses shown in Figure I.I.
The claim that the number of models affects performance is upheld by this data
(F=39.69, p<0.01) although there is clearly not a linear relationship between number
of models and percentage correct answers. In fact the difference between two and three









Figure 4.1: Percentage correct conclusions by model: Kxperiment One
model syllogisms with a valid conclusion is not significant (t=0.N3 n.s.). Again, per¬
formance is improved on the syllogisms without a valid conclusion. Although .lohnson-
Laird claims models are constructed for these syllogisms as for those with a conclusion,
the difference in subjects' success at correctly answering "no valid conclusion and
drawing a correct conclusion tends to suggest that the correspondence between these
two types of syllogisms is not as close as he suggests. Testing shows that two model
syllogisms with a valid conclusion are answered with significantly less accuracy than
two model syllogisms without a valid conclusion (t = 7.(17. p<().()()()() 1 ). The same is also
true of three model syllogisms with and without valid conclusions (t=2.95. p<0.003).
Given that the explanation for differences in error rates lies with tin1 number of models
required to solve the syllogism, in that the greater the number of models the greater the
likelihood that memory will fail, it is difficult to see how such a hypothesis can account
for these differences. The lower number of errors for syllogisms without a valid con¬
clusion suggests that subjects are able to detect the lack of a valid conclusion without
cycling through all the models required and are therefore avoiding the major source ol
error.
4.1.1 Syllogisms with no valid conclusion
A closer examination of two model syllogisms with no valid conclusion reveals differences
in error rates within the group. Syllogisms with the quantifiers "hoik1" and "some..not"
in whichever order are sometimes prone to higher error rates (see figure 1.2).
The type of quantifiers affects the ability of the subjects to correctly solve the syllo¬
gism (t. = 5.79. p<0.00001). A similar effect is found for .Johnson-1.aird ami Steedinan s
(1978) data. For example in the first experiment, subjects achieved the percentage
correct answers shown in Figure -1.3.
73





Figure 4.2: Correct responses for syllogisms with no valid conclusion





Figure 4.3: Johnson-Laird and Stoedman's daia
As all these syllogisms require two models for a correct answer to he given, there
is no explanation for this effect in these terms, as the probability of finding the cor¬
rect response should be the same. Another explanation for this effect must then be
found. Examining the syllogisms with the quantifiers "none" and "some..not" it can
be seen that the error rates within this group are not uniformly affected. Figure 4.4
demonstrates this.
As shown, these asymmetries are reflected in the number of correct responses for
the syllogisms with the quantifiers "none" and "some", but in the opposite direction.
This tendency is particularly strong for the two figures ah hc and ha ch and the
asymmetry for the "none, some" pairs is related to the figural elled. The cases with
high correct responses are those where a (igural conclusion exists and those with low
Figure None/Some..not Some., not /None None/Some Some/None
ab-bc 19 13 (j 17
ba-cb 13 21 15 5
ab-cb 13 20 10
ba-bc 14 10 II 12
Figure 4.4: Number of correct responses for None/Some..not syllogisms
rates, where an antifigural conclusion only is correct. In t lie latter case, high levels of
incorrectly given NVC1 reponses are found and this provides t he probable answer to the
asymmetries in the "none, some..not" pairs. It has already been mentioned that "some"
and "some..not" are easily confused. Recall data is used above and will be used later
to demonstrate this point. If this is taken to be the case, then these conclusion rates
can be explained. If "some" is substituted for "some..not" then in the figures ah-hc
and ba-cb there will be a strong temptation to report an erroneous conclusion in cases
where afiguraJ conclusion exists for the "none, some" pair. In cases where transforming
"some..not" into "some" results in a syllogism that has an antifigural conclusion, there
will be a tendency to report "no valid conclusion" as happens for the "none, some" pair
and there will be an apparently higher correct answer rate. The asymmetries lor the
two other figures are harder to explain. In the case of ha bo the asymmetry is small
and as would be expected the correct response rates are low for the "none. some..not
syllogisms as the responses to the "none/some" cases are not affected by figure. The
asymmetry for ab-C'B may be related to the very faint asymmetry found for the "none,
some" pairs in this figure, or perhaps to the rather larger asytnineiry in incorrectly
given NVC responses for these syllogisms - "some. none", to which "some..not. none" is
supposed to be equivalent, has 15 NVC responses, while "none. some", to which "none,
some..not" is supposed to be equivalent has only 9. This reflects t lie asymmetry of the
equivalent "none. some..not" pairs, but the explanation for this has yet to he found.
4.2 General Effects: Experiment Two
Rather than perform the standard2 task subject were here asked to try to find a valid
individual for the syllogism. Validity in this case is defined in the same way as lor a
valid conclusion: the individual found must describe a. state of affairs that necessarily
exists, whatever the interpretation of the syllogism. All three nouns in t he syllogism
must be used, but the individual can be asserted to have or not to have any combination
of these properties. There are eight distinct types of individual the subject can choose
from plus six orders in which the nouns can appear, so for example if a subject chose
'Here, as in other parts of the text, the response "no valid conclusion" is referred to by its iiiitals.
for brevity's sake
2The paradigm where subjects are asked to search for and report valid conclusions linking tin terms
A and C will be referred to as the "standard" task.
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the individual -fa-b+ c' the nouns could appear in this order, or in the order -b + a + c
or +c+a-b and so on. The full list of types of individuals is given in ligure l.~>. hlie
subjects also have available the response "no valid individual"® if they are unable to
find an individual that meets the criteria for validity. It can be seen, of course that
individuals with one or two terms negated are the most common, in practice there are
seven syllogisms that have an individual with all positive terms, twenty where the valid
individual has one negative, eight where two negative terms are needed and none where
all three terms can be negative. The latter response is chosen occasionally, but it is very
rare.
Dividing the syllogisms by model as was done for the data in Ex periinent One shows
a rather different pattern from that found above for the standard task. Syllogisms with
no valid individual cannot be divided into two and three models in quite the same way
as before because the groups do not necessarily contain the same members' and this
would make a comparison meaningless. All no valid individual syllogisms are given as
one group therefore. The syllogisms with valid conclusions all have valid individuals
also, so a direct comparision is possible. In figure l.ti a difference can be seen between
syllogisms of only one model and those with two or three models, but the progression
of difficulty between two and three model syllogisms is not found, in fact two model
syllogisms prove to be a little harder than their three model counterparts. Syllogisms
without a valid conclusion also show the advantage found in Experiment One having a
rather higher success rate than, two and three model syllogisms. The diffetences within
the groups as a whole is significant (F=N.7 p<0.001) and testing between groups shows
that the one model syllogisms fare significantly better than all other types ol syllogism
and that those with NVI better than two and three model syllogisms that do have a
valid individual.
4.2.1 Individuals where no valid conclusion exists
When Stenning's modified Eider's circles notation is adopted, it has been shown that
certain syllogisms that do not normally have a conclusion do have a valid individual as
mentioned above, revealed by t'.e presence of double hutching. The EE syllogisms always
3This will be occasionally referred to as NY] for short
4This is due to the fact that some syllogisms that have no valid conclusion do have a * a I id individual
and therefore these syllogisms have been excluded from this analysis
i b
No Negative One Negative Two Negatives All Negative
Terms Term Terms Terms
hline +a+b+c + a+ b-c 4-a-b-c -a-h-c
+a-b+c' -a+b-c
-a+b+c -a-b+c
Figure 4.5: Types of individual for Experiment Two
Number of Models % ('ori en t




Figure 4.6: Percentage correct responses by number of models: Experiment I wo
have individuals of this type, so do three of the KO and three of the OF syllogisms.
From these syllogisms, examples of which are shown in figure 1.7 can be drawn the fact
that an individual of the form +b-a-c exists. The data from Experiment Two has been
analysed to see if subjects are capable of finding these conclusions. A comparison of the
percentage of correct responses is given in figure 4.M for the syllogisms that do yield an
individual and the EO. OE and 00 syllogisms that do not. From this it can be seen
that subjects do find the individuals, but that they are less accurate than lor similar
syllogisms that do not have a valid individual, or making the comparison to figure 4.6.
than syllogisms in the standard task that have two or three models. The presence of
these individuals that cannot be expressed in terms of conclusions, does not affect the
standard task. In fact syllogisms with no valid conclusion that are double hatched are
easier not harder to solve. Therefore the presence of one of t liese individuals does not
confuse the subject into believing that a conclusion also exists.
I I
None of the B are A g A
Some of the B are not C B ~C
None of the A are B ~A B
None of the B are C B ~C
Figure 4.7: Syllogisms with no valid conclusion hut a valid individual





Figure 4.8: Percentage correct responses for syllogisms with no valid conclusion, hut
where in some cases an individual does exist
Overall Success Rate a-c Conclusions c A ('oncl tisiotis
ab-bc 63.9% 78% 22%
ba-cb 62.75%' 24.4% 75.6%
ab-c'b 64.75%. 50.6% 19,1%
ba-bc 64.5%. 58.1% 11.4%
Figure 4.9: Choice of conclusion by figure: Experiment One
Figure Overall Success Rate A first 15 first ( ' fi 1 St
ab-bc 78.3% 60,5% 35.9% 3.6%
ba-cb 74.8% 4.7% 11.9% 53,1%
ab-cb 74.3% 35,1% 20.0% 1 1,5%
ba-bc 88.2% 6.0% 91.2% 2.8%
Figure 4.10: Percentage of each noun in first position by figure: Experiment I wo
4.3 The Figural Effect
There is no significant difference in the success rate for correct conclusions between
figures in Experiment One but a strong figural effect is found in figure 1.4.
Overall there are slightly more a-c type conclusions (52.56%) than c a (4i.II%)
possibly reflecting a. tendency to choose the first premise noun for t he subject of the con¬
clusion, where other factors such as the figural effect do not operate (t= 1.51 I. p<().()•">).
There is a significant effect of figure on the frequencies of different types of conclusions
(F=6.75. ])<().01).
A figural effect can also be found for Ex[>eriment Two by comparing the numbers ol
times each noun appeared in first position when an individual was reported. Comparing
the percentage of the responses for each noun and figure demonstrates a strong figural
effect that is significant (F= 16.85 p<0.00001). The overall success rate is significant In¬
different for the four figures (F=7.7 p<0.001). with the difference between ha hc and
the other figures being significant. Thus, subjects find this figure easier to solve than
the other three.
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Type of % of Incorrect %• of Total
Syllogism Conelusions Responses
NYC 92.4% not applicable
One Model 78.9% 44.1%
Two Models 84.1% 49.4%
Three Models 88.0% :{().:}%
Figure 4.11: Atmosphere response as a percentage of incorrect responses
4.4 The Atmosphere Effect
Strong evidence has been presented that subjects do use an aggloinerative representa¬
tion followed by cycles of testing to solve syllogisms. Discrepancies in the results for
syllogisms with no valid conclusion have been investigated, further discussion of this
follows in a later section. As previously stated however, there are claims that subjects
do not necessarily draw conclusions by the mental models method but are. consistently
or on occasion, using the "atmosphere" of the syllogism to generate conclusions. Many
correct conclusions are in line with atmosphere anyway, particularly 1 hose requiring only
one model to be solved. Two and three model syllogisms often have conclusions not in
line with atmosphere, syllogisms with no valid conclusion never do. of course. Instances
where an incorrect conclusion was given, either because none existed, or because a dil-
ferent conclusion was correct are examined to see what proportion are in accordance
with the atmosphere effect. Figure 4.11 gives the results.
Clearly, when an incorrect conclusion is drawn, it is overwhelmingly likely that it
will be in accordance with atmosphere. This is particularly the case for syllogisms that
have no valid conclusion and the tendency increases steadily with the number ol models.
However it is also not true that all conclusions are obtained by this method, otherwise
"no valid conclusion" would never be reported. Politzer( 19x9) suggests that in cases
where the capacity of the subjects is on treadled, in this case one presumes memory
capacity, then conclusions will be given according to atmosphere. One would therefore
expect increasing numbers of atmospheric conclusions as the numbers of models needed
to solve the syllogisms increases, both in terms of the proportion of incorrect conclusions
s()
given and the proportion of incorrect answers given. As already stated 1 lie former is
found, as the number of models increases, so the percentage of incorrect conclusions
that are atmospheric increases. The same is not true however of the proportion of the
total incorrect responses that are atmospheric. This increases bet-ween syllogisms with
one or two models, but declines sharply for three model syllogisms. The reason for
this, also shown in figure 4.11 is that the number of NVC responses increases sharply
at this point. This suggests that rather than draw conclusions in line with atmosphere
when their capacity to solve a syllogism rationally is exhausted, subjects will give the
response '"no valid conclusion". The atmosphere effect then appears more to be an
underlying trend, perhaps as the result of a group of subjects failing to combine and
test the premises and using a representation of the form l'olitzer suggests.
4.4.1 Matching
Gilhooley and Wetherick claim to have found a group of subjects who do not interpret
the syllogism in such a way that conclusions can be rationally drawn. As already
discussed they identify a group of subjects whose characteristic performance consists of
finding a conclusion whose quantifier matches that of the original syllogism.
This group was found by using a set of six syllogisms that are particularly tempting
for subjects who might be using this strategy, as both the quantifiers are the same and
the syllogism actually possesses no valid conclusion, making matching responses easy
to identify. Ilere, the syllogisms that can be used to identify matching responses have
been extended to cover all the syllogisms where both quantifiers are the same and no
valid conclusion exists, to combat sparsity of data.
To show that matching is a strategy explicitly adopted by certain subjects, the
number of correct conclusions can be correlated with the number of syllogisms from the
subgroup that were given a "matching" conclusion. If some subjects are not treating
the syllogisms as logical problems and are generating solutions for them by choosing
a quantifier from the syllogism, then their overall success rate will be lower than it
will be for subjects who approach the syllogisms logically, as matching cannot generate
a correct conclusion in every case. Correlating number of correct com lusioiis with
number of matches gives r=-0.50'2 p<().()()■">. In other words, the higher the number
of correct conclusions, the lower the number of matches on the identifying subgroup.
si
Matchers might also bo expected to use the response "no valid conclusion" rather less
frequently than those using a logical strategy, as mat clii ng can not generate t his response.
A correlation between the number of "no valid conclusion" responses, excluding the
diagnostic syllogisms, and the number of matches gives r=-0.169. p<0.01. showing that
the number of matches is inversely related to the number of times a subject responds
that there is no valid conclusion.
It is also the case that the number of matches a subject produce's correlates signifi¬
cantly with the number of a-0 conclusions s/he has produced. The higher the number
of matches, the higher the number of a-c conclusions (r=+0. is 1. p<0.05). There is
a small negative correlation between the number of matches and the number of ( a
conclusions, which is not significant (r= 0.12. u.s.). "Matching" subjects prefer a c
conclusions, as do the subjects as a whole, but the more likely subjects are to choose
non-logical responses, the more likely they are to chose a c conclusions. The preference
for a-c conclusions appears to be related to a non-logical approach to syllogisms.
A sub-group of subjects can thus be identified that are generating conclusions with¬
out considering the logic of the syllogisms whatsoever. They are obviously regarding
the task as a question of interpret! ng the li kely out come of a st ate of afl'ai rs and a re bas¬
ing their judgements on a commonsense evaluation of the information they have been
given. In the case of syllogisms where both quantifiers are the same it is manifestly
sensible to assume that the same relationship holds between the two elements of the
conclusion. It is most helpful to think of mat chi ng as t he part of t he at tticsphere effect
that relates to a particular group of syllogisms. It is to be expected tluui that the group
of matchers found, will go on to use the other principles of the atmosphere eflcct to
generate conclusions for syllogisms where the two quantifiers are different.
4.4.2 The relevance of the atmosphere effect
It might be argued that the existence of a group of subjects that are not using a rational
approach to solving syllogisms is of little relevance to the mental models paradigm. If
the latter is taken as the normative way subjects who comprehend the logic of the
syllogism set about finding a correct solution to it. it seems of minor interest to note
that some subjects do not grasp the logical reqtiicements of t lie t ask and li nd ot her ways
to provide a response. As already argued however.it is important to establish that such
so
subjects exist in order to bo able to answer the question "Do all subjects, irrespective
of strategy use the same represent ation for I lie syllogism before seeking a response?".
From Johnson-Laird's point of view it is important to claim that at some level all
representations are the same and are mental models, because this conception of the
representation is crucial to his explanation of the figural effect (see below). Figure 4.12
demonstrates that the figural effect is common to all subjects, even when those subjects
using matching responses are considered separately from those that are not. An A nova
demonstrates that the effect of figure is significant (F= 7.18 p<0.0001) and that there
is an effect of being assigned to the group "matching" or "non-matching" (F = 5.I2
p<0.02). This relates to the percentage of .v-c and o ,\ conclusion given by the two
groups. For the non-matchers the proportions of the two response types are nearly
equal(50.1% for A-c, 49.9% for C-A) while for the matchers there is tendency to draw
more A-c conclusions (57.4% versus 42.6%).
The figural effect does not depend therefore on the strategy used to solve the syl¬
logism. although it is affected by it. One candidate theory is that all subjects use1 a
common strategy or representation that predisposes the choice of certain conclusions
following certain syllogisms and then deductive or non-deductive strategies are used.
Johnson-Laird's tableaux are certainly a candidate for this. The alternative is to sup¬
pose that the figural effect has two causes: for subjects not using a deductive approach
it is the result of. for example, a representation such as the one 1'olit/er proposes, dis¬
cussed in chapter 1. For su bjects who do grasp the logical roqui rem en 1 s of the syllogism,
tableaux are used. One's preference is naturally for the former argument, it stretches
credulity a little to believe that an effect as strong and consistent as tin- figural ellect is
in reality the result of two quite different mechanisms, which may change m the course
of one experiment.
The question is to determine if all subjects do in fact use a representation such as
the one that Johnson-Laird proposes and that some just fail to use this representation
in any deductive way. One interesting comparison to make is between the performance
of subjects making greater than average matching responses and those making less than
average on syllogisms that require only one model for a correct valid conclusion to be
drawn. In a case such as this, the conclusion requires no testing to be validated, it simply
presents itself as the only possible answer to the syllogism. In many cases it also matches
s:S
Non-mat cliers




AB CB 48.8'X 51,2'X
BA BC 54. FX 45.9 V?
Mat cliers
Figure AC C A
concl usions conclusions
AB BC 76. FX 23.9 V?
BA-CB 36.4 (X 63.6V?
AB CB 52.6'X 4 7,-FX
BA BC 45.9V? • 18.2V?
Figure 4.12: Thefigural effect by matcliiug and noii-matcliiiig subjects
Syllogism Type Non-matchers Mat ( hers
No Valid Conclusion 19.7% 12.6%
One Model 5.4% 22.5%
Two Model 49.2% 71.7%
Three Model IN. l % SI.9%
Figure 4.13: Error rate for conclusions by matcher and non-matchers
one of the quantifiers in the syllogism. If all subjects use a tableau representation to
agglomerate the premises of the syllogism, one would expect all subject-., no matter
their strategy in other circumstances to be equally able to find the valid conclusion
for one model syllogisms. Figure 1.13 shows that error rates for one model syllogisms
are different depending on the performance of the subject on t he diagnostb "matching"
syllogisms. This leads to the conclusion that subjects prone to make matching responses
do not have access to an agglomerated representation such as a mental model.
The implication of this, is t hat t lie figural effect is not t lie result of using a particular
kind of representation, but that its mechanism lies in some feature of the syllogism
commonly accessible to all types of s1 rategy. Recall data will be used in the next chapt cr
to further illustrate this point. With respect only to the recall data, asymmct ries in
conclusion choice can be found for the parallel figures that seem to be explicable on the
basis of the quantifiers found in the syllogism.
4.4.3 Conclusion types and quantifier order
The distribution of types of conclusion is not itni form for t lie t wo figu res not sit pposed t o
show a figural effect. For the figures ah cb and ha bc the frequency ol conclusion types
varies for different syllogisms. This is best demonstrated with t he one-model syllogisms
where either an A-c or c-A conclusion is valid. Figure -I.14 shows I lie frequencies for
each type of syllogism considered.
It is evident from the frequencies that only one of the four syllogisms shown gives
an equal number of A-c and c-A conclusions. An inspection of the quantifiers ol the
syllogisms shows that the a-c preference arises when the syllogism begins with the
quantifier "all". This preference does not arise when t he syllogism has aunt herquantifier
No
Syllogism ('onel usion
All A are B.
No C are B.
N o A a re C (17)
No C are A (7)
No A are B.
All C are B.
No A are C (9)
No C are A (13)
Some B are A.
All B are C'.
Some A are (' ( 1 "2)
Some C are A (12)
All B are A.
Some B are (_'.
Some A are (.' (16)
Some (' a re (' (S)
Figure -1.14: Frequencies of conclusion type
in the first premise. A chi-square test finds that the type of conclusion is related to the
type of syllogism in the case of the figure ah en (X = 3.19 p<(). 1) hut not for figure ha h<
(X=1.14 n.s.). There are two plausible mechanisms by which such an asymmetry could
arise. The first might be to suppose that a c and c a are equally likely lo be chosen
for these two figures, but that certain conditions favour the choice o| a < conclusions
or suppress the choice of c'-a conclusions, much in the same way as the figural effect
operates. The second would be to assume a slight preference (or a c conclusions overall,
as already shown, and suppose that a second preference is supplementing the first under
certain conditions and conflicting with it in others. Thus for some syllogisms there
will be a marked increase in the number of a c conclusions and in others, the slight
disadvantage of c—A conclusions will be overcome, producing nearly equal numbers ol
conclusion types. The second hypothesis better explains the data.
One of the conditions for the second preference seems to be the presence ol the
quantifier "all" in the first premise. It has already been shown in the recall data that
"all" is the preferred quantifier when the first premise is being recalled. Subjects tend to
make fewer recall errors when the quantifier in the first premise was "all and they also
tend to choose "all" when making an error in recalling another quantifiet lor the first
premise. They will also tend to reverse the quantifiers in a syllogism that has "all in







Figure 4.15: Percentage of responses hv quantifier order
appear to have, therefore, a preference for quantifiers to be in a certain order and it
is hypothesised that this may be the result of a tendency to state positive information
before negative. When searching for a conclusion to syllogisms that conform to this
preference subjects might be inclined to choose a as a topic for the conclusion in line
with the preference. In the case where "all" occurs in the second premise, some subjects
might seek a conclusion that gives subject position to the noun in this premise, in this
case the c term.
By dividing the syllogisms into those that have "all" as the lirsi quantifier and those
that have it as the second (but excluding t lie syllogisms where bnt h quantifiers are "all",
the effect of quantifier order 011 t he syllogisms as a whole can be examined. In figure 1.15
the percentages of each type of conclusion are given for these two groups ol syllogisms.
A test of significance finds a just significant result (1' = 2.7 p<(). 1) demons! rating 1 hat a
syllogism with the quantifier "all" in the lirst premise is more likely to be given an A c
conclusion than c-a and that 1 he opposite is true for syllogisms where "all" appears in
the second premise.
4.4.4 The figural effect - a summary
The figural effect has been shown to operate and an overall preference for a < con¬
clusions found. The finding of a group of subjects who make "matching" responses,
inexplicable in a purely deductive framework that also show a figural effect throws
doubt on explanations for this effect thai depend on the existence of an agglomerated
representation from which simple deductive responses can be made. Rather than pro¬
pose a two mechanism model for the figural effect, it is argued that the effect is the
result of processing or strategies that occur independently of deductive reasoning. One
s?
such strategy has been found to be the order of the quantifiers in the syllogism, with
the end-term associated with a universal quantifier tending to take subject position in
the conclusion of the parallel5 figures.
An alternative explanation for the figural effect, one that does not depend on an
agglomerative representation is therefore needed. One such, suggested by Gilhooley
and Wetherick and mentioned in Chapter 1 is that the relevant subject term is taken as
the subject of the conclusion. Thus for the figures ab-bc and ba-cb, a and c will lie
chosen as the subject terms respectively. The other two figures cannot be explained so
simply, because in these cases no one suitable term possesses subject position. Noticing
that a-c conclusion are preferred overall suggests that subject might simply choose the
first mentioned end-term as the subject for the conclusion where grammatical roles are
not unambiguous. In the case of ba bc where neither candidate is in the subject, this
strategy should and does appear to influence the1 overall incidence of a-c conclusions.
The factor relating to quantifier order also plays a part. and i n II nonces t lie choice t < >wards
c-a conclusions under certain circumstances. The figure ab ck has two subject terms
that could be chosen, one would expect and finds that almost equal numbers ol each
conclusion appear, with the quantifier order biassing the choice for particular syllogisms.
Thus an alternative explanation for the figural effect can be found, which, while
not unitary, can account for any subjects displaying the effect, whatever their logical
competence.
4.5 Strategies for Syllogisms Without a Conclusion
As was noted above, there are discrepancies between the response success for syllogisms
that require two or three models to lie solved, that have or do not have a valid conclusion.
Syllogisms of this type thai have no valid conclusion are answered with greater success
than syllogisms that do. This effect is not explicable using the mental models paradigm
and it seems clear that subjects have access to another strategy that allows them to
make a decision about the presence or absence of a conclusion without needing to cycle
through candidate conclusions and run the risk of erroneously accepting a nou-valid
conclusion because of a failure of memory capacity. Stenningf 1990) has proposed that
^Figures where the middle term has the same grammatical role in both premises can he described
as "parallel figures (BABC and ABCB). The other two figures can be termed "diagonal figures
XX
B All of the A are B
Some of the A are B
None of the A are B
Some of the A are not B
Figure 4.16: Stenning's version of Filler's circles
subjects, once they have begun to use an agglomerative representation, notice that
almost all syllogisms with a valid conclusion have something in common. This can best
be illustrated by the use of his adaptation of Filler's circles, using a hatching notation.
Figure 4.16 shows that hatching the areas where an individual is definitely asserted to
exist can in some cases lead to one area being double hatched. This indicates, in some
cases that a valid conclusion to the syllogism exists. In only two syllogisms is t here a
valid conclusion where the corresponding diagram has no double hatching (figure 1.17).
There are some syllogisms that have double hatching but no valid conclusion and a
greater number that have no double hatching and no valid conclusion. Double hatching
is closely related to the phenomenon of cancellation, which allows the B term to be
removed from the syllogism because it is either positive or negative in both premises.
Some subjects therefore could have access to this strategy without needing to form an
agglomerated representation of the syllogism. To investigate the existence of such a
strategy, data from both the experiments will be considered.
so
AH of the A are B A B
C~BSome of the C are not B
Some of the A are not B A-B
C BAH of the C are B
Figure 4.17: Syllogisms with a valid conclusion but 110 double hatching
4.5.1 The individuals experiment
It has been shown in an earlier section that for this experiment syllogisms without a
valid individual are not answered more accurately overall than those that do have a
valid individual, in contrast to the findings for the standard task. 1 In1 next question
to be considered is whether the presence or absence of double hatching or cancellation
will affect the subjects ability to correctly answer the syllogism. Syllogisms that did not
cancel were answered with greater accuracy than those that did cancel (see figure I.IS)
A break down of accuracy of response by whether the syllogism cancelled and whether
a valid individual existed or not is shown in figure 4.19. Mere it can be seen that the
presence or absence of cancellation strongly affects the ability of the subjects to find
that no valid individual exists. It is also the case that syllogisms that do not cancel
but have a valid individual are answered with much less accuracy than those that do
cancel and have a valid individual. If a syllogism does cancel then finding a valid
individual or concluding that no individual exists is done with nearly equal accuracy, so
the strategy for solving syllogisms with can eel la I ion does not favour one type of response.
The differences between these groups are all significant ( F(cancellation ) = s.2b p<0.004.
F(individual)=25.4 p<0.00001, Ffinteraction)=28.74 p<0.00001). Clearly cancellation
is acting as a cue to subjects about the presence or absence- of an individual, lack of
cancellation facilitates the response "no valid individual" and makes it more- difficult to
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Cancels Does Not Cancel
18.8% 21.8%
Figure 4.18: Percentage of incorrect responses by cancellation







Figure 4.19: Percentage of incorrect responses by cancellation and presence of a valid
individual
find a valid individual where one exists.
4.5.2 The standard task
Addressing the same issues for the standard task is taken in two parts. first one
must ask the question whether the two syllogisms that do not cancel but have a valid
conclusion are answered with greater or lesser accuracy than those that do cancel.
The question must also be asked as to whether syllogisms with no valid conclusion are
answered more or less readily when they cancel or are double hatched than those that
are neither. The first question is addressed by figure 4.20. Here AO and OA1' syllogisms
of figure ab-cb (which are not double hatched but which have a valid conclusion) are
compared with AO and OA figure ba-bc (which are double hatched and have a valid
conclusion). Both types of syllogism require two models to be solved correctly.
The difference between the numbers of correct answers for these two types ol syllo¬
gism is significant at the p<0.1 level (t — 1.45) and the number of ""no valid conclusion"
responses given significant at p<0.004 (t=2.9b). Therefore the presence or absence of
double hatching appears to have a small effect on the ability of the1 subjects to find the1
correct valid conclusion and a much larger effect on their tendency to report (incorrectly)
eThe four quantifiers can be referred to bv means ol lour letters, derived from (lie latin words alfirmo
and nego. Using the first two vowels in each word, "all becomes "A" . "some becomes "1 . "none
becomes "E"' and "some..not." becomes "O". At points throughout the text t his convent ion will be used














Figure 4.20: Frequencies of response types for selected syllogisms
Not Double-Hatched Double-Hatched
32.4% 28.0%
Figure 4.21: Percentage incorrect responses by double hatching for syllogisms with no
valid conclusion
that there is 110 valid conclusion.
For the syllogisms that have no valid conclusion, cancellation and double hatching
are not equivtilent as they are for the AO and OA syllogisms studied above. It is
not relevant to study double hatching for the individuals task as the presence of this
always denotes the existence of an individual. However, for the standard task, double
hatching may or may not imply the existence1 of a valid conclusion and it must be
studied separately from cancellation therefore. Figure 4.21 shows that syllogisms with
110 double hatching and 110 valid conclusion are more prone to error than those with
double hatching. This is significant (t= 1.67 p<0.09). Therefore for the standard task
lack of double hatching is not used as a cue that no valid conclusion exists, but instead
makes answering these syllogisms more difficult. Hxamining only those syllogisms that
cancel exaggerates the effect: non-cancelling syllogisms are men more prone to error
with respect to cancelling syllogisms than is the case with non-double hatched versus
double hatched (t=2.1 p<0.03).
Thus although the two tasks are similar in finding that syllogisms with no double
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hatching or cancellation are more difficult u> solve correctly if they possess a valid
conclusion, they differ in responses to syllogisms without a valid conclusion. The use of
cancellation to give a quick solution to syllogisms with no valid conclusion seems to be
specific to the individuals task. In the standard task, this feature and that of having
no double hatching makes the syllogism harder to solve. That these syllogisms require
more processing is backed up by analysis of the reading time data. Figure 1.22 shows
that there are longer reading times for the second premise of cases that either have no
double-hatching or that do not cancel. The overall difficulty in processing the group
of syllogisms that do not have cancellation or double-hatching explains why they tend
not to be used to discriminate response types and also suggests something about the
way the syllogisms are represented as this factor seems to play quite a large part in
determining the ease with which the syllogism can be understood.
This makes sense when viewed in terms of the requirements of the task. When
isolating an individual, the subject has to use all three terms of the syllogism. A non-
cancelling b term will immediately abut her/him to the fact that no consistent individual
can exist. The standard task requires a search for a relation between tin- ,\ and c terms.
For this to be achieved b must be removed from tin- representation and presumably this
will not be facilitated if this noun is negative in one premise and positive in the other.
Thus the syllogism that does not cancel is harder to process and will be prone to more
errors.
The greater accuracy for syllogisms with no valid conclusion responses for the stan¬
dard task must still be explained however. The simplest hypothesis for the effect must
be that subjects notice, after a little experience that certain pairs of quantifiers will
never yield a valid conclusion. They might formulate some rules ol logic. resembling
Aristotle's maxims, perhaps. These might incltide the observation t hat syllogisms whore
both quantifiers are the same (and not "all") will never have a valid conclusion and that
pairs of quantifiers that are hot It negative or hot It particular also never have a valid con¬
clusion. Once these observations have been made, the subject will be able to conclude,
without requiring a representation, that no valid conclusion exists.
While double-hatching and cancellation have not provided a solution to the "no
valid conclusion" question, the results have indicated that syllogisms that do not have1









Figure 4.22: Reading times of the second premise by type of syllogism
between the AO and OA syllogisms observed above). That these syllogisms might be
more difficult to process is supported by analysis of the reading times for the second
premise, a rough indicator of the time taken to process the syllogism as a whole.
4.6 Summary
It has been found that both in the standard and the individuals task, the number of
models needed to solve the syllogism correctly has an effect, if the syllogism possesses
a. valid conclusion. The fact that no significant differences exist between syllogisms
with two and three models for either task (and in fact is in the direction opposite to
that predicted for the individuals task) suggests the relationship between numbers ol
models and processing capacity is not st ridly linear as has been suggested. These results
point much more to a mechanism that can agglomerate premises without a great deal
of difficulty and read off a conclusion, but that is immediately compromised by any
amount of manipulation and that greater amounts of manipulation do not significantly
add to the burden on memory. It may also be the case that tin1 division into two and
three model syllogisms is artificial and that subjects use ways to solve the syllogism
that only ever demand one cycle of testing.
For both experiments it was also found that syllogisms that do not possess a valid
conclusion, or in the case of Experiment Two a valid individual, are more easily solved
than their counterparts with valid conclusions or individuals. In the case of Experiment
Two this is found to be dependent on whether the syllogism in question cancelled or
not, suggesting that when performing this task subjects will use cancellation to guide
their initial decision about whether an individual exists or not. The situation with
the standard task is different. Here there is also a strong advantage lor syllogisms
that have no valid conclusion, which suggests that subject have found some way ol
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solving these syllogisms that does not require the use of cycles of testing. However,
the presence or absence of cancellation does not affect accuracy of response in the way
it does for the individuals task, in fact the opposite effect is found: non-cancelling
syllogisms are harder to solve. The same is true for double-hatched syllogisms that
do possess an individual but not a valid conclusion. Rather than be confused by this,
subjects find these syllogisms easier to respond to. It is proposed therefore that the two
tasks invite subjects to use different strategies. In the case where all three nouns are
to be linked in the syllogism, the subject can see from a non-cancelling syllogism that
no relationship exists, in other words, they learn to assume that b must cancel for a
relationship between the nouns to be possible. The two exceptions to this amongst the
AO and OA syllogisms are rather difficult to solve therefore and the conclusion missed
because some of the syllogisms do not cancel. When looking for conclusions however, the
same factors operate but this time subjects seem nol to spot the shortcut cancellation
offers. Non-cancelling syllogisms seem to be more difficult to solve, possibly because il
viewed from the point of view of someone attempting to link A and c they constitute an
indeterminate problem. The costs of attempting to interpret such a problem are high
and it is therefore not surprising that subjects are often led into error. However, to
explain their good performance on other syllogisms with no valid conclusion, one must
assume that subjects are able to use their experience with syllogisms to derive logical
principles which can be used to determine the presence or absence of a conclusion and
thereby obviate the need for cycles of testing.
The figural effect is also found for both experiments and it is also found for a group
of subjects who appear, according to the criteria laid down by Clilhooley and YYelherick
to be drawing conclusions to the syllogism by a process of "matching". These subjects
have a high error rate, as might be expected, but this extends to one model syllogisms
as well as other types. If these subjects are not able to draw conclusions that can be
derived from the representation without testing, one must raise the possibility that they
are not using an agglomerated representation at all. II this is the case, then tin- fact
that they display a figural effect brings into question whether this effect is in fact tin-
result of forming the representation as Johnson-haird claims, as this is exactly what
this group of subjects appears not to be able to do.
It was also found that incorrect conclusions tend to l>e drawn in line with the at-
mosphere effect, leading to tlie possibility that Politzer's claim that subjects will use
atmosphere to draw conclusions when their capacity to solve the syllogism by other
means has been exceeded. However, the proportion of atmospheric conclusions does not
increase with increasing difficulty of the syllogism, but the number of NYC responses
does, suggesting that the latter will be the subject's answer when the process of vali¬
dating a conclusion fails and that atmospheric (and incorrect) responses are given by a
subgroup of subjects who do not use an agglomerative approach at all. This explana¬
tion would make most sense, because it avoids the need to argue that subjects have an
agglomerated representation, but resort to one of the form Politzer suggests when the
syllogism is too difficult. It is easier to envisage that some subjects do not grasp the
logic of the syllogisms immediately and use other means to draw conclusions until limy
learn to agglomerate the premises. It may be that the group who produce atmospheric





An important use of the data gathered in those experiments is to examine various
theories about syllogisms in the light of this new information. With respect to the
recall data, certain theories make very specific claims about the operation of memory
in syllogistic reasoning. As already discussed. Johnson-Laird uses the idea of working
memory to explain two effects: the differences in difficulty between syllogisms and the
figural effect. These are two obvious first candidates for investigation. Other processes
that might be expected to leave traces in the recall profiles are the misinterpretation of
quantifiers, including the effect of Cricean implicat ures and conversions.
5.1 General Recall Effects
There are many well documented effects relating to t he interaction between memory and
language. Primary amongst these is the depth of processing effect, first documented
by Craik and Lockhart (1972) and which forms the theorectical basis for theories of
language processing such as kintsch and van Dijk's work. The difficulty of a task
subjects are required to perform after reading a piece of text has an inverse relation to
errors - the harder the task the fewer the errors1, but this is affected by the relevance
of the task and a ceiling effect is often observed, even a worsening of memory with
very demanding tasks. Depth of processing has a clear relation to questions such as
the role of non-logical processing of the syllogisms and also to the number of models
needed to solve the syllogism. Difficulty also encompasses the latter however and if
differences in error rates for memory are observed between groups divided on the basis
of models, it will be difficult to assign the changes unequivocally to one or the other,
'see Einstein and McDanielf 1990) for a review.
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Figure 5.1: Percentage error by first and second premise
One would in any event expect syllogisms with two or three models to have increased
depth of processing when answered correctly and to constitute a more difficult task and
therefore be better recalled than one model syllogisms.
One way to measure depth of processing is by the time taken to read the premises.
The first premise is read for a much shorter time than the second but the error rates
between the two premises do not reflect the division of labour. In figure 5.1 it can be
seen that the second premise has many more instances of an error occurring than the
first premise and that this effect is accentuated by delay. The extra time spent reading
the second premise does not improve its chances of being recalled correctly therefore.
However the results found do suggest that primacy rather than recency is a main factor
in improving recall. This would be expected at delay, it is interesting to find that
drawing a conclusion has such a st rong effect on recency at immediate recall, as it could
be argued that the process of reasoning constitutes a form ol rehearsal.
The effect of models on recall will be studied solely with regard to rorre< tly answered
syllogisms, because it would be futile to expect depth of processing or difficulty- to be
represented by model number when subjects might not have treated the syllogism in
question as a reasoning problem at all. Figure 5.2 also excludes syllogisms with no
valid conclusion as the differences in correct response rates for these1 syllogisms found in
chapter 4 suggests that their processing may not relate to model in any simple way. At
immediate recall number of models and recall are not linearly related, although three
model syllogisms have more errors than one or two model syllogisms, but at delayed
recall the number of models seems to increase the syllogism in question s propensity
to error. This is exactly the opposite effect to that predicted: that an increase in
the number of models required to correctly solve the syllogism increases both depth
of processing and difficulty of task, thus leading one to suppose1 improved recall with
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increasing number of models. One explanation might be that cycles of testing improve
only information directly relevant to the task in hand, that is using rational means to
solve the syllogism. Information such as the subject and predicate status of the nouns in
the syllogism might be lost as the syllogism becomes more integrated and the material
less relevant. The logical properties of the quantifiers however, would be much less
readily lost as this determines the logical status of the syllogism and one would expect
their order to be retained except in circumstances where it is irrelevant to logic. The
role each noun plays in the syllogism is also important to the logic.
Syllogisms of the form AE or EA have, in four out of eight cases one model solutions
and in the other four cases three model solutions. Studying these syllogisms separately,
by number of models will show whether three model cases, correctly answered retain
more logical information than one model (examples. Figure b.-'f demonstrates that the
information regarding the identity of the quantifiers is no better retained for the three
model group and in fact at delayed recall is more readily forgotten. Xouii assignment
is better remembered however, again especially at delayed recall and recall of the order
of the nouns in each premise is unaffected by numbers of models. I his can only suggest
that logical information in t lie form of t lie quantifiers is not bet ter consolidated by cycles
of testing, but it is interesting to note that noun assignment is better retained. It seems
then that forming more than one model is detrimental to most types of information in
the syllogism, whether important to logic or not. This may be due to the worsening
of memory noted when the task following a text becomes too difficult. One additional
factor affecting the quantifier recall is the identity of the conclusion itself. In all one
model syllogisms and all but one two model syllogisms (where valid conclusions exist )
the conclusion contains a quantifier also found in the original syllogism. In all three
model syllogisms, the conclusion quantifier is different from both the quantifiers in the
original. 11 is possible that arriving at a situation where this new relation is represented
and presented as the correct answer causes confusion as to the identity of the original
quantifiers when the representation is used for the purposes of recall. If this is so. and
it has not been tested, then the observation by f.ea et al (15)90) that inferences made
from a text are not confused in memory with t he text itself, does not apply to these
syllogisms.
The results shown here give very little reason to suppose that previously observed
0!)
Number of Models Immediate Recall Delayed Recall
One Model 28.2/ 67.1'/
Two Models 2-1.0'/! 72.0'/
Three Models 32.7/ 82.2'/
Figure 5.2: Percentage of recall errors by models for correctly answered syllogisms













Figure 5.3: Percentage of recall errors by models for correctly answered syllogisms of
AE and EA type
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effect such as depth of processing or difficulty of task have any relevance to syllogisms.
Studying answers by type and including incorrect responses does show that answers
of the form "no valid conclusion" are more often followed by error-free recall than
syllogisms given a conclusion (18.5% errors versus 57.8%. at immediate recall). This
only applies at immediate recall and is to he expected, given the subjects have the
opportunity when giving this response to go straight to recall without passing through
a menu. However at delayed recall, the advantage is all but lost (61.2% versus 65.-1% ). It
may be that here is to be found a. depth of processing effect. The shorter reading time of
the second premise for syllogisms given "no valid conclusion" responses has already been
noted and the superior performance on syllogisms without a valid conclusion attributed
to responses being given without the need for cycles of testing. The reduced processing
presumably devoted to these syllogisms may well be the reason for their performance
at delay, where they do not have the same advantage as at immediate recall.
5.2 The Figural Effect
A valid conclusion for a syllogism must relate the "end terms" of the syllogism . Once a
quantifier has been chosen for the conclusion, these two nouns must be used to complete
it. The nouns can be arranged in the order \ o or c-A and in some cases, syllogisms
with a valid conclusion can have either order and the conclusion will still be correct.
In a number of cases, the conclusion must have a particular order of nouns to be right.
The figural effect has already been described, to recap it consists of the observation that
the figure ab-bc tends to be followed by conclusions of the form a c and the figure
ba-cb by conclusions of the form c-a
5.2.1 The Mental Models explanation of the figural effect.
To explain this effect. Johnson-Laird (1985)' appeals to the properties of working mem¬
ory and the mental representation of the syllogism. When processing the figure ah bo.
subjects are able to form a model of the first premise. A B and then immediately sub¬
stitute c: into that model using its relationship to b. Thus the noun a enters working
memory before c. When the figure ba-cb is encountered, t ho information regarding c
2As has been the case so far, the end terms are referred to as A and ( ' for the noun in the lu-t and
second premise respectively. The middle term in the syllogism is referred to a> B.
3see also Johnson-Laird and Bara (1982).
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cannot be immediately substituted into a model of h-a . If the premises of t lie syllogism
are interpreted in reverse order as C'B-ba then substitution is possible. In this case c
enters working memory before a. Assuming that working memory operates on a "first
in-first out" principle then when constructing the conclusion for an ab-bc syllogism
a-c conclusions will be preferred and for ba-ch syllogisms c-a conclusions. For the
other two figures ab-cb and ba-bc. Johnson-Laird hypothesises that reversals within
a premise, either to create the figure ab-hc or ba-cb. are used and then t he figures are
processed in the order described above. In Figure 5.1 the processes required to represent
each of the four figures are laid out.
There are two possible interpretations of Johnson-Laird's theory, however. It is
clear that Johnson-Laird believes in the case of the figures ha hi and ah ch that a
different kind of representation is constructed for each of the two types of conclusion.
Which conclusion is chosen will depend on the way in which the subject manipulated
the premises to obtain a transitive arrangement of the nouns in the representation, lor
figures ab-bc and ba-C'B it is not obvious whether Johnson-Laird is claiming that a
different representation underlies t he non-preferred conclusion, or whether only one kind
of representation is ever constructed for these figures and the non-preferred conclusion
arises by chance, or as a result of especially careful checking by certain subjects. Hot It
possible interpretations of the hypothesis need to be considered when using the recall
data to assess its plausibility.
One interpretation will be that different conclusions require different type of rep¬
resentation for all the figures and this will be called version 1 of tin1 mental models
explanation. The other interpretation is that different representations underlie only the
conclusions for the parallel figures and that the diagonal figures only ever give rise to
one type of representation from which the preferred conclusion generally arises. This
will be called version '2 of the mental models explanation. In Figure 5.1. the operations
needed for version 1 of the theory are shown for the non-preferred conclusions for figures
ab-bc and ba-cb: version 2 differs in that these operations would not occur.
5.2.2 Predictions for recall
A number of general predictions can be considered regarding Johnson-Laird's "ligural
theory", concerning the relative numbers and types of errors for certain figures. As
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Figure AB BC HA CB
Conclusion A-C C-A A -c C ■ - A
First premise processed A-B C-B A B C H
Second premise processed H-C B-A H -C H A
first premise reverse reverse
second premise reverse reverse
both premises reverse reverse
Figure AH CH BA B(
Conclusion A C C- A A C C A
First premise processed A - B c- B A B C H
Second premise processed B C B A B C B A
first premise reverse reverse
second premise reverse ri'veis'1
both premises reverse reverse





Figure 5.5: Percentage of noun errors by figure
well as evaluating these predictions, more detailed analysis of possible errors by conclu¬
sion types and figure will allow a comparison of 1 lie mental models approach with the
grammatical roles theory of the figural effect, described below.
In general, if the figural effect is to have an impact on recall, one would expect this to
be mainly on memory of the nouns of the syllogism as it is t hose around which t he figural
effect operates. Quantifier errors would not be expected to vary with the predictions of
the figural effect. The following predictions can be made.
1. When the figure ab-bc is encountered of the mental models hypothesis, the sub¬
sequent recall of the nouns should contain fewer errors than recall following the
other figures as the former requires no reordering before the premises can be com¬









Figure 5.6: Percentage of each figure type chosen when an error in I lie figure was made
at delayed recall
kind of conclusion can be drawn and this should be reflected in greater numbers
of recall errors for the nouns of the syllogism. Figure 5.5 shows t his to be the case
for delayed recall, but not immediate recall.
In addition, at delayed recall also, the figure ah-hc is found to be more likely to
be the figure chosen if one of the other figures is remembered incorrectly. This sug¬
gests that a transitive arrangement of the nouns recalled after a <lela\ is preferred,
if the actual figure has been forgotten (see Figure 5.6).
2. The processing times for the figures should vary as a function of the transfor¬
mations needed to create a representation. The only measure of processing time
available is represented by the reading time for the second premise and although
this may not correspond exactly to the time taken to solve the syllogism it seems
reasonable to suppose that the transformations needed to create t he transitive rep¬
resentation will take place before the second premise is removed from the screen.
The mental models account of the figural effect would predict that the ligure
ab-bc would have the shortest reading time for the second premise, the two fig¬
ures ab-cb and ba-bc would have similar reading times as they require similar
amounts of processing and that the figure ba-cb will have a longer processing
time than ab-bc. Figure 5.7 shows that at least one of the predicted differences
does occur, as ba-cb has a longer processing time than ah bc. However, the
shortest time is found for ba-bc. which cannot be explained by the mental mod¬
els approach. A test of the differences in reading time for ligure (I =2.96. u.s.)
leads to the conclusion that there is no significant difference in processing time
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Figure 5Processing time by figure







Figure 5.8: Percentage premise reversals
for the four figures.
3. A high number of cases with the nouns within a premise recalled in reverse order
might be expected with figures ab-ch and b.\ ho. w hich are supposed to have one
premise reordered to form ah ho or ha oh. However this type of error is found
no more frequently for these figures, than it is for the other two figures, which do
not require this type of reordering according to .Johnson-I.aird (see Figure 5.9).
4. It is the central point of this t Iteory that the premises for t he b a oh are i nlerpreted
in reverse order as cb-ba and those for ah ho in order of presentation. II this
is the case, then many more instances of recall profiles where the premise's have
been reversed would be expected for the figure hack than ah ho. In figure 5.x
the percentage of recall profiles where a premise reversal occurred are given for
a-c conclusions following ah-hc and o \ conclusions following ha-oh. I here
are slightly more premise reversals for ha oh at immediate recall, but at delayed
recall ab-bg has more. Either processing the premises in reverse order does not
play a part in the figural effect or the results of this processing are not reflected
in memory.
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Figure 5.8 also shows that the proportion of this type of error is very low. In
addition, although the percentage of reversed premises is higher for ha cb at
immediate recall, at delayed recall it is higher for ah bc. If premise reversal is
a feature of processing these figures then at both immediate and delayed recall.
ba-cb would have many more instances of this type of error than ah bc. Taken
as a whole the recall data shows that there is really no difference between the two
figures for this type of error.
The predictions from Johnson-Laird's theory are not supported by the data here
and in some cases are contradicted by it. Fit her one must assume that memory lias no
relationship to the processing of the syllogism, even though t he feat tires of memory play
a crucial part in this explanation for this effect, or this explanation must be rejected
and another found.
5.2.3 Other explanations for the figural effect.
As already argued, some researchers, such as (iilhooley and Wetherick (19X9) propose
that the figural effect is simply the result of the subject maintaining the grammatical
roles of the noun in the syllogism when constructing a conclusion. This is taken to be
a consequence of the subject viewing the syllogism as an argument about something.
Many studies in linguistics have noted that language comprehension is characterised by
the recipient of language attempting to identify the object or person that a communica¬
tion is about. Kieras (1980.1981) has found t hat t here are a number of factors affecting
the choice of focus. The subject of the discourse is one such, but the first-mentioned
item and the most frequently mentioned item are also taken to be topic. When a is the
only candidate for the conclusion in subject position, the syllogism solver will take this
as the subject of the conclusion. When c is the only candidate, it will be chosen.
The parallel figures have no unequivocal choice for the conclusion, thus other fac¬
tors will come into play. In chapter 1. some of the asymmetries resulting from this are
discussed. However, some indirect support is found for the view that it is the grain mat -
ical role of the nouns in the syllogism that influences the form of the conclusion (see
Figure 5.10) by considering the parallel figures and their recall profiles alone. For each
type of conclusion the number of times a or c appeared in subject term in the recall (in
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to remove bias due to differences in numbers of conclusions.
It is found that at immediate recall the conclusion A c is more likely to be followed by
recall profiles where a is the subject than where ois the subject of the recalled premises.
Similarly, the conclusion c-a is more likely to be followed by recall profiles where c is
the subject than a. There is a significant interaction between the conclusion type and
the noun recalled at immediate recall (F = 9.7 p<0.01) and there is a significant effect
of noun type (F = 10.6 p<0.01), so a is recalled in subject position more frequently
than c. At delayed recall, there are no significant differences. This data might indicate
two things: that the conclusion interferes with the recall of the syllogism so that some
nouns are recalled with the grammatical role they had in the conclusion rather than
that in the original syllogism, or that when unable to recall the role of the noun in the
syllogism, the subject uses the grammatical role of the nouns in the conclusion as a guide
or substitute. The actual mechanism for this effect is probably a combination of the two.
Both proposals show that the grammatical roles of the nouns in the conclusion exert an
effect on the form of the recall. In fact it could be argued that the subjects expect the
nouns of the syllogism to have the same grammatical role as those of t lm conclusion,
as this is the main basis for choosing the topic for the conclusion and me therefore1
influenced by this to change the recalled syllogism to resemble the conclusion, (liven
that memory for order of the nouns, that is grammatical role, is lost relatively quickly,
the explanation that subjects will use the conclusion to reconstruct the syllogism seems
the most likely one. This only serves to em pit a.size that the sit bject s ex pert at ions about
the syllogism depend upon the form of t he conclusion, which in turn strongly suggests
that the form of the conclusion is derived from the same features of the syllogism.
Thus it can be argued that if the grammatical roles of the nouns in the conclusions
affect the recall of the syllogism, then grammatical role has some salience for the subject
at least regarding memory. If this is so. then it is possible to extend the argument to
the choice of the subject and the predicate of the conclusion. If grammatical rob1 is
important for recall, in that subjects make errors t hat relied t he grainiiiath al role of the
conclusion, then it may also be important for t lie const met ion of t he concl usion from t lie
original syllogism. As Johnson-Laird's explanation of the (igtiral effect is unsupported
by this data, then more weight can be given to any evidence, even if indirect, that
supports the grammatical roles theory, the only other good (explanation for this effect.
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a-c c-a a-c C a
a subject 24.39% 22.86% 20.54% 20.28%
c subject 14.37% 22.96% 20.08% 25.98%
Figure 5.10: Percentage recall by conclusion type
5.2.4 Comparing the mental models and grammatical roles explana¬
tions
Some indirect evidence has been gathered to support the grammatical roles explanation
of the figura.1 effect, the mental models explanation has not been supported by other
data. However, these findings are not conclusive for a number of reasons.
L. The processes described by Johnson-Laird might not cause errors thai directly cor¬
respond to the operations required. To reverse t lie order of t lie nouns in a premise
when constructing a. representation might not necessarily cause the premise to be
recalled with reversed nouns. The quantifier in the premise affecls the possibility
of this occurring, as does the serial position effect.
"2. The type of conclusion affects the type and complexity of the processing. Specific
predictions for certain conclusions must be evaluated to exclude 1 lie possibility of
trends being obscured in too general a picture.
3. The evidence for the grammatical roles theory is indirect and the possibility that
these findings are a result of mental models is not excluded.
By examining trends by conclusion and figure, the predictions of version l of the
mental models theory ( different represenations are used to create different conclusions),
version 2 of this theory (diagonal figures always have the same representation, whatever
the conclusion given) and the grammatical roles t heory can be compared to I he obt ained
pattern of errors. The numbers of instances where an unspecified error occurred will
be considered, to avoid the problem raised in I above, that the error types might not
correspond to types of process.
Figure 5.11 gives the relative error rates, again this would be for recall of the nouns
of the syllogism, predicted by the three theories. No two theories give exa< tly the same
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Figure mental models version 1 mental models version 2 grammatical roles
ab-bc a-c low errors low errors low errors
c-a low errors very high errors high errors
ba-cb a-c medium errors medium-liigh errors high errors
c-a medium errors medium errors low errors
ab-cb a-c low-medium errors low-medium errors medium errors
c-a high errors high errors medium errors
ba-bc a-c low-medium errors low-medium errors medium errors
c-a high errors high errors modium-higli errors
Figure 5.11: Predictions for mental models and grammatical roles accounts
pattern of errors, so they can he distinguished. Figure 5.12 gives tin- obtained error
rates, expressed as a percentage of the number of conclusions of t his type found for each
figure. Thus the effect of numbers of conclusions is eliminated.
At immediate recall, the pattern of errors most resembles the predictions ol the
grammatical rotes theory, with version 2 of the mental models theory being ruled out
by the high numbers of errors for the non-preferred conclusions for figures ah bo and
ba-cb. Version 1 of the mental models t hcory would predict a difference in errors lor t he
other two figures, with conclusion o - a creat i ng more errors t ha n a o. I lie gramma I ical
roles theory would not predict a difference for conclusion types here and this is the
result found.
5.2.5 Other strategies affecting the choice of conclusion.
The analysis of the recall data in chapter 5 suggests that there are non-logical principles
that affect the subjects choice of quantifiers and how accurately they can recall the
different types of quantifier. It was argued in chapter 1. on the basis of tin- conclusions
drawn by the subjects, that there may be other strategies used when seeking a topic
or focus for the argument in the syllogism. One such strategy seemed to be to choose
the end term in the first premise. This preference might be derived from a general
principle, established by Kieras and mentioned above that topics of arguments tend to














Figure 5.1*2: Percentage recall errors for the nouns of the syllogism l>y conclusion type
and figure
of conclusion was the order of the quantifiers in the syllogism. There is a preference,
revealed in the recall data, to argue from the positive to negative, that is to introduce
the argument with the quantifier "all" or "some" and qualify the situation described
with the quantifiers "some..not". This expresses itself when the conclusion is drawn
as a preference for nouns associated with the positive quantifiers to he the subject of
the conclusion. This preference might cause error in the recall of other parts of the
syllogism, such as the order of the nouns. For example, when a syllogism which has a
positive quantifier in the second premise and some other quantifier in tho first premise
is recalled, there is a strong tendency to recall the quantifiers in reverse order, so that
the positive appears first. When this occurs, there might be a related tendency to recall
the nouns from the second premise in the first. This might not simply result in reversed
premises, but also in the appearance of the c term in the first premise.
The following predictions regarding recall of the syllogism can be tested.
1. If the A term is generally preferred for the subject of the conclusion then it should
be preferred as the subject of the premises at recall. Figure 5.13 shows that A
I 12







Figure 5.13: Mean choice of role lor nouns
is the subject of one or other of the premises most frequently at immediate and
delayed recall. This finding supports the hypothesis that in a general sense A
takes priority as a subject for the syllogism at the stage when the syllogism is
being solved.
There is a. significant interaction between delay and the number of each noun re¬
called in subject position (Fint=13.5 p<0.01) but no effect of eit her delay or noun
alone (Fdelay=0.18 n.s.. Fnoun= 0.2 n.s.). A t-test shows that the difference be¬
tween the nouns for immediate recall is significant that there1 are more instance's
of the A noun being recalled in subject position at immediate recall than < .
'2. Syllogisms that conform to the preference lor the form erf I he> argument should shew
fewer errors in the recall of ihe nouns than syllogisms that eIe> not. In partie u 1 ar
syllogisms that do not conform shoulel have a higher iiumbi'r of instance's where'
c is recalled as having occurred in the1 first premise than syllogisms that conform.
This would Ire because in the cases where1 a posi t i ve quant i fie r < recti rs i n I lie1 sen on el
premise (non-conforming syllogisms) there is a tendency to recall this quantifier
as having occurred in the first premise. The c term will alsei tend to be- re'calh'el
in the first premise therefore. This is supported by analysis of t he1 re< all errors for
the figure and noun assignment of the syllogisms. When the syllogism conformed,
there were fewer errors at both immediate and delayed recall for both variables
then when the syllogism did not conform.
Inferential analysis of these errors demonstrates that the differences shown in
Figure 5.14 do not simply imply that conforming syllogisms are less likely to
attract recall errors in general. The errors for figure are not signific antly higher
for non-conforming syllogisms (Fdelay= 51.93 p<().() 1. Fsyll=l.s| n.^.. Fint=0.bl
n.s.), but for noun assignment there is a significant change (1 delay = 0 1.03 pcO.OI.
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Syllogism type Noun assg. Figure
conforming 30.3% 50.3%
non-conforming 33.7% 52.3%
Figure 5.14: Mean errors for conforming and non-conforming syllogisms
Fsyll=4.73 p<0.01. Fint= 0.21 n.s.). litis suggests that the effect of having a
nonpreferred order for the quantifiers in the syllogisms is to specifically disrupt
the memory of the roles the nouns played in the syllogism. This is supported by
the finding that there are significant Iy more inst ances of c bei ng recalled in t lie first
premise for syllogisms that do not conform ( Fdelay=40.5 p < 0.01. let erm-9.52
p<0.01. Fint—0.22 n.s.). Thus the form of the memory disruption is to lead
subjects to recall the minor term as having occurred in the first premise, that is
to give it the role of ma jor or middle term.
5.3 Misinterpretation of the Quantifiers
Work was cited in the first chapter that investigates the role of an incorrect under¬
standing of the quantifiers as leading to incorrect reasoning. One effect has already
been found in the previous chapter that seems to be the result of a confusion between
"some" and "some..not". but closer examination of subjects" understanding of what the
quantifiers imply logically can be carried out by use of their errors when recalling the
quantifiers themselves and the premises they appear in.
5.3.1 Conversions
A common mistake when recalling the nouns of the syllogism is to reverse their order.







Figure 5.15: Percentage of type 2 errors for each quantifier
possible to do so has been used as an explanation for reasoning errors by Chapman
and Chapman (1957) and Revlis (1975) who have called t he phenomenion "conversion".
Figure 5.15 demonstrates that the type of quantifier does have an effect on the number
of instances where the nouns are recalled in reverse order .
A two-way Anova. shows that delay has a significant effect on the number of conver¬
sions (Fdelay=71.94 p<0.01) as does the typo of quantifier (Fquant = 1.81 p<0.05) but
that there is no interaction between the variables (lint =0.52 n.s.). Although I lie type
of quantifier makes a difference to the number of times a subject will recall the nouns
of the premise in reverse order, clearly this does not follow exactly from tlrn |<>gi< ol the
quantifiers. While "all" has significantly fewer conversions than the other quantifiers
"some...not" does not and logically, "some..not" will not allow a conversion and logic
to be preserved unlike "some" and "none which do imply their converse. I his may be
because "some..not" is often misinterpreted as being equivalent to "some . so making
this error will also allow the error of assuming that "some..not logically implies its
converse. The relationship between these recall results and the question ol whether
subjects do make errors in reasoning through illict conversions is hard to determine.
What these results do indicate is that in cases where the subject perceives that the
order of the nouns in the premise is relevant to meaning, the order will tend to be
preserved. Thus in cases where the order of the nouns in the premise is unimportant to
meaning it will be lost. This does not imply that the errors found in recalling the order
of the nouns for the quantifier "all" are an indication that in t hose cases conversion at
the reasoning level has occurred, rather that in general the logic of "all" b appreciated
and that conversions are rather likely not to be a source of error, at least us far as this












Some..not 32.67% 1 1.36%
Figure 5.16: Percentage.conversions for each quantifier
quantifier is concerned. What is indicated and pursued further below, is t hat subjec ts
do not appreciate the logic of the quantifier "some..not" but rather tend t<> assume it
means the same as "some". The lower number of type 2 errors for "none" is also inter¬
esting. because the logic of this quant i fier does not demand that t he order of t lie u on ns
in its premise be retained. This taken with the lower type 2 errors for "all" suggests
that universal quantifiers allow the grammatical structure of the premise they are in to
be better retained. It has already been shown in chapter 2 that particular premises are
associated with higher levels of a number of noun order errors and this may be another
example of this phenomemon.
As the incidence of conversions appears to be related to the logic of the quantifiers,
the extent to which each of these two groups of subjects understand the logic of the
quantifiers can be measured by studying the numbers of conversions for each quantifier
type for each group in Figure 5.16
Logicians make fewer of this type of error than non-logicians. 1'he pattern ol errors
for logicians indicates that they grasp the full meaning of the quantifier "all" but not of
"some..not", suggesting that they are prone to the misinterpretation of "some..not as
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being equivalent to "some" and thus the order of 1 he nouns following it being irrelevant
to meaning. Non-logicians made most conversions following the quantifier "some", but
did not make fewest for "all", thus implying that they do not have a full grasp of its
meaning.
5.3.2 Other types of misinterpretation
It has been shown, in other studies5 that some subjects do not grasp the full logical
implications of the quantifiers used in syllogisms, but interpret them according to heuris¬
tics used in general language processing. Griceati implicat tiros. for example, state that
people will not interpret "some" as meaning "some and possibly all" but as meaning
"some but not all" and similarly "some..not" is interpreted as meaning "some..not but
not none'1 rather than "some..not and possibly none". If this is true, similar findings
may be revealed by the recall data, on the principle that if subjects make an error at
the level of reasoning that error is likely to reveal itself at recall.
1. If subjects interpet "some" as meaning "some but not all" limit recalling "some"
as "all" should be rare.
2. If subjects interpret "some..not" as meaning "some..not but not none", then re¬
calling "some..not" as "none" should also be rare.
3. If subjects misinterpret "some..not" as implying "some" then these two quantifiers
should be commonly confused.
The direction of the results shown in figure 5.17 confirm tlm predictions and a
two-way Anova shows that both delay and the interaction between delay and type of
confusions are significant (F= 210.7 p<0.() 1. 1 = 1.7 p<0.()l). Type of confusion alone is
also significant (F= 13.2. p<0.01). The effect of Gricoan implicat tires have most ell'ect in
preventing "some..not" from being recalled as "none". The smaller differences between
"some" being recalled as "all" and "all" being recalled as "sonic are probably due
to the preference for "all" in the first premise, which will increase the incidence of all
quantifiers changing to "all". There is a slightly greater tendency to recall 'some" wlmn
the actual quantifier was "some..not" than vice versa. Subjects often reported difficulty
in understanding the quantifier "some..not" and tins may account for the preference lot-
see especially Newstead and Griggsf 1983) and NVwMoadf 1!>X8).
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Immediate recall Delayed recall
"all" — "some" 3.3% 15.8%
"some"— "all" 2.0% 1 1.8%
"none"— "some..not " 3.6% 19.5%
"some..not"— "none" 0.7% 7.2%
"some"— "some..not" 5.3% 21.7%
"some..not"— "some" 8.1% 25.3%
Figure 5.17: Percentage of confusions for quantifiers
"some". It is certainly the case that these quantifiers are much more likely to he confused
with each other than with their universal counterparts. This is further evidence for the
existence of Gricean impli cat tires in interpreting the quantifiers. This also suggests that
the quantifiers "some" and "some..not" share a uniform representation, as they are so
easily confused.
As in the previous section, the extent to which using a deductive reasoning strat¬
egy implies a full understand'! ug of t he qua ill i liers is i n vest igat ed. I lie effect of (i ricean
implicatures might only be found for subjects t renting the syllogism as a piece of commu¬
nication and nothing more: subjects approaching the syllogisms as reasoning problems
might be immune to textual effexts such as these. This is not t he case. Tlx same effects
that have been found for the group as a whole are present in each ol these subgroups
showing that the type of confusion between quantifiers has a significant effect for both
logicians (F=-1.6. p<0.01) and non-logicians (F=(j.(). p<().() 1 ).
5.4 Recall and Features of the Representation
It was found in the previous chapter that there was evidence that cancellation and
double-hatching played a part in reasoning strategies for the individuals task, the same
findings were not found for the standard task, but there was evidence that cancellation
and double-hatching were playing a part in the reasoning process, by making syllogisms
that did not cancel or have double-hatching more difficult to solve. The recall data
will now be used to investigate the proposition that this increased difficulty is related to
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('an eels Doesn't Cancel
Error in Recall 27.1% 40.4%
(Immediate)
Error in Recall 62.4% 64.4%
(Delayed)
Reading Time(ms) 24-14.8 2,829.7
Figure 5.18: Recall errors and reading times for the second premise by the presence or
absence of cancellation
Double-Hatched Not Donble-11 a.1 died
Error in Recall 27.5% 2,8.2%
(Immediate)
Error in Recall 62.1% 64.4%
(Delayed)
Reading Time(tns) 249 1.6 2547.0
Figure 5.19: Recall errors and reading times for the second premise by tlu- presence or
absence of double-hatching
indeterminacy in the text. It was demons!rated by Stenning ( 198(i) i hat descriptive texts
take longer to read and are more poorly recalled if indeterminate t ban detei initiate ones.
The reading time and memory data will be used to see if these two variables relate to
the presence or absence of cancellation and double-hatching in such a way as to suggest
that the absence of these factors constitutes indeterminacy.
Figures 5.18 and 5.19 give the overall percentage of texts that had any kind ol error
at immediate and delayed recall for texts with and without cancellation or double-
hatching and the reading times for the second premise for tin1 same groups. The differ¬
ences between recall errors at immediate recall for cancelling and non-cancelling texts
is significant (1=2.05. p<0.04) as is the difference in reading times (1=4.92. p<0.000l).
The numbers of errors for delayed recall is not significantly different between lexis,
nor are any of the differences for the double-hatched versus non-double-hatched texts.
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Cancelling texts therefore are found to have a lower error rate for immediate recall and
less time is taken to read their second premise. As the second premise reading time
constitutes some measure of the time it takes for the subject to feel confident of a rep¬
resentation. if not to have decided on a response, it seems safe to say that cancelling
texts are easier to understand and possibly easier to represent. The presence or absence
of double-hatching does not appear to make a difference.
It will be shown later that the type of conclusion drawn for the syllogism lias an effect
on the ability of the subject to recall the syllogism. Hearing this in mind, the analysis
above is repeated, but only for syllogisms that do not possess a valid conclusion. These
syllogisms can be divided into three groups: t hose t hat cancel and have double-hatching,
those that cancel and have no double-hatching and those that do not cancel and have no
double-hatching. Figure 5.20 gives an example for each category. I here are no example
of syllogisms that do not cancel and yet have double-hatching. There are significant
differences between these three groups for all variables but delayed recall errors (I (intin
rec)=3.44. p<0.03; F(del rec)=1.05. n.s: F(resp)= 6.58. p<().()() 1 F(rt) =2.bl. p<0.07)
and the percentages given in figure 5.21 indicate that syllogisms that cancel and have
no double-hatching are recalled with fewest errors, followed by those that cancel and
do have double-hatching and those that neither cancel or have double-hatching having
the poorest recall. This is true at both stages of recall (but only significant at im¬
mediate recall), also of the accuracy of the reasoning responses given and tin1 reading
time for the second premise. Testing between groups finds that only the difference in
recall errors between syllogisms with no double-hatching but which camel or do not
cancel are significant (t = -2.83. p<0.00 I). The reading time for syllogisms that cancel
and have no double-hatching is significantly shorter than the reading times for can¬
celling syllogisms with double-hatching and non-cancelling syllogisms without (t=3.M.
p<0.0002 for doesn't cancel, no double-hatching versus cancels, no double hatching.
t= 2.47, p<0.01 for cancels, double-hatching versus cancels, no double-hatching). The
accuracy of tlm responses is significantly lower for syllogisms which do not < ancel and do
not have double-hatching than the accuracy for the other two groups (t = 2.3. pel).02.
t—2.36. p<0.01) but the presence or absence of double-hatching for the two groups
which cancel does not make a difference in the subjects ability to correctly solve the
syllogism.
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The main effect appears to be that syllogisms whose middle lernis cancel are read
more quickly, recalled more accurately and have more correct reasoning responses than
those that do not cancel, when the analysis is confined to those syllogisms that do
not have a valid conclusion. Rather than cancellation being used as a tool to detect
syllogisms without a valid conclusion, its absence appears to make syllogisms harder to
process and to solve, when a conclusion is searched for. It has already been suggested
that the reason for this may lie in subject's attempts to relate the end-terms and being
prevented from doing so by the fact that the middle term cannot be removed from the
"equation" simply. Figure 5.2*2 shows why this might be so. Double-hatching does not
seem to make syllogisms with no valid conclusion harder to answer, but its presence
does i ncrease t he processing time for t ho second premise and the number ol recall errors
at immediate recall.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter the recall data has been used to address various issues relating to t lieories
about syllogistic reasoning. It has been found that the mental models explanation of the
figural effect is not supported by an analysis of the data, either for predictions generated
bv that model alone or in terms of a comparison of predicted levels of recall error for this
explanation and t he grammat ical roles ex pi an at ion. The latter hy pot hesis is supported
though, from indirect evidence showing that the grammatical roles (or locus) of the
conclusion is preserved in the recall, suggesting that the factors that lead to its being
preserved are the same that led to its being chosen as the topic of the conclusion in
the first place. The predictions of the grammatical roles theory are also borne out by
the relative levels of noun recall error for various combinations of figure and conclusion
type.
Recall errors are also found that reveal misinterpretations of the logic of the quan¬
tifiers. There appears to be an appreciation of the logic of "all" as the nouns in the
premise containing this quantifier are recalled in reverse order rather lews frequently
than the other nouns, however, the fact that "none" also has reversed nouns less of¬
ten in the premises it heads at recall tends to suggest along with findings made earlier
that universally quantified premises are less prone to all types of error. The frequency
with which certain quantifiers are changed to others reveals the operation of Ciriceatt
None of the A are B





Some of the B are A B A
Some of the C are B C B
Not Double-hatched
Cancels
Some of the A are B A B
Some of the C are not B C ~B
Not Double-hatched
Does Not Cancel








Error in Recall 28.8% 35.1%. 10.0%.
(Immediate)
Error in Recall 78.6% 80.3% 81.0%
(Delayed)
Incorrect 27.7% 28.0% 36.7%
Responses
Reading Time(ms) 2163.1 2538.9 2797.0
Figure 5.21: Recall errors. Incorrect responses and reading times for tlie second premise
by the presence or absence of double-hatching and cancellation for syllogisms with no
valid conclusion
All the A are II




from which the B term cannot be removed because it is positive in one premise and
negative in t he ol her
Figure 5.22: An example of a non-cancelling syllogism
1
implicatures. Changes from universal to particular are more common in general than
vice versa., which is in line with the observation that subjects are less prom1 to observe
the full logical meaning of particulars, which implies the universal statement also to
be possibly true. The most common types of quantifier error however involve changes
between the particular quantifiers, suggesting that the interpretation of these two may
not be distinct in many cases.
Finally, recall data is used to examine the proposition that cancelling syllogisms are
more determinate than non-cancelling ones. This is upheld, particularly with reference
to the group of syllogisms that have no valid conclusion. Double-hatching, which does
not seem to play much part in processing overall, is also found to influence recall and
processing, but in such a way as to worsen or lengthen these factors: the opposite of
cancellation. In the previous chapter it was found that the absence of double hatching
made syllogisms with valid conclusions more difficult to answer and while the presence
of this feature does nol affect correct response rates, its impact on the recall suggests




In the previous chapters basic recall effects have been demonstrated and tins data along
with the reasoning data from both experiments lias been used to look critically at various
theories pertaining to syllogistic reasoning and memory phenomena in general. It now
seems appropriate to use the i n format ion gai tied from t liese ex peri men t s to formula) e an
impression of the priorities and strategies used by subjects when solving those problems.
Of particular interest is information pertaining to the type of representation actually
used by subjects when reasoning. Must this be based on individuals as .lohuson-l.aird
claims, or is there evidence that set-based representations might also be used? Does
tlie evidence suggest that this is a useful distinction to make, or are llie.se theories only
distinguishing between learned st rategies. t heniselves arising from homogenous processes
at another level?
6.1 Reasoning and Recall
It has been established that there exists a group of subjects who in the standard task,
at least initially, do not appreciate the logic of syllogisms and who generate conclusions
from them on the basis of judgements about t lie plausibility of cert aiu relations ex i st i ng
on the basis of the situation described. There also exists a rather larger group of
subjects who appear to be using rational means to solve the syllogism, of the general
form: combine the premises and use cycles of testing to identify the presence of a valid
conclusion. The relationship that these different processes bear to recall has already
been examined in rather specific ways in the pieced i ng eh a] iter, but a broader look at this
Type of Conclusion Immediate Recall Delayed Recall
Correct NVC' 21.2% 63.1%
Correct VC 25.2% 57,1%







Figure 6.1: Percentage error by types of response
connection is required. The responses to 1 lie syllogisms in Kxperiinent 1 can be grouped
into five categories: those that were correct and a valid conclusion drawn. t hose t hat were
correct and no valid conclusion drawn, those that were incorrect because a conclusion
was given where none exists, those that were incorrect because no conclusion was given
and one does exist and those that were incorrect because the wrong conclusion was given
although a valid conclusion does exist. It lias already been recognised that answering
"no valid conclusion" will, at immediate recall cause less disruption of memory than
drawing a. conclusion. However it has also been shown that this advantage disappears at
delayed recall, presumably because of poorer consolidation of syllogisms where no valid
conclusion is given. It is of interest to see whether this effect is consistent over all types
of response, for example, giving "no valid conclusion to a syllogism with a conclusion
may arise from exitting cycles of testing prental ttrely. whereas i n ol her cases gi vi ug 1 his
response may be accompanied by a superficial representation of the syllogism because
logical principles have been used to solve it rather than an agglomerated representation.
When conclusions are drawn distinguishing between those that are correct and those
that are not is important because some will be the result of matching and therefore are
thought to be the result of a rather different reasoning strategy.
Figure 6.1 shows that these distinctions are well motivated. I here is a very much
higher percentage of errors for syllogisms where the response was one of the incorrectly
drawn conclusions at immediate recall and a rather less dramatic difference at delay.
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Incorrectly stated "no valid conclusion" responses have the lowest percentage of recall
errors at immediate recall and the second lowest at delay. Correctly given valid conclu¬
sions also have low percentage error rates at both immediate and delayed recall, correctly
given "no valid conclusion" is well remembered at immediate recall, as generally found,
but does less well at delay.
These findings can be explained in the following way. The evidence gathered so
far suggests that subjects acting non-logically tend to draw more, not fewer valid con¬
clusions. The response "no valid conclusion" is rather underused by these subjects
suggesting that it is not the response used as a fall-back or guess. When it appears in¬
correctly one must assume that it is the result of cycles of testing (inishing prental urely
or, in the case of the figural effect, a valid conclusion being missed because it is autifig-
ura.l. In this case then subjects may well have combined the premises and performed
some testing, but do not go through the process of drawing a conclusion and interfering
with the recall immediately after reading t lie syllogism in this way. Valid conclusions
will be arrived at after a similar process, but on average, more testing. I his does not
confer an advantage on memory, as shown in I lie previous chapter however, and I lie act
of drawing the conclusion seems to affect memory adversely at immediati recall. Cor¬
rectly given "no valid conclusion" will also often result from testing and therefore the
recall of 1 his and incorrect "no valid conclusion" should be similar. As noted in chapter
4 however, some of these conclusions do not result from testing, but from the use ol
heuristics or logical principles. The lesser amount of consolidation will ailed recall at
delay as is found. Incorrect "no valid conclusion" should stiller less at delay because
they are more likely to have been integrated and tested. Correct valid conclusions will
be better retained at delay, as they result from a well-integrated structure. Conclusions
given where none exists will always have poor recall, they result from matching in a
high number of cases and will be based on a superficial understanding of the syllogism
and suffer from the effect of drawing a conclusion. Incorrectly drawn conclusions where
one does exist might be assumed to be the result of the same process and I hose also are
found to have poor recall.
Thus, recall in a general sense appears to be affected by the strategy underlying
the interpretation of the syllogism, if not the amount of processing. Combining the
premises seems to be a major determining factor, although this does not relate to
depth of processing in any simple way as shown by the analysis of numbers of models
and recall in chapter 5. The strong "evening out" effect at delayed recall suggests
that the information that improves immediate recall for valid conclusions for example
is not robust enough to withstand thirty-two texts delay in a large number of cases.
Given the assumption that subjects drawing incorrect conclusion are doing so because
of a more superficial representation, can evidence be gathered about the nature ol
this representation from investigation of types of recall errors and types of response?
Analysis shows not. There are no interesting variations in the types of errors found for
syllogisms with different types of response, rather there is a global effect of response
type, which increases the tendency for some part of t he syllogism to be forgot ten v it bout
affecting one type of information more than any other.
6.2 Ordering of Information in the Syllogism
The hypothesis that the preference for B as subject term is related to the subject s
attribution of topic to the middle term of the syllogism conflicts with the requirement
of the standard task that one of t lie end-t en us be t a ken as t lie subject ol the concl usion
(and thus act as the focus or topic of the argument). However, in tin case o| the
second experiment, the subjects is under no such restraint: choosing an individual gives
him/her freedom to choose any of the three nouns in the syllogism as primary. It is
of interest therefore to ex ami no the orders preferred by t he su bject s in this ex peri ment
and relate these preferences to recall choices from the standard task.
Subjects were asked to decide if a valid individual followed from the premises of the
syllogism. If they concluded that one did they were asked to write down the properties,
no order was suggested, and make a note of whether the individual did or did not
possess the property in question. Studying the results of this leads to a number ol
interesting observations. The first position noun is much more likely to be k than a
or c (see figure 6.'2). The relative frequencies ol a and c reflect rather closely those
of a-c and c- a conclusions for the standard task. This suggests that b does indeed
take topic position when circumstances allow it to do so. A figural effect has already
been demonstrated for Experiment 2 in chapter I. the effect of tin- four figures on the
frequency of b in first position has not been studied. 1 lie figural effect can again be
observed, but in addition one can see that b collects a sizeable proportion of the choices
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Figure 6.2: First position noun for the individuals task
Noun in First
Position
A B-BC HA CB AB CB BA BC
A 62.3% ■1.1% 7-1.5% 7,1% •
B 35.9% 11.9% 5,1% 91.2%
c 1.8% 5 1.0% 20.0% 1,1%
Figure 6.3: First position noun by figure for the individuals task
for these two figures, particularly for ha cb. This noun is a great deal less popular for
ab-cb and is overwhelmingly the favourite for ha bc\
It is difficult to imagine that the factors creating these preferences are not the same
ones responsible for the figural effect. The type of task the subjects are asked to pen-
form is certainly different in some important respects, but it is also similar in others,
particularly in that to correctly solve the individuals problem the subjects must ag¬
glomerate the premises in the same way as for the standard task, even if the way they
manipulate them to search for an individual is different from cycles ol testing. II the
figural effect results from the process of agglomeration, one would expect the choice of
first noun for the individuals task to follow in the same way. It should be obvious that
any explanation of this effect based on transitivity of a mental model will have difficulty
accounting for these results. According to this hypothesis. B must always enter working
memory between the end terms, because only in this way can a coherent model be built.
Because A and c are never found in the same premise, the subject has at the time of
combining the premises no information that would allow these two nouns to be linked,
which would have to be the case if b were 1o enter the model first. Because of this.
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the occasions where individuals beginning with b are chosen cannot be explained and
as these constitute more than chance occurences, it must be assumed that some other
mechanism is responsible for the effect.
In chapters 4 and 5. an alternative account of the figural effect was examined and
found to fit the recall and conclusion data rather better than .Johnson-Laird's expla¬
nation. This consists of the observation that the end term which is subject is taken
to be the subject of the conclusion and in the case where there are two candidate's or
no candidates for the subject, factors such as which noun was first mentioned play a
greater or lesser part. In the individuals task, there is always a choice of two subjects
for the conclusion. In only one figure are they both the same noun - ba bc. thus the
preference for individuals with b as the first noun. In one case b is never in subject
term, for ab-cb and the incidence of b-lirst choices is therefore small, for the ligural
cases the end-term in subject position is most often chosen, but in the case of ba cb
the middle term is also a popular choice. Taking into account the other proposed factor
- that the noun in the first premise is also preferred for the subject position, one can
see that in the case of ba-cb there will be a conflict between b and ( in lirst position,
leading to nearly equal choices while for ab bc a litis both factors counting for it and
therefore obtains a larger share of the choices. This also explains the disparity between
a and c choices for ab-cb - a is chosen for first position more often because it is in the
first premise.
The grammatical roles account of the figtiral effect can be applied to the results
of this new task and can explain findings which the mental models formulation can
not. It has already been shown that choosing an individual predisposes the subjects
to different strategies, suggesting that to an extent the representation used by the
subject is determined by the task they are requested to perform. The standard task,
for example requires the subject to remove from the equation one ol the nouns - the
middle term - which is exactly the noun that appears to assume referential importance
for the individuals task. It may be that the elimination of b for the standard task takes
place at a. stage after the consolidation of the premises. 'The consolidated representation
may then reflect the preferences for noun order found in the individuals task, while the
reasoning component of the process will be dependent on the type of task involved, thus
the differential effects of cancellation and double hatching.
140
One must therefore look for evidence that underlying the recall for the standard
task are structures that reflect the preferences found for the individuals task. Certain
syllogisms lend themselves well to an analysis of the ways in which these structures
might affect recall. Figure 6.4 shows the most popular noun orders for the EA. AE.
EI and IE syllogisms from the individuals task. In no case was any other individual
more popular, in all but one case the displayed choice accounted for 50% or more of the
total and in that one case the most popular choice was "no valid individual". The AE
and IE pairs tend to be given in an order that conforms to the order of the nouns of
the syllogism, that is abc for figures ab-bc and ab--cb and bag for figures ba-cb and
ba-bc. The EA and EI pairs tend to have \ as the final term of the individual and
often c as the first term. The effect this might have on memory is difficult to predict
exactly as there are many ways that subjects might use a representation such as this
to inform recall about the position of the nouns in t lie syllogism, assuming that this
in fact happens at all. One simple mechanism that might be operated however, is for
the subject to retain the individual, choose one of the first two nouns a-, the middle
term and repeat that middle term somewhere in the individual retained, to end up with
four nouns which then represent the noun order of the syllogism. Figure (>."> shows that
so long as the correct middle term is picked, the individuals commonly drawn for the
AE and AI pairs will often lead to a correct recall and always to one where the noun
roles of the syllogism are preserved and that for the EA/EI pails, even if the correct
middle term is picked correct recall never follows and in particular in all cases will lie
placed in the second premise. In half the cases included. <" will appear in the firs!
premise. In addition one would expect the first mentioned noun in the individual be
the first mentioned term in the recalled noun order. Those observations indicate some
predictions to be examined:
• The EA and EI pairs will tend to have greater numbers of cases when a is recalled
as having occurred in the second premise than iho AE and IE pairs.
• The EA and EI pairs will tend to have greater numbers of cases where r is recalled
as having occurred in the first premise than the AE and IE pairs.
• The first mentioned term in the individuals drawn from AI. and IE syllogisms is
also the first mentioned term in the original syllogism, so little of interest can be
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Type of AB-BC' BA-CB AB-CB BA BC
Syllogism
AE/IE ABC B A C' ABC BAC
EA/EI BC'A CBA CBA BC A
Figure 6.4: Most popular types of individuals for AE/IE and EA/EI syllogisms by figure
Type of Possible Noun Orders
Individual (wit h B as middle term )
ABC A BBC BABC ABCB
BAC BANC BACB
B C A BCAB BCBA
C B A BCBA CBAB
Figure 6.5: Possible noun orders by individuals
predicted for these cases in terms of which noun will be recalled in first position.
However, in two of the EA and IE cases the first position noun would be predicted
to be B when in only one case is this the actual first noun and in the other two
cases, c would be the first noun.
These predictions are compared to the recall in figure 6.6. figure 6.7 and figure 6.X.
The predictions for the recall of A and c are borne out. There are significant differences
between all the comparisons across the two groups with the EA/EI pairs always having
a. greater percentage of error (t= 1.46 p < 0.1. t =2.01 p<0.()5. for a in the second premise
at immediate and delayed recall respectively. (1=2.11 p<().()4. t = 1.5 I p<0.OS for c in
the first premise at immediate and delayed recall). Looking wit bin the EA and El pairs
does show that instances where B was chosen as the first property in the individual are
also instances where b was recalled as the first noun. This difference is significant at
immediate recall (t= 1.85 p<0.06). but not at delay (t=EI5 n.s.).
By isolating this particular group of syllogisms and comparing t ho indiv iduals found





































Figure 6.8: Percentage of recalls with h in first position for the f.a/f.l syllogisms
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be recall phenomena that reflect the existence of individuals of 1 his type. Hie question
of why these particular individuals should he chosen in the first place has not yet
been addressed and in the next section it will be shown that some, if not all of these
phenomena can be traced to a common cause.
6.3 Positive and Negative Information
At points throughout this work it has been noted that information in the syllogism must
be ordered in a particular way according to whether it is positive or negative. Research
has already established that negative information is more difficult to process and tends to
be understood as a conversion to affirmative statements (W'ason (1959.1901.19(53. 1965).
Donaldson (1959)). Wason makes the observation that positive statements are usually
used to introduce information and negative ones to qualify those statements. There
is found an intuitive observation that this experiment has shown empirically to be
the case. The strong ordering effects of the quantifiers give dramatic evidence of this
process at work and also shows a tendency to prefer universally quantified statements
to be followed by particular ones.
6.3.1 Negative information and the recall data
Interactions between this and the recall of the nouns have already been observed. It
can also be shown that these effects exist independently of the process of solving the
syllogism. Two groups of syllogisms can be isolated, the IA and KA syllogisms and the
AI and AE syllogisms of figures ab-bc and ba cb. These two groups are not logically
equivalent within themselves but each member of a group has a logically equivalent
member in the other group. The IA and EA syllogisms have the non-preferred order of
quantifiers, however and the AI and AE group the preferred order. The only factor that
can affect the recall of these two groups is the order of the quantifiers, as logical factors
have been controlled for. When the percentage of texts that had any kind of error at
all is observed, it can be seen (figure 6.9) that a very large difference exists between the
percentage of errors for the former group as opposed to the latter. Examining every
category of recall error produces the same result, with the exception of type noun
order errors (reversal of noun within a premise) which are equally common for both
groups (t= 0.43 n.s.. t= 0.08 n.s. at immediate and delayed recall respectively). The
1.11
Type of Error Preferred Order Non-preferred Order Significance
Any Error
Immediate Recall 25.0% 38.0% t=2.32 p<0.01
Delayed Recall 61.0% 84.0%, t = 2.75 p<0.008
First Quantifier
Immediate Recall 5.0% 10.0% 1=2.57 p<0.01
Delayed Recall 21.0% 50.0% 1=4,17 ixO.OOOOI
Second Quantifier
Immediate Recall 3.0% 17.0% 1=3.38 p<().00l
Delayed Recall 36.0% (i 1.0% 1=3.17 p<0.002
Reversal of Nouns
Immediate Recall 14.0% 13.0% t=().43 n.s.
Delayed Recall 23.0% 22.0% t =0.0>! u.s.
a in Second Premise
Immediate Recall 5.0% 16.0% 1=2.57 p<().() 1
Delayed Recall 18.0% 30.0% t =2.91 pCO.OOl
C in First Premise
Immediate Recall 3.0% 13.0% 1=2.0 1 p<0.01
Delayed Recall 13.0% 27.0% t =2.5 p<0.0l
Figure 6.9: Errors in recall by preferred and non-preferred <|iiantifier order
quantifiers are particularly affected as would be expected as are the numbers ol recall
errors where a or c appear in the inappropriate premise.
6.3.2 Negative information and choosing individuals
It was found in chapter 4 that this order preference for positive and negative information
causes asymmetries in the type of conclusion chosen, both for particular syllogisms not
generally thought to show these types of order effects and over the entire set. Preference
for order of nouns in individuals is also affected by negative and positive information.
Subjects in Experiment '2 were asked to find individuals which must exist under every
circumstance, but who could either have (positive information) or not have (negative
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information) the attributes in the syllogism. There are. as already stated, eight possible
individuals, if the order the nouns are given in the response is ignored. One of these
types of individuals should never occur, others are found rarely. Figure 0.10 lists the
individuals and the percentage of each noun order that were found for each one. One
individual is excluded - -A-B-c - because it is very rarely given (only five cases appear
overall) and can never be correct. The percentage of each noun order is given for
the responses as a whole. The type of individual given and the noun order do not
interact randomly. Inspection reveals that very rarely is a noun that conveys negative
information in the individual found in first position. When only one 1101111 is positive,
then there is a strong tendency for it to be found in first position, when two nouns are
positive then B tends to be the first choice, followed by a and finally c. The percentage
of noun order for the total responses reflects this preference and also shows that noun
orders where b is given last in the order are rather rare. This is due to the fact that
noun orders where b is negative are very randy given. These findings are summarised
in figure 6.11. From this we can see that when a given noun is negative, it will take
first position in only around 3% of cases, with one of the other two nouns (usually h)
in first position. Looking at the nouns in last position it can be seen that negative \
and c take last position in 87.1% and 79.2% of cases respectively. The exception is h.
Even when this noun is negative, it is not to be found iu last position. \ is the preferred
choice for this.
6.3.3 The overall effect of negative information
The previous two sections have demonstrated that, irrespective of the type ul task
subjects are asked to perform, the order of the information conveyed by the quantifiers
has a profound effect on the types of responses subjects give and the number and type
of recall errors they make. Subjects prefer to take in negative information after positive
information, to reiterate Wason's comments: allirniative statements are generally used
to introduce information and negative ones to qualify that which has been introduced.
Subjects will find syllogisms that contain information in the opposite1 order difficult to
process, it seems likely from the data, that they reverse the order of the premises in
memory, thus tending to recall both the quantifiers and the nouns iu revet so order and
also tend to structure conclusions in the standard task around the reversed, not the
Order of Nouns
Type of ABC AC'B BAC Bt'A CAB C B A
Individual
T"AT B -pc 31.1% 2.4% 28.1% 18.0%. 2.4% 18.0%
-A+ B+C ■1.7% 0.0 9.2% 42.9% 0.0 44.2%
+A-B+C 75.0% 0.0 25.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0
-A-B+C 4.2% 0 0 0.0 0.0 20.8% 75.0%
+A+B-C 46.7% 0.0 46.1 % 5.9% 0.0 1.3%
-A + B-C 2.8% 1.9% 57.0% 33.6% 0.9% 3.7%
+A-B-C 84.2% 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3% 10.5%
Total 12.6% 0.6% 16.1% 1 1.9% 0.9% 10.6%
Figure 6.10: Percentage of type <>f noun order for each individual
1 i rst Position Nou n
Negative Term A B c
A 3.7% 52.1% 14.1%
B 14.2% 3.6% 82.1 %
C 33.9% 62.9% 3.9%
Last Position Noun
A B c
A 87.1% 0.0 12.9%
B 64.3% 1 7.9% 17.9%
C 19.1% 1.8% 79.2%
Figure 6.11: Position of nouns by negative terms
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original order.
This explains at least in part the interactions found between the types of individuals
drawn in Experiment 2 for certain syllogisms and recall errors for those same syllogisms
in Experiment 1. The reason that certain terms are always found as the last noun of
the individual is because they are negatively quantified. These same syllogisms when
recalled will have the negative information appearing first. It has already been noted
that this tends to cause a reversal of both quantifiers and nouns to achieve a preferred
order. The kinds of recall errors found reflect this kind of reversal. One need not suppose
however that these two phenomena result from two separate processes. The reordering
noticed in the memory for these syllogisms may result in a representation from which
an individual of the type and order found can be drawn. The fact thai within this
group preferences for order within the individual also affect to a lesser degree the recall
results suggest that the relationship between two tasks operates at the level of a common
representation.
6.4 Processing the Information in the Syllogism
Also in the data for Exeriment '2 has been found a preference for h as t lie (irst term in the
individual. b is very rarely given a negative value and when it is it tends not to be placed
at the end of the syllogism as are a and r. The figure ha hc has an overwhelmingly
high number of cases where b is the first term, an effect reminiscent of the figural effect
and an explanation for this and other observations based on the grammatical roles
theory has been given above. Relating this to the recall data produces some interesting
hypotheses about the strategies subjects apply to understanding the syllogism. It is
noted in chapter 3 that of the four figures, ha hc is the quickest to be processed during
the standard task and tends to be the preferred choice when recalling the syllogism
immediately after reasoning and attracts fewest errors overall, particularly type 2 errors
(reversal of the nouns within a premise). At delayed recall ha hi enjoys no immunity
from error and is no longer the most popular choice of figure, but it remains more
popular than its counterpart parallel1 figure ah-cb which fares badly in this respect
at both immediate and delayed recall. To this can be added the observation that b is
'Here as in other parts of the text, the figures will he referred to as hcing "parallel" or "diagonal".
This groups the figures into those that have the middle term wit h t lie same grammatical role and I hose
in which it has different grammatical roles in each premise
I 3N
the preferred subject term for the first premise overall and that it is associated with
negative to positive changes in the first quantifier when it does take this position.
It seems that the arrangement of the nouns in syllogisms of the figure ha-bc has
some property that makes them easy to process and preferred for recall. Returning
once more to Kieras' work on the factors that subjects use to identify the topic of a
set of sentences, he found that the first mentioned term, the subject term and the most
frequently mentioned term were all more likely to be taken as the topic around which
the discourse was organised. Recognising that these factors do not always coincide,
he went 011 to discover that poorly structured texts, where topic is ambiguous, can be
resolved but the processing times are higher and the choice of topic more heterogenous
between subjects. The implications of some of these points have already been discussed
in relation to the figural effect, the second experiment now shows how 1 hose factors
might be influencing the processing of syllogisms in a broader sense. The four figures all
possess nouns that 011 the basis of these factors identified by Kieras are candidates for
the topic of the syllogism. However, what differs between figures is the extent to which
these factors coincide in indicating the same topic. On the basis of subject position.
a, b or c could be topic, depending on the figure. The first mentioned noun could be
either a or b and the most frequently mentioned item is b for all figures. How these
factors interact is shown in figure 6.13 from which it is clear that ba hc possesses the
structure that most unambiguously identifies a topic - b. the two diagonal figures arc-
split between a and b in the case of ah bc and c and b in i lie case of ba c b. \b c b
has the most conflicting arrangement, any noun could be the topic, a perhaps enjoying
a. slight advantage because of it being both a subject and the first mentioned item.
In terms of processing then, ba-bc should be the easiest to process, then \b bc and
ba-cb and finally ab-cb.
These observations provide a good fit to the noun order frequencies by figure col¬
lected from Experiment 2 as already noted and for the reading time and recall accuracy
and preferences observed at immediate recall (see figure 6.12 for reading times). The
change in recall pattern at delayed recall remains to be explained, however, firstly it
is pertinent to note that many of the effects relating to noun order recall errors disap¬
pear at delay. Waiting for thirty-two texts before recalling the text again increases the
frequency of all types of error and tends to reduce rather than increase the differences
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Figure 6.12: Processing time by figure
in recall success between a number of groups. The disappearance of BA-Bf's advantage
is probably part of that tendency. Other preferences for these particular variables do
appear however. The diagonal figures are more often chosen at delayed recall than the
parallel ones, the opposite being true at immediate recall. One needs to consider the
whole process of deriving a conclusion to see why this might be so.
It has been proposed that ba-bc is the easiest figure to process because it unambigu¬
ously indicates a topic for the argument. However, the topic it indicates happens to be
the one noun that cannot play a part in the conclusion, should one exist. This implies
that once the syllogism has been interpreted and the premises combined, in the case of
ba-bc the subject must choose another topic for the syllogism which directly conflicts
with all the information contained in the text itself. In the cases of I lie diagonal figures,
the topic is ambiguous anyway and the choice the subject makes has a 50(/ chance ol
being one of the end terms, although the choice of topic will depend on the weighting
given to the three factors. In a significant proportion of cases, the choice of topic for the
conclusion will be the same as that chosen for the text as a whole and no interference
will result. For ab-cb the choice of topic for the text will hardly ever interfere with the
choice of conclusion topic as the indicators are that the former will rarely be b. It might
be expected that this interference will only really make itself felt at delayed recall, when
the subjects will have to rely on the least superficial aspects of the syllogism to inform
their memory and as has already been noticed, the internal grammar of the premises,
upon which the choice of topic is largely dependent, is fragile information. What the
subject will retain at delay is instructions about the topic of the syllogism which will



















Figure 6.13: Choice of topic for each figure according to the factors identified by Keiras
percentage of errors in the noun order at immediate and delayed recall for each figure,
divided by whether a conclusion was drawn or not are considered. The final distinction
is important because although giving the response "no valid conclusion" must in some
cases involve the searching out of a topic for putative (but finally rejected ) conclusions,
in a large number of cases, as already established, no such process is attempted when
this type of answer is given. A conclusion, valid or not. must always have a topic and
will always invoke the interference tinder discussion.
The data shows that the differences are as predicted: at immediate recall the varia¬
tion in percentage of correct noun recalls is increased for ba bc. Responding "no valid
conclusion" seems to create particularly little interference for the parallel figures. At
delayed recall, the stage of real interest, it can be seen that ba bc has similar propor¬
tions of errors for cases where no conclusion was drawn as other figures. It is only in
the cases where a conclusion is given that the percentage of correct noun recalls drops
sharply, exactly as predicted. It is interesting to note that drawing a conclusion seems
to improve the recall of ab-cb. the other parallel figure. One might suppose that this
is because, as pointed out above that drawing a conclusion will not interfere with the
topic chosen and this gives it a relative advantage compared to the other ligures which
are all likely to suffer a degree of interference.
6.4.1 Recall of the Figures and Types of Conclusion
These processing factors can also be of use in explaining another recall phenomenon,
also related to figure and to the type of conclusion drawn. It has been found that
at immediate recall there is a tendency to recall parallel rather than diagonal figures
I I
Immediate Recall
Figure Conclusion No Conclusion
Given Given
AB-BC 09.3'X 75.9'X










Figure 6.14: Percentage of correctly recalled noun orders by figure and conclusion given
Immediate Recall
Type of No Conclusion ('onclusion Percentage of
Figure Chosen Gi veil Given Total
Parallel 54.8% 47.9% 51.3%
Diagonal 45.2% 52.1% 48.7%
Delayed Recall
Type of No Conclusion ('onclusion Percentage of
Figure Chosen Given Given Total
Parallel 46.4% 41.4% 43.9%
Diagonal 54.6% 58.6% 56.1 %
Figure 6.15: Percentage of type of figure cliosen by response given to syllogism
(figre 6.1o). A breakdown by type of conclusion shows that this tendency is confined to
cases where no conclusion was given. Syllogisms that were given a conclusion, correct Iv¬
or incorrectly, tend to be recalled as having a diagonal figure. At delayed recall on the
other hand, it can be seen that the overall tendency is for diagonal figures to be chosen
and this is especially true of syllogisms for which a conclusion was given. Syllogisms
where no conclusion was given also tend to be recalled as diagonal, but this t rend is less
strong.
It has already been shown that for one figure at least, syllogisms given no conclusion
are less likely to suffer interference as a result of conflict between topics. This is because,
it is argued, in many cases no topic for possible conclusions has been derived and
therefore there is no conflict. In these cases, the likely choice lor the recall <>1 the
figure will be that which is easiest to process - ba-hc. as there is no other coding ol
the syllogism other than the initial interpretation. This preference is strong enough
to create a preference for parallel figures overall. Syllogisms for whom a conclusion
has been drawn will have two codings to choose from: the initial one and the one
for the conclusion. In some cases there will be no conflict, in others the choices of
topic will be different, but the most recent coding will be that for the conclusion. I he
preference will be then, to choose a figure that preserves the subject-predicate structure
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of the conclusion - a diagonal figure. At delayed recall, this tendency is exaggerated
and in addition the syllogisms for whom there was given no valid conclusion are also
mostly recalled as diagonal. The cases from this group where coding was given lor the
conclusion are now also using this information at recall, because, as has already been
shown, surface information in the syllogism is fragile and often superceded by the coding
used for the conclusion2.
6.5 The Nature of the Representation
In this section the implications of these finding for t he representation underlying syllogis¬
tic reasoning will be discussed. Of particular interest here is the form of representation
used by logically experienced subjects - the nature of the agglomerated representation.
The issue of interest is the stat us of such a representation - is it task specific, or is t here
any evidence that all subjects tend to prefer one type of notation over another?
The evidence studied in chapters -I and i tended to show that subjects were us¬
ing a strategy that would reveal the presence of individuals, not normally evident in
the standard task. There was also evidence that the presence or absence of cancella¬
tion helped this group of subjects to make decisions about the presence or absence of
valid individuals. In the standard task facilitation of this kind was found, but can¬
cellation could not have been responsible for it. It was decided therefore that subject
had abstracted logical principles and used those to detect the likely absence of a valid
conclusion. Double-hatching was also not found to hinder subjects in making this typo
of decision. That is not to say. however that cancellation and double-hatching were
entirely without effect - in fact these factors were found to have the opposite effect to
that predicted for syllogisms without valid conclusions and worsen response accuracy.
It was then suggested that in the standard task, where a relationship between a and c
is the object of interest, a syllogism that either fails to allow the h term to be elimi¬
nated or that does not yield a representation where a relationship between a and r can
provide a starting point for testing will be hard to interpret at all. much in I lie same
way that indeterminate texts are hard to interpret. To back this hypothesis, the recall
data, grouped according to cancellation and double-hatching shows that non-cancelling
2Another example of this can he found in chapter !. where subject/predicate robs at recall art-
changed to resemble those of the conclusion
and non-double-hatched texts are more difficult to recall.
The safest position to take might be to state that exact forms of r< 'present at ion
are task- and individual-specific. There is good evidence that subjects attempting the
individuals task use a representation that includes cancellation and double-hatching, the
absence of such results for the reasoning data of the first experiment could simply be
because the task did not invite such a notation. It has also been one of the major points
of this work to demonstrate that subjects do not bring to this type of reasoning problem
a ready-made type of strategy. Depending 011 their previous experience and general
ability for problems of this kind, subjects learn through the course of the task to find a
means of representing the syllogism that will allow them to draw and assess conclusions.
What all subjects do appear to bring to tin- task, is not anything like a mental model,
but a series of preferences based on language comprehension, that underlie the ligural
effect and that reveal themselves in various recall phenomena. These language effects
have not been shown to significantly affect subjects' ability to reason successfully, apart
from influencing subjects away from considering certain starting points foi conclusions,
as has been shown to be the case with the ligural effect. These factors are not lost once
the syllogism has been processed, however, or they would not appear at recall. In some
way, they must form part of the representation, therefore.
To say, however, that subjects do include information about cancellation and double-
hatching. as the data seem to suggest, may not be the same as making a strong claim
about the nature of their representation. Just as Stunning has shown that mental models
and Euler's circles can be made to be equivalent by tin1 addition of notation, so the
additional phenomena observed in these augmented representations can be expressed
in a mental models terminology. Double-hatching might be expressible in terms of
"straight-through links" and cancellation, it must be obvious, is not observable from
the representation, but from a simple, unagglomerated formulation of the two premises.
Although at some level the two representations are indistinguishable it should be noted
that there are two respects in which an Euler's circles based notation can be shown to
have an advantage over mental models.
1. It has been shown at points 1 hroughout this work that I ho quantifier.- "some" and
"some..not" are often confused. There is evidence hot h from the reasoning data ol
A K\j B \ Some of the A are B








Some of the A are not B
Figure 6.16: A comparison of Filler's circles and mental models representations for the
quantifiers "some" and "some..not"
Experiment One and the recall data from the same experiment that supports this
proposal and there is evidence from earlier studies that gives the same result. As
has been already argued this type of confusion follows naturally from a conception
of the representation as being Filler's circles based. Figure (j. 16 compares this and
the mental models formulation to demonstrate that all that is required to confuse
the two quantifiers in the former notation is misplaced shading, or asserting an
individual to exist where this is not certain. The mental models interpretations
however, are hard to confuse. The impression has been gained that this has been
considered one of mental model's strengths, however the data suggests ii i-,. in
fact, a weakness.
2. The evidence collected and examined fails to support the mental models expla¬
nation of the figural effect, but rather suggests a mechanism based on linguistic
features aimed at choosing topic. The position can be taken that menial models
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offers simply a description of the figtiral effect and that Euler's circles, suitably
amended could offer the same, rendering the two notations equal. However, the
finding that b is the favoured choice of topic for the figure ba-bc is damaging to
the position of mental models, because this noun cannot be represented as having
primary position in this formulation in the way used so far (making the primary
noun the left-most in the model), without asserting links between nouns that do
not exist. Euler's circles suffer no such problems. The only way to save mental
models from this problem is to also use additional notation to indicate topic status
leading to two contradictory notations within the same representation.
6.6 Summary
It has been shown that while the numbers of models required to solve a syllogism do not
affect recall in the way depth of processing accounts would suggest, the nature of the
response given to the syllogism in Experiment One does affect recall. Tlie^e differences
do seem to relate to the probable amount of processing the syllogism received before the
response was given, but this cannot be related to different types of recall errors occurring
for different types of processing - it seems to be a global effect on t he tendency to commit
an error at recall.
The ordering of the information in the syllogism, in the form of figure is found to
relate to strong preferences for certain orders of nouns to be chosen in the individuals
task (Experiment 2). This in turn is found to be explicable by reference to linguistic
factors affecting the attribution of topic in the text. In the recall data this can be seen as
causing preferences for certain patterns of recall immediately after giving the reasoning
response, which decay by delayed recall because at this stage what is used for recall
are features of the agglomerated representation which conflicts with the choice of topic
made at the intial stages of interpretation.
It is also found that certain syllogisms in Experiment Two tended to attract certain
orders of nouns for the individuals determined to exist for these cases. The recall data
from the first experiment tends also to show evidence of these orderings. These two
phenomena can be traced to the already found preference for positive information to
be followed by negative information (where negative information has to be used at
all). This tends to force a certain order of nouns on both the choice of individual and
the recall, and as shown in an earlier chapter affects the type of conclusion chosen in
the standard task. The effect of this preference for the ordering of information has
profound effects 011 recall, in that it increases recall errors of every kind, not simply of
the quantifiers. Grouping the syllogisms to create cadres that are logically symmetrical
but that differ in that one group has the preferred order of information and the other
group the non-preferred order shows that this effect operates independently of the logic
of the syllogism.
Discussion of the status of the candidate representations for agglomerated premises
leads to the conclusion that at some level they are indistinguishable empirically and in
any event are the result of learnt strategies, rather than making claim to a universal
code for cognitive operations. There are. however, one or t wo fi udi ugs t hat suggest I hat
the Eider's circles approach may be more descriptively adequate. There may be ways
in which this claim could be cemented by further experimentation, but this is without





In chapter 1, a number of explanations are given for subjects' characteristic performance
for syllogistic reasoning. Some of these claims have been investigated by using the
reasoning data collected from two experiments and the recall data from experiment I.
The evidence from this suggests that explaining subject's choices will not be possible
by choosing to support any one of these theories alone.
While it is certainly true that subject's observed rationality must be explained, it
is also the case that effects of quantifier misinterpretation and evidence of matching
and atmospheric strategies have been found. These effects do not seem to appear for
all subjects in circumstances where the syllogism has become too difficult for them
to solve, but appear to be produced by a certain sub-group of subjects. Therefore
some subjects are not using rationality to solve syllogisms and it should be noted that
misinterpreting the quantifiers does not appear to be restricted to this particular group
of subjects, so imperfect understanding of the logical information represented by the
syllogism appear to be a fairly widespread trait. It is also the case that subjects do not
adopt a uniform strategy for all syllogisms. They appear to recognise at some point
during both the standard and t he individuals I ask that cert ai n syllogisms will never have
a. valid conclusion. How they make this decision seems to depend on the task I.hey are
being asked to perform, for the standard task they appear to have internalised logical
maxims for example of the form "a syllogism with two particular quantifiers never has
a valid conclusion". In this way they are able to answer certain syllogisms correctly
without recourse to cycles of testing, llius improving their performance on this group.
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For t he i ndivid uals task t hoy sootn to use I lie presence or ahsenoo of ca n collation in tin-
original syllogism to decide whether there is a conclusion or not.
One wants a theory of syllogistic reasoning that will allow all these effects to take
place. It. is important that subjects should be able to represent the syllogism in such
a way that they will fail to be able to draw correct valid conclusions even to those
syllogisms that require no testing. Their representation of the syllogisms must contain
the information that influences them to produce conclusions in accordance with the
figural effect. Other subjects are behaving rationally and it seems to be the case that
they do this very much in the way that Johnson-1.aird describes: by agglomerating the
premises and using cycles of testing to isolate correct conclusions. They must also be
able to abstract from these with experience certain logical principles that will enable
them to answer syllogisms correctly without going through this process and they too
will show a figural effect.
It seems reasonable to suppose that a 11 subjects possess a grammatical analysis of
the syllogism which will conform to a greater or lesser extent with their expectations
about the topic or focus of the syllogism. This will influence the ease with which they
will process certain figures and it will create a preference for the terms of the syllogism
to appear in a certain order, both in the i ndivid uals task and t lie standard task.
7.2 The Figural Effect
It has already been mentioned that subjects must possess a representation that will
influence them to choose conclusions in accordance with the figural effect even in sit¬
uations where they can be shown not to have created an agglomerated representation.
There is further evidence, already summarised that points to the fact that the figural
effect cannot be due to a mental models type representation combined with working
memory effects, but is much more likely to be the result of a coding of the syllogism in
terms of topic. The two main points of evidence are:
1. The recall data from the first experiment does not show many of the effects that
would be expected if the manipulations of the nouns in t lie syllogism, necessary
to create a transitive mental model actually take place. A comparison ol the
predictions of this theory, in two versions and a grammatical roles theory relative
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to error rates for recall of the noun order find that the grammatical roles theory
is supported.
2. The results from the individuals task show that subjects often prefer orders begin¬
ning with the noun B. Making the (not unwarranted) assumption that this effect
springs from the same source as the figural effect, one finds that the mental models
explanation cannot account for this effect, as it could only be produced by a non-
transitive model, which is inadmissable for this not at ion. Cli ven that the transitive
nature of the mental model only provides a description of the figural effect and
that it is the operation of memory on this model that creates the pieference. the
lack of recall data supporting this explanation is particularly damaging.
The grammatical roles explanation is accepted as the cause of the figural effect.
This implies that the early stages of interpretation of a syllogism are characterised by
the search for the topic or focus of the argument. This process is heavily influenced by
linguistic factors such as which terms a re in su bject and p red i cat e posit ion (hence I lie use
of the name "grammatical roles" for t he ex plana I ion ) and also which term is men! ioirnd
first and which most frequently mentioned. These factors combine in some cases to lead
the subject to choose b as the topic for the argument, which causes no problems lor
the individuals task, but of course will create difficulties for the standard task where
the topic of the conclusion must be a or c. This conflict leads to increased errors for
certain figures at delayed recall and the overall profiles suggest that the information
about topic derived from the conclusion has a strong effect on what is chosen for recall
at delay. This information must form an integral and indistinguishable part of the
representation of the syllogism and demonstrates that in this case subjects are not able
to differentiate between information created as part of the process of inference and
information actually occurring in the syllogism. Whether they can distinguish inferred
material from the original in terms of the nature of the conclusion is mote difficult to
determine. Adequate analysis of this point has not been carried out. one reason for this
being that attempts to find instances where the conclusion quantifier dilfets adequately
from the originals and isolate particular factors quickly results in a data set that is too
small. The effect of drawing negative conclusions to positive premises and vice versa is
ruled out because of this and the same is true for particular and universal conclusions.
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7.3 The move to positive information followed by nega¬
tive information
The finding that people prefer to assert positive information before making a negative
statement is not a new one. A similar effect is found in this data in the form of a very
strong preference for quantifier order between the premises. This can be summarised
as recall errors resulting in a. shift from negative features to positive ones in the first
premise and the opposite for the second premise. There is also a shift from universal
statements to particular ones in the second premise. This in turn affects the recall of
the nouns in the syllogism, some cases of which have already been noted above. The
preference for b in subject position when the first quantifier changes from being negative
to positive may simply indicate that this change disrupts other parts of I lie memory less
than other quantifier errors, as in this case there are fewer instances of the noun c being
wrongly recalled as having occurred in the first premise. W hen the second quantifier
changes from positive to negative, there is a higher number of errors where ,\ is recalled
as having been in the second premise, when it can only ever actually be found in the
first premise. There are fewer reversals of nouns within a premise when this type of
quantifier error happens, so its effect is not just to cause greater amounts of superficial
disruption of memory. The possibility that a is being carried into t he second premise by
some kind of feature swopping of t he quantifiers is yet to be investigated. It is certainly
that case that when two quantifiers are reversed in order the premises are often recalled
in reverse order also, so there is a tendency to keep the information in premises together.
In many cases where a is found in the second premise it will have replaced b as the
repeated term: quantifier change may specifically disrupt information about which noun
was repeated. This may also be coupled with tin1 fact that first premises of the form
ba are more prone to this type of error, presumably because the subject assumes that
the second-mentioned noun in the first sentence is going to be the repealed term, (the
second premise is not available at. the point the first is read) and then rope ats the error
at recall. The change in quantifier may accentuate this trend.
A similar effect of negative information is found for I he individuals experiment. Here,
negative terms are very often found last in t lie individual and i f 1 here is on I \ one positi ve
term, it is usually found first.
The representation of the syllogism must therefore either lose the ordei information
pertaining to all the quantifiers, which seems unlikely as subjects are usually rather
unlikely to reverse the order of the quantifiers, or it must reorder information that does
not conform to the subject's preference.
7.4 The Nature of the Representation
The process of understanding a syllogism begins with an initial linguistic analysis w hich
assigns a value to the topic of the syllogism. At this stage also, possibly, the subject
must resolve indeterminacy created by non-cancellation, or will use information about
cancellation to decide on the presence of an individual, if this is the task being performed.
If the standard task is being attempted, experienced subjects may perceive from the
quantifiers alone that there is no conclusion and never attempt an agglonu ration of the
premises. In some cases, subjects will fail to realise that agglomeration is necessary and
will draw a conclusion 011 the basis of the linguistic analysis alone. The information
in the quantifiers will be reordered at this stage so that negative information follows
positive and particular information universal. This will usually match the quantiliers in
the syllogism or be drawn on the basis of atmosphere. Subjects who agglomerate will
do so and then search for a conclusion wit h t he topic term as its subject. In cases where
B has been chosen a new topic will be needed. Once a conclusion has been derived, it is
often tested. In cases where testing fails the response "no valid conclusion'" tends to be
given (because the original has been invalidated). Subjects who go on to lest another
possibility and find the correct solution remember these syllogisms no better, possibly
because the conclusion differs from the original and they are no longer aide to tell the
two types of information apart. This and other recall findings suggest that the inferred
material is incorporated into the syllogism and that it is often used at delay as a guide
to recall. Grammatical information in the original syllogism is often lost a^ the subject
is influenced by other considerations such as ease of processing or the inferred material
at the recall si age.
Reasoning with a syllogism is not simply a question of using rational processes there¬
fore. It is part of language processing and tends to be treated as such. Tim representa¬
tions that subjects use when they grasp the logic of the syllogism are at some level all
equivalent - they are all agglomerative. all can be used to lest candidate conclusions. Il
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seems unlikely that any one of those can lay claim to capturing the true nature of the
coding in which reasoning is carried out. What is more likely is that all these represen¬
tations are learned means for subjects to make explicit a process that remains hidden
from view.
7.5 Implications for Future Research
The findings of this research allow a number of predictions to be made which could be
the subject of future research.
7.5.1 The Figural Effect,
The major claim here is that the figural effect is not t ho result of "lirst-iu (i rst-out" mem¬
ory structures which are themselves dependent on a particular form of representation,
but rather the consequence of the strategies adopted for successful language processing,
based on awareness of simple grammatical roles. As a result one might expect this to
be a phenomenen that emerges with language development and it should be possible
to link the phenomenen with the appearance of certain types of linguistic competence
or performance. The difficulty here would be to create syllogistic paradigms within the
capabilities of children of the right age. but there have already been many successful
attempts to key into children's reasoning performance and demonstrate the parallel key
linguistic factors that are related to (or indeed underpin) the emergence of types of
logical performance.
A similar set of possibilities exists for linking the operation of the1 (igural effect with
the linguistic competence of adult subjects. One would not expect, for example to find
the effect varying very much with variations in literacy to the level of average or just
below average functioning as the effect seems to be the result of a type of language
comprehension strategy basic to everyday successful functioning. It should be noted
however that one of the reasons for selecting subjects for this experiment in the way
that was done was in order to collect data that was not distorted by relative inexperience
with these types of problems and in particular the concept of validity versus truth. It is
possible that using groups of subjects with differing levels of literacy will demonstrate
different types of reasoning performance, but if any effect is noted for the figural effect
this would have to be shown to be the result of a demonstrable difference in linguistic
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strategy at the level that has been described.
Those who are language impaired may well exhibit a different phenomena and again
this would be worthy of research, should it be possible to find a suitable reasoning
task in which the figura.1 effect could be demonstrated to operate. Establishing the
constancy of the figural effect under conditions where subjects are encouraged to use
representations other than mental models or demonstrating that explicitly teaching the
mental models technique does not exaggerate the effect is evidence that at least at the
top level, representation is not a factor in the causation of the effect.
7.5.2 Posit ive and Negative Information
The strong effect of positive and negative information both on memory and reasoning
results is worthy of further exploration. Again here is a linguistic strategy "invading"
or rather determining a cognitive task and the same predictions about its appearance
during the course of language development. its robust ness in adults who use and under¬
stand language without impairment and its likely disppearance or distortion in those
who do not have a normal language function are all relevant here.
There are also a number of specific assumptions made about the way in which the
information in the quantifiers i nteract s wit h t he no it ns i n the t w< > sentences a ml it would
be of value to examine more closely exactly how the mechanism operates, for example
the hypothesis that moving a quantifier from one sentence to another in memory also
causes one of the nouns to be moved in memory should be established exp< riinentally.lt
would also be useful to investigate whether subjects do make assumptions about which
noun is to be the repeated term and hence the topic of the syllogism. The set of
criteria established by Chafe as interacting to dotermitie "subjecthood could be used to
generate statistical predictions about the likelihood of errors oeeuring. both in reasoning
and recall and used to model error rates. One might also like to look in more detail
at the question of how inferred material becomes incorporated into the memory for the
syllogism and presumably the representation so that it cannot be distinguished from
the information originally given. Some thought would have to be given to ways of
creating an experimental design where the original material differed significantly from
the inferred material so that the emergence <>l the latter in a memory task could be
isolated.
7.5.3 Matchers Versus Non-matchers
Finally, it should be possible to further explore the question of (lie use of non-logical
strategies to answer syllogisms. Here finding a group of subjects that are relatively
inexperienced in questions of logic would be desirable in order to look at reasoning
results where the likelihood of matching is much greater and also to then examine recall
data in comparison with a more experienced group to see if the linkage between the
type of answer given to a syllogism and its correctness still persists and is linked with
similar qualitative memory phenomena.
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Correct responses are given in bold type, incorrect in light, type. The number
of subjects giving each response is noted in brackets.
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All Some None Some.,not
All
AQ A are C(18)
NVC(3)
Sonne A aie C(4)
Some A are C(21)
Some C are A(3)
All A aie C(l)
Some C not A(4)
NVC(8)
No A aie C(7)
No C aie A(3)
Some C aie (1)
Some A aie C(2)
NVC(9)
Some A not C(7)
Some A aie C(5)
Some C not A(3)
Some C aie A(l)
Some
NVC(14)
Some A aie C(5)
Some C aie A(4)
Sonne C not A(2)
NVC(IS)
Some A aie C(4)
Some C aie A(l)
Some C not A (1)
Some A not C(l)
Some C not A(6)
NVC(ll)
Some A not C(6)
No A aie C(2)
NVC(18)
Some A not C(4)
Some A aie C(2)
Some C not A(l)
None
No A are C(19)
No C are A(3)
NVC(l)
All A aie C(l)
All C aie A(l)
Some A not C(17)
NVC(7)
Some C not A(l)
NVC(23)
No A aie C(2)
Nvctiai
Some A not C(ll)




Sonne A not C(8)
Sonne C not A(l)
Some A aie C(l)
NVC(1£)
Some A not C(7)
Some C aie A(l)
All C aie A(l)
NVC(1?)
Some C not A(4)
Some A not C(l)
Some A aie
NVC(21)
Some A not C(3)
Some A aie C(l)
Figure A.l: Responses for the figure ab bc: Fxporinionl One
All Some None Some.,not
All
An C are A(17)
All A are C(6)
NVC(l)
Scrme A are C(l)
NVC(15)
Some C are A(5)
Some A are C(3)
All C are A(l)
Some C not A(l)
No C are A(t8)
No A are C(6)
NVC(9)
Some C not A(12)
Some C are A(2)
Some A not C(l)
Some A are C(l)
Some
Same C are A(2D
Same A are C(l)
Some C not A(2)
NVC(l)
NVC(22)
Some C are A(2)
Some C not A(l)
Same C not A(15)
NVC(6)
Same C are A(3)
No A are C(l)
NVC(18)
Some C not A(4)
Some A not C(2)
Some C are A(l)
None
Same A not C(3)
NVC(15)
No A are C(4)
No C are A(3)
Some A not C(5)
NVC(12)
Some C not A(5)
Some A are C(2)
No C are A(l)
NVC(23)
Some A are C(l)
No C are A(l)
NVC(Zl)
Some C not A(2)




Some C riot A(10)
Some C aie A(8)
Some A riot C(2)
Some A are C(l)
NVC(20)
Some C are A(3)
Some A not C(2)
NVC(13)
Some C not A(6)
Some C are A(3)
Some A not C(2)
Some A are C(l)
NVC(21)
Some C not A(3)
Some A not C(l)
Figure A.'2: Responses for the figure ha-ch: F.xperinient Oik
All Some None Some,.not
All
NVC(1£)
All A aie C(5)
All C axe A(3)
Some C aie A(l)
NVC(130
Some A aie C(6)
Some C aie A(4)
Some C not A(l)
Some A not C(l)
No C are A(12)
No A are C(9)
NVC(4)
Same A not C(ll)
NVC(IO)
Some A aie C(3)
Some C not A(l)
Some
NVC(15)
Some C aie A(5)
Some A not C(2)
Some A aie C(2)
SOme C not A(l)
NVC(19)
Some A aie C(3)
Some C aie A(l)
Some A not C(l)
Some C not A(l)
Same C not A(10)
NVC(9)
Some A not C(3)
No A aie C(3)
NVC(19)
Some C not A(5)
Some A not C(l)
None
No A are C(l£)
No C are A(7)
NVC(2)
Some A not C(8)
NVC(15)
No C aie A(l)
Some A aie C(l)
NVC(20)
No A aie C(2)
No C aie A(2)
Some C aie A(l)
NVC(20)
Some C not A(2)
Some A not C(2)
No C aie A(l)
Some
not
Some C not A(7)
NVC(ll)
Some C aie A(3)
SOrre A not C(3)
NVC(20)
Some C not A(4)
Some C aie A(l)
NVC(13)
Some C not A(9)
Some A not C(l)
Some C aie A(l)
Some A aie C(l)
NVC(23)
Some C aie A(l)
Some A not C(l)
Figure A.3: Responses for the figure ab-ch: F.xporinionl One
All Some None Some..not
All
Some A ire C(8)
Same C ire A(5)
All A are C(6)
All C are A(4)
NVC(2)
Some C are AX12)
Same A are C(12)
Some A not C(l)
Some C not A(8)
No A are C(7)
No C are A(6)
NVC(4)
Same C not A(9)
Some A are C(6)
NVC(4)
Some C are A(4)
Some A not C(2)
Some
Same A are C(lf>)
Same C are A(8)
Some C not A(l)
NVC(20)
Some A not C(2)
Some A are C(2)
Some C are A(l)
Same C not A(14)
NVC(8)
Same C not A(l)
Some A not C(l)
No C are A(l)
NVC(21)
Some C not A(3)
Some A not C(l)
None
Some A not C(9)
No A are C(8)
NVC(6)
No C are A(2)
Some A not C(12)
NVC(12)
No A are C(l)
NVC(22)
No A are C(l)
No C are A(l)
Some A not C(l)
NVC(IO)
Some A not C(12)
Some C not A(3)
Some
not
Same A not C(15)
NVC(4)
Some A are C(2)
Some C are A(2)
Some C not A(2)
NVC(21)
Some C not A(2)
Some A not C(2)
NVC(14)
Some C not A(7)
Some A not C(4)
NVC(24)
Some A not C(l)
Figure A.4: Responses for the figure ha hc: Kxperinient One
Appendix B
Experiment Two
Correct responses are given in bold type, incorrect in light type. The number
of subjects giving each response is noted in brackets. Not all responses are
given as for many cases these are widely dispersed, but in cases where the
error rate was greater than 4 out of 22 responses, the next one or two most
frequent answers are given.
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All Some None Some,.not
+A+B+C(22) +A+B+C(21) -A+B+C(l£) NVC(12)
All
NVC(3) -A+B+C(3)
NVC(9) NVC(18) -A+B+C(17) NVC(18)
Some
+A+B+C(13) NVC(3)









Figure B.l: Responses for tlio figure ah kc : Kxperinieni Two
All Some None Some,.not
+A+B+C(20) NVC(ll) -A+B+C(18) NVC(9)
All
+A+B+C(11) -A+B+C(ll)




+A+B-C(11) +A+B-C(13) -A+B-C(8) -A+B-C(13)
NVC(5)
•A-B+C(3) NVC(8) NVC(IO) NVC(8)




Figure B."2: Responses for the figure ba-cb: Experiment Two
All Some None Some..not





NVC(16) NVC(IS) -A+B+C(15) NVC(19)
Some
+A+B+C(6) NVC(3)
+A+B-C(13) +A+B-C(7) -A+B-C(10) NVC(16)
None
-A-B+C(6) not counted(ll) NVC(?) +A-B-C(3)




Figure B.3: Responses for the figure ab-cb: Kxperinienl Two
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All Some None Some..not
All






















For each syllogism an indication is given as to whether the syllogism pos¬
sesses a valid conclusion (VC or NVC), cancels (C or NC) or lias double-
hatching (DH or NDH).
Figure ab-bc All Some None Some..not
All VC VC VC NVC
DH DH DH NDH
C C C NC
Some NVC NVC VC NVC
NDH NDH DH NDH
C C C NC
None VC VC NVC NVC
DH DH DH NDH
C C C NC
Some NVC NVC NVC NVC
..not DH DH DH NDH
C C C NC
Figure C.l: Features of syllogisms wit h li gu re AH B<
Figure ba-cb All Some None Some..not
All VC NVC VC NVC
DH NDH DH DH
C C C C
Some VC NVC VC NVC
DH NDH DH DFI
C C C C
None VC VC NVC NVC
DH DH DH DH
C C C C
Some NVC NVC NVC NVC
..not NDH NDH NDH NDH
NC NC NC NC
Figure C.'2: Features of syllogisms with figure ha ch
Figure ab-cb All Some None Some., not
All NVC NVC VC VC
NDH NDH DH NDH
C C C NC
Some NVC NVC VC NVC
NDH NDH DH NDH
C C C NC
None VC VC NVC NVC
DH DH DH NDH
C C C NC
Some VC NVC NVC NVC
..not NDH NDFI NDH NDH
NC NC NC C
Figure C.3: Features of syllogisms with figure ah cb
Figure ba-bc All Some None Some..not
All VC VC VC VC
DH DH DH DH
C C C C
Some VC NVC VC NVC
DH NDH DH DH
C C C C
None VC VC NVC NVC
DH DH DH DH
C C C C
Some VC NVC NVC NVC
..not DH DH DH NDH
C C C C
Figure C.-l: Features of syllogisms with figure ha b<
Appendix D
Instructions to Subjects -
Experiment One
The following instructions were given in written form to subjects undertak¬
ing Experiment One.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SYLLOGISMS EXPERIMENT
To begin you must log-on to the practice session. To do this type *1 AM
CATH.SY99. The computer will chain the program, tell you to wait while
it reads in the material and then will instruct you to press the [SPACE]
bar when you are ready. This is the large bar at the very bottom of the
keyboard. Do this and you will be presented with the first sentence of the
syllogism - "All the Welsh are busdrivers". Once you have read this, press
the [SPACE] bar once more for the second sentence - "All the busdrivers
are moslems". Once you have finished reading this, press the [SPACE] bar
again.
Now you will be asked if you can draw a conclusion from the syllogism
you have just read. Think about the syllogism that you have encountered,
can you find a relationship between the Welsh and the moslems that must
always be true according to what you have read?
In this case you can; if all the Welsh are busdrivers and all th busdrivers
are moslems, then it must be the case tilt all the Welsh are moslems. But
notice that it is not necessarily the case that all the moslems are Welsh -
there may be moslems that are not busdrivers and are therefore not Welsh
without violating the terms of the syllogism.
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Having decided that there is a conclusion, press the [Y] key for Yes. You
will then be presented with a menu and asked to draw that conclusion. The
top item in the menu - "all" - is highlighted, if you press the [SPACE] bar
you will see it is written up at the top of the screen. Press the [DELETE] key
(at the bottom on the right hand side) and the "all" will disappear. Choose
"all" as this is the beginning of the conclusion. Now press the [X] key and
the highlighted item will move down one place. Press it again, until you
reach the item "Welsh" and select this item. If the item "moslems" is above
"Welsh" then use the [Z] key to move the highlighted item up, if below, use




written up at the top of the screen. This stands for the sentence "all the
Welsh are moslems". To tell the computer that you have finished press the
[RETURN] key (large button on the right). It will ask younif you are sure
of your response - if you answer 110 (by pressing [N]) it will give you the
chance to alter your response by using the [DELETE] key to remove your
responses and choosing new ones as before. If you answer [Y] it will write
your data and present you with the second menu.
This second menu is for you to reproduce as exactly as possible the syl¬
logism that you have just read. The menu works exactly as before, but this









This stands for "All the Welsh are busdrivers"All the busdrivers are
moslems". It is important that you get the words in each sentence in the
same order that they were in the original test, as has been shown above,
so try and remember this too, but you can recall the two sentences of the
syllogism in any order you like. If there are things you can't remember,
then make a guess. The computer will make you choose six items and of
course two of them will be from the first four items in the list, all; some;
none; some..not, in first and fourth position in your answer ami the other
four will be from the last three items in the list, making up the rest of your
answer.
Again, once you have finished, press [RETURN]. As before you will be
given a chance to correct your answer, if you think you have got as close as
you can, press [Y].
Now you are ready for the next, syllogism. The procedure is as before,
but let's look at the conclusions to the next three syllogisms in detail.
Read the next syllogism and stop when you are asked if you can draw
a conclusion or not. In the situation described it might equally be the
case that none of the vegetarians are Algerians, but equally t hey might
all be, without any of them being teachers. The same goes for all or no
Algerians being vegetarians and also for the cases where some are or where
some are not. In other words the syllogism places no real restriction on
the relationship between the vegetarians and the Algerians, so there is no
conclusion that can be drawn as there is 110 relationship that must always
be the case. Therefore you should press the [N] key. The computer will
write No Valid Conclusion and then will give you the menu for recalling the
syllogism.
WARNING - ONCE YOU HAVE PRESSED THE [Y] OR [N] KEY
FOR THE QUESTION "CAN YOU DRAW A VALID CONCLUSION"
THERE IS NO GOING BACK, SO TLIINK CAREFULLY BEFORE YOU
ANSWER.
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Complete the menu as before and then yon are ready for the next text.
Read syllogism number three. Does this one have a valid conclusion?
If none of the rugbyplayers are Ethiopians and some of the farmers are
rugbyplayers then the farmers that are rugby players cannot be Ethiopians.
You can therefore draw the conclusion that some of the farmers are not
Ethiopians. This is a valid conclusion because it is always true - there is no
situation in which all of the farmers could be Ethiopians and the relationships
described by the syllogism also be true.
Carry on until you have finished the third syllogism and are ready to
answer the fourth and final one. In this situation we are told that some of
the French are teetotallers and that all of the butchers are French. Can there
be a valid conclusion for this syllogism. One possible conclusion might be
that some of the butchers are teetotallers. However, it could be the case that
the butchers happen to be those French people that are not teetotallers, as
"some" implies that there may be French people who not teetotallers as well
as some that are. In that case could we say that some of the butchers are
not teetotallers? Again it might be the case that all of the butchers happen
to be those French people that are teetotallers. Similar arguments apply for
conclusions using "all" or "none" for this syllogism. So there is no conclusion
that must always be true, as there is always another possible situation that
means that the conclusion does not hold, although the situation described
by the syllogism is still captured. Therefore we must say that there is no
valid conclusion for this syllogism.
Continue as before until you have finished recalling the syllogism you have
just read. There are no more syllogisms to read but there is one more thing
you have to do and that is to try to remember all the syllogisms you have
read in the order you read them. The computer will ask you to remember
syllogism number one and will give you a menu to choose from, as before.
Use the menu just as you did before and then you will be given the menu
for the second syllogism and so on until you have recalled all four. Then the
computer will say that it is writing your data and after a short pause will
come back with the prompt.
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Now it is time for you to start the experiment proper. You log-on as
before wirh *1 AM CATH.SY? where ? is your subject number, which will
have been given to you. There are two sessions each has 32 syllogisms. Once
you have finished the first session you can get the second one by logging-
on as before. Don't worry if you find it hard to remember the syllogisms,
especially at the final recall stage - you can remember more than you think
you can.
GOOD LUCK AND THANK YOU!
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Appendix E
Instructions to Subjects -
Experiment Two
The following instructions were given orally to subjects undertaking Exper¬
iment Two.
"This is an experiment about solving problems. I am going to ask you to
try to solve some problems called syllogisms. Written here 011 this piece of
paper is an example syllogism. You could imagine the situation described by
these two sentences as being about people that have or don't have certain
characteristics. To solve the syllogism you have to decide if there must
exist a particular kind of person that either has or doesn't have certain
characteristics. For example you might find that there is a person that must
be German, a butcher and a football player. You might find for another
syllogism that there is a person who is not German, but is still a football
player and a butcher. For a lot of syllogisms it isn't possible to find a person
that must always exist. This is because when you think about the kinds of
person that could exist according to the syllogism, you can always imagine
another situation where that person doesn't exist, but where the situation
descrobed by the syllogism is still true.
Try the first syllogism and write down your answer below it.'"
(The subject tries the first syllogism and writes an answer).
If the subject is right: "Good, well done. You can now do the rest of the
syllogisms. I'm afraid I can't help you, so just carry on and do your best
until you've finished."
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If the subject is wrong: "Can you explain why you think that is the
answer? The right answer is actually X and that is because...(an explanation
is given, only orally, couched in the same terms as the explanation above).
Do you understand now? I can let you try one more syllogism if you like."
(If desired the procedure can be repeated exactly as before, one more time
only).
"Now carry on and try the rest of the syllogisms. I'm afraid I can't help
you, so just carry on and do your best until you've finished."
"Have you finished? Thank you very much, this has been a great help."
1X1
